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"It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set
of litigants and the opposite way between another."'
INTRODUCTION
The federal tax system operates in a paradoxical way. On the one
hand, it functions as a system of voluntary compliance,' but, on
the other hand, it is based on statutory rules, many of which are so
complex and intricate that they are comprehensible only to a tax ex-
pert.3 Because of this paradox and the important role of the system in
1. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 33 (1921), quoted in
Estate of Carter v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1971).
2. Although this is the popular belief, there are contrary views. See, e.g., Kenneth
L. Harris, On Requiring the Correction of Error Under the Federal Tax Law, 42 Tax
Law. 515, 515 (1989) (arguing that the system is actually one of coercion because of
the legal obligations to file and to pay, and because of the system of penalties that
serve as a backup to these obligations); Tom Herman, Tax Report: A Special Sum-
mary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax Developments, Wall St. J., June 29, 1994, at
Al (quoting statement of IRS Chief Margaret Milner Richardson who referred to a
sarcastic letter she received because she frequently refers to the tax system as "volun-
tary": "He told me I must be from Mars if I really believe the U.S. has a voluntary tax
system").
3. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9722 (1994) [hereinafter I.R.C.].
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the functioning of the federal government, it is crucial that the public
perceive the system to be fair.4 Thus, general principles are incorpo-
rated into the statutory scheme that are designed to promote fairness
while the system is preserved as an all-important source of revenue.
One example of such a principle is the statute of limitations.5 The
statute bars both the government and the taxpayer from asserting a
claim against the other after the expiration of a specified time period.6
The policy behind such a time bar is not only fairness but also admin-
istrative efficiency.
From the government's perspective, the statute of limitations af-
fords a final determination of revenue available for a particular period
without threat of a refund claim by the taxpayer. From the taxpayers'
perspective, the statute eliminates the duty to maintain records indefi-
4. See generally M.H. Hoeflich, Of Reason, Gamesmanship, and Taxes: A Juris-
prudential and Games Theoretical Approach to the Problem of Voluntary Compliance,
2 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 9, 11-12 (1983) (arguing that tax reform is necessary not just to
increase revenues, but "to deal with the widespread perception amongst the public
that... the wealthy are able to avoid their fair share of the tax burden").
5. See generally Charles W. Davis, Playing Safe with Statutes of Limitations, 16
N.Y.U. Ann. Inst. Fed. Tax'n 453 (1958) (discussing the application of the statute of
limitations in federal tax cases). The statute may run in favor of either the taxpayer or
the government. Although it is designed to be a neutral final settlement, in the public
interest, the statute is generally construed strictly in favor of the government. Id. at
453; accord Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984) ("[W]hen courts
construe a statute of limitations, [they] 'must receive a strict construction in favor of
the Government.' (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456,
462 (1924))); see also Bowers v. New York & Albany lighterage Co., 273 U.S. 346.
350 (1927) ("[T]he public interest should not be prejudiced by the default or negli-
gence of public officers.").
6. The general statutory period for assessment is three years from the later of the
due date of the return or the date the return is filed. I.R.C. § 6501(a)-(b) (1994). The
statutory period for filing a claim for refund or credit of an overpayment is the later of
three years from the date the return is filed or two years from the date of payment.
I.R.C. § 6511(a) (1994); see also Commissioner v. Lundy, 116 S. Ct. 647, 657 (1996)
(holding that two-year period applies if taxpayer receives a notice of deficiency and
has not yet filed a return); Richards v. Commissioner, 37 F.3d 587, 590-91 & n.7 (10th
Cir. 1994) (discussing jurisdictional distinctions between the Tax Court and the Fed-
eral District Court of initially filing a return within three years after payment), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 813 (1996); Nunziato v. United States, No. Civ. 95-30205, 1996 VL
437538, at *2 (D. Mass. May 7, 1996) (distinguishing the two-year and three-year stat-
utory periods).
Under some circumstances, however, the normal statutory period may be extended.
See eg., I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) (1994) (providing six-year period for omission of sub-
stantial item of income); I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1), (3) (1994) (providing that no statutory
period will run if there is fraud or if no return is filed); I.RtC. § 6501(c)(4) (1994)
(providing for extension of statute by agreement of the parties). Procedurally, the
statute may be extended 90 days plus an additional 60 days if a statutory notice of
deficiency is issued by the government. I.RC. §§ 6212-6213 (1994). Further, if the
taxpayer chooses to file a petition in the Tax Court, the statute is tolled until the
decision of the court becomes final. See I.R.C. § 6512 (1994); see also I.R.C.
§ 7481(a)(1) (1994) (providing that, if no appeal, decision becomes final when period
for appeal has run); I.R.C. § 7483 (1994) (providing that notice of appeal runs for 90
days after entry of decision); I.R.C. § 7459(c) (1994) (providing that date of entry of
decision is date decision is entered on records of the Tax Court).
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nitely and reduces the risk of incurring a tax liability long after the
receipt of the corresponding income. The closure provided by the lim-
itations bar prevents the litigation of stale claims, which carries with it
the inherent problems of limited availability of witnesses and docu-
ments, faded memories, and the possibility of perjury. 7 Thus, the stat-
ute lessens the likelihood of a wrong result on these grounds.
An example of a more revenue-oriented principle is the concept of
the taxable year, an artificial tax accounting concept in which income,
deductions, and credits are cabined into a consecutive twelve-month
period.' Each taxable year is a discrete taxable period and must be
considered separately and independently of any other taxable year.
Thus, items of income and deduction attributable to one taxable year
may not be used as a general adjustment in computing the tax liability
of another taxable year.9 This principle ensures that each taxpayer
pays a fair share of taxes for the proper annual accounting period and
7. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 301 (1946); see also
Geneva Constr. Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co., 122 N.E.2d 540, 549 (Il1. 1954)
(noting that the basic policy of statutes of limitations is "to afford a defendant a fair
opportunity to investigate the circumstances upon which liability against him is predi-
cated while the facts are accessible"); David N. McConnell, The Doctrine of Recoup-
ment in Federal Taxation, 28 Va. L. Rev. 577, 602 (1942) (discussing the function of
federal tax statutes of limitations).
8. See I.R.C. § 441 (1994). Such a period may be either a calendar year or a fiscal
year. Id. §§ 441(d)-(e). An item of income must be included in the taxable year in
which it is received, unless the taxpayer's accounting method indicates that the item is
includable in another taxable year. I.R.C. § 451(a) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1 to -2
(as amended in 1957); see also I.R.C. § 442 (1994) (discussing change of annual ac-
counting period); I.R.C. § 443 (1994) (setting out guidelines for accounting periods of
less than twelve months); I.R.C. § 446 (1994) (outlining tax accounting methods);
I.R.C. § 461 (1994) (describing proper taxable year for deductions).
It is not always a simple matter to determine the taxable year in which an item of
income should be included. For example, when income is received under a contin-
gency which may result in the taxpayer having to repay later all or a portion of this
amount, an issue that often arises is which taxable year or accounting period is the
proper reporting period. See, e.g., North Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417,424
(1932) (delineating the claim of right doctrine); Fifth Ave. Coach Line v. Commis-
sioner, 281 F.2d 556, 561-63 (2d Cir. 1960) (discussing tax consequences of legal con-
tingencies under the accrual method of tax accounting), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964
(1961). Because of the artificiality of the taxable year and the uncertainty of whether
and when income is includable, errors frequently occur. When they do, the concept of
the taxable year fosters a tunnel-visioned approach which prevents correction of any
errors unless either the statutory mitigation provisions or one of the equitable reme-
dies applies. See infra text accompanying notes 262-85 (discussing statutory mitigation
provisions); see also infra parts I-II (enumerating equitable remedies).
9. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365-66 (1931). Thus, if an error
is made in one taxable year and no correction occurs in a later year, the fisc either
loses revenue or unfairly benefits. On the other hand, if the error is corrected in the
open year, it renders the entire transaction inaccurate. Note that correction of the
error may not be exact because of the differences in tax rates, filing status, and the
concept of the time value of money. Steve R. Johnson, The Taxpayer's Duty of Consis-
tency, 46 Tax L. Rev. 537, 547-48 & n.59 (1991) [hereinafter Johnson, Duty of
Consistency].
[Vol. 65
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that the government receives the appropriate amount of revenue at-
tributable to that period.
Occasionally, a conflict in the interrelationship between two or
more statutes of limitations may give one party an unfair advantage
over the other. A common example is the conflict between the limita-
tions periods on related income tax and estate tax returns. In some
instances, after the expiration of the statute of limitations on an estate
tax return the statute may remain open on the decedent's final income
tax return.10 If an income tax deficiency is assessed during this open
period, the liability reduces the taxable estate, resulting in a corre-
sponding estate tax overpayment. Because the estate tax refund
would be barred by the statute of limitations, the estate would be
double taxed.
The excessive taxation of some taxpayers presents a public policy
problem because the federal tax system in general could be under-
mined if the public perceives it as unfair. On the other hand, if tax-
payers derive double benefits because the government is precluded
from assessing a tax liability due to the statutory bar, those taxpayers
who pay their fair share of tax liability are victimized."
In cases in which equity demands relief, the remedy of recoupment
might apply to lift the statutory bar.12 If recoupment applied in the
10. Such a situation could arise due to the fact that the statute of limitations on the
income tax return may have a different starting point than the statute of limitations on
the estate tax return. Compare I.R.C. § 6072(a) (1994) (setting out due dates for filing
income tax returns) and Treas. Reg. § 1.6072-1(b) (1980) (providing that decedent's
income tax return is due the fifteenth day of the fourth month following the close of
the 12-month period which began with the first day of the fractional part of the year)
with I.R.C. § 6075(a) (1994) (providing that estate tax return is due nine months after
the date of decedent's death). The general statute of limitations for both returns is
three years from the later of the due date or the date the return was actually filed. See
supra note 6. There also may be instances in which the statute of limitations on either
the income tax return or the estate tax return is extended; for example, where there is
fraud on the income tax return, but not on the estate tax return. See infra text accom-
panying notes 239-50.
11. Interestingly, one policy rationale that does not apply is increased revenue
loss. While in strict economic terms the government loses revenue if a taxpayer is
allowed a double benefit (although, conversely, there is a revenue gain if a taxpayer is
double taxed), in absolute terms there is no more revenue lost overall through the
inconsistent tax treatment than through a single mistake resulting in a tax benefit in
one taxable year.
Although the taxpayer technically receives a double benefit in the former case, as
opposed to a single benefit in the latter case, in the former case one of the "benefits"
the taxpayer receives is a correction of the earlier mistake. But the correction results
in the taxpayer receiving the "net benefit" to which she was entitled. Thus, there is,
technically, no revenue loss in the later year. The result in both cases is a revenue loss
attributable to only one taxable year. See McConnell, supra note 7, at 601-02 (explain-
ing this theory).
12. Recoupment is not necessarily confined to federal tax cases or, for that matter,
to cases involving the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Coar v. Kazimir, 990 F.2d 1413,
1420-21 (3d Cir.) (holding that pension fund was entitled to recoupment in offsetting
benefits against liabilities of a fiduciary who breached his duty to the fund), cert. de-
19961
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above example, the estate would be allowed to credit the barred es-
tate tax overpayment against the open income tax deficiency in order
to reduce or eliminate the deficiency despite the statutory bar.' 3 But
if the barred refund claim is greater than the alleged deficiency, the
taxpayer cannot obtain a refund of the excess amount because recoup-
ment is in the nature of a defense; therefore, it does not sanction af-
firmative recovery. 4
Similarly, the remedy could apply in favor of the government to
credit a barred deficiency against an open refund claim.' 5 Because the
government is, likewise, not entitled to affirmative recovery, it cannot
assess a deficiency against the taxpayer if the barred deficiency is
greater than the open refund claim. 6
Although it is relatively simple to articulate how recoupment ap-
plies, determining when the remedy should apply is an altogether dif-
ferent matter. One problem is that equitable remedies must be used
sparingly when there is any potential conflict with a statute.' 7 The
integrity of the limitations period, as well as the integrity of the taxa-
nied, 510 U.S. 862 (1993); Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 874-76 (3d Cir. 1984) (dis-
tinguishing setoff from recoupment in the bankruptcy context).
It has been suggested, however, that the rigidity and finality of the statute of limita-
tions warrant special consideration in federal tax controversies because of the diffi-
culty of categorizing items of income at the time of receipt, and similarly, of
categorizing items of deduction. A further consideration is the inequity of allowing a
party, whether the taxpayer or the government, to take advantage of the statute of
limitations to claim a double benefit. See McConnell, supra note 7, at 601.
13. See Arthur W. Andrews, Modern-Day Equitable Recoupment and the "71vo
Tax Effect:" Avoidance of the Statutes of Limitation in Federal Tax Controversies, 28
Ariz. L. Rev. 595, 632-34 (1986) (discussing the "two tax effect" of offsetting a barred
estate tax overpayment against an open income tax deficiency-the Herring-Bowcut
model). The remedy also has been characterized as "two wrongs make a right."
Steven J. Willis, Some Limits of Equitable Recoupment, Tax Mitigation, and Res Judi-
cata: Reflections Prompted by Chertkof v. United States, 38 Tax Law. 625, 633 (1985)
[hereinafter Willis, Limits].
14. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1935) ("[R]ecoupment is in the
nature of a defense arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which the
plaintiff's action is grounded."); see also infra text accompanying notes 375-86 (dis-
cussing the nature of recoupment as a defense in the Dalm case). If affirmative recov-
ery were permitted, it would violate the closure policy behind the statute of
limitations and obfuscate any final settlement. Moreover, recoupment as an equitable
remedy cannot override the direct application of a statutory remedy. See infra text
accompanying note 258.
15. See infra note 352.
16. See O'Brien v. United States, 766 F.2d 1038, 1049 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that
doctrine of equitable recoupment applies only as a credit of a barred liability against
an open refund claim, and may not result in the collection of the barred tax itself).
17. Some courts, however, do not regard equitable remedies as appropriate in fed-
eral tax cases under any circumstances. See, e.g., Webb v. United States, 850 F. Supp.
489, 493 (E.D. Va. 1994) ("[T]ax statutes of limitations ... operate in both directions
in that the government is given a limited period of time in which to make assessments,
and taxpayers are given a limited period of time to seek refunds."), aff'd, 66 F.3d 691
(4th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1996) (No. 95-
1360); Blatt v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 882, 888 (W.D.N.C. 1993) ("Tax cases do
not lend themselves to an equitable solution. The Tax Code and regulations are tech-
[Vol. 65
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ble year, arise from statutory laws rooted in compelling public policy
which must be given preference over any equitable remedy.
Recoupment has no statutory underpinnings.' 8 It is a special, judi-
cially created remedy grounded solely in equity and resting on the
potential conflict between the voluntary compliance aspect of the fed-
eral tax system and the importance of its revenue-raising function.
Recoupment applies only when certain poorly defined but stringent
elements are met. These elements were established by the Supreme
Court in four cases decided between 1935 and 1946.19
Under the first element, either the taxpayer or the government
must attempt to assert an inconsistent position while claiming the pro-
tection of the statute of limitations. This position, if successfully as-
serted, would result in a double benefit for the taxpayer or,
conversely, a double tax for the government."0 The second element is
that the inconsistent claims must arise from the same transaction2'
and must involve the same taxpayer, or two or more taxpayers who
share an identity of interest.2
Unfortunately, in establishing these elements, the Supreme Court
did not clearly articulate its reasoning, and since 1946, the Court has
not substantively addressed the issue of recoupment. 3 This has led to
an inconsistent application of the remedy in the lower courts, thereby
obscuring the main thrust of the Supreme Court decisions.' The in-
consistencies, in turn, lead to forum shopping and relegate recoup-
ment to the ranks of an ineffective remedy, even in the narrow
nical and must be interpreted accordingly, like a game which must be played strictly in
accordance with the rules."), aff d, 34 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 1994).
18. In this respect, equitable recoupment is very different from the remedy of set-
off. See infra part ll.A (discussing Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281, modified, 284 U.S.
599 (1932)).
19. See infra part Il.B.
20. See finskoff v. United States, 490 F.2d 1283, 1285 (2d Cir. 1974); Stephen J.
Legatzke, Note, The Equitable Recoupment Doctrine in United States v. Dalm.'
Where's the Equity?, 10 Va. Tax Rev. 861, 863 (1991).
21. Another way of stating this is: equitable recoupment is based on the concept
that "one taxable event should not be taxed twice, once on a correct theory and once
on an incorrect theory, and that to avoid this happening the statute of limitations will
be deemed waived." Minskoff, 490 F.2d, at 1285 (citation omitted) (quoting Minskoff
v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)). A rationale for this re-
quirement is that otherwise "[e]very assessment of deficiency and each claim for re-
fund would invite a search of the taxpayer's entire tax history for items to recoup."
Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 302 (1946).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 145-46 and part IV.B.3 (discussing identity
of interest).
23. The Court has, however, addressed the issue from a procedural perspective in
the case of United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990). For a discussion of Dalm, see
infra text accompanying notes 366-74.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 295-301 (discussing the Court's failure to
distinguish between the terms "transaction" and "taxable event," resulting in varying
interpretations).
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circumstances in which it ought to apply.' In fact, although equitable
recoupment has been raised in a number of cases since 1946, the rem-
edy has seldom been applied to provide relief either to the taxpayer or
to the government. 26 As a result, very few treatises on equity even
mention recoupment as a remedy.
Nearly ten years ago Professor Arthur Andrews, in an illuminating
article, attempted to quantify recoupment and its use in federal tax
controversies.27 So effective was Professor Andrews's article that few
substantive articles on recoupment have been written since.28 But the
courts have continued to struggle with recoupment issues, although
relatively few seemed to have grasped the theory behind this ex-
traordinary remedy.29 The reason is that the remedy itself is highly
problematic, primarily because its elements are so poorly defined.
As a fairness doctrine, however, recoupment deserves more careful
consideration than it has received because it is the only flexible,
broadly based remedy available to address abuses of the statute of
limitations.3° Yet recoupment has become highly ineffective because
frequently courts do not apply the remedy when the facts otherwise
indicate that they should. This Article suggests that the reason is that
courts have lost sight of the equitable nature of the remedy. Instead,
recoupment is treated as a quasi-legal remedy in which fact patterns
are forced into rigid, and often inconsistent, judicial views of the rem-
edy's established elements.
This Article examines the development of recoupment by first com-
paring and contrasting other equitable remedies. Because discussions
25. See infra part VII (discussing examples of confusion and misapplication re-
garding recoupment).
26. See, e.g., Estate of Mann v. United States, 731 F.2d 267, 279 (5th Cir. 1984)
(denying recoupment to government on ground of failure of single transaction ele-
ment); Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363, 1371 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (denying recoup-
ment to government on ground of insufficient identity of interest); Minskoff v. United
States, 349 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (denying recoupment to taxpayer on
ground of failure of single transaction element), afftd, 490 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1974).
27. See Andrews, supra note 13.
28. These few articles have dealt primarily with jurisdiction. See, e.g., James E.
Tierney, Equitable Recoupment Revisited: The Scope of the Doctrine in Federal Tax
Cases After United States v. Dalm, 80 Ky. L.i. 95, 102-03 (1991) (discussing the effect
of the Dalm decision); Legatzke, supra note 20, at 892-96, 897, 900 (same).
29. See infra part VII.
30. The statutory mitigation provisions allow closed years to be opened under cer-
tain specific, narrowly construed circumstances. See I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1994) (set-
ting out requirements and method of adjustment); see also infra text accompanying
notes 262-85 (discussing statutory mitigation provisions). In addition, the mitigation
provisions presumably apply only to income taxes. See I.R.C. § 1314(e) (1994) (pro-
viding that mitigation does not apply to employment taxes). But see Chertkof v.
United States, 676 F.2d 984, 986-92 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying mitigation in a case of
income tax refund arising as a result of valuation of securities for estate tax purposes).
For a discussion of the Chertkof case and its ramifications, see Willis, Limits, supra
note 13, at 652-59.
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of related equitable remedies have filled tomes in themselves,31 this
Article concentrates only on the more salient aspects of these reme-
dies as they pertain to the development of recoupment in the federal
tax context. Next, the established elements of recoupment will be dis-
cussed in depth, with particular emphasis on the views of Professor
Andrews. The Article questions whether Professor Andrews's views
represent the most effective analysis of the recoupment criteria in
light of the judicial inconsistencies.
In discussing the ineffectiveness of recoupment as a modem rem-
edy, this Article also addresses jurisdictional problems inherent in the
remedy and contrasts statutory mitigation with recoupment. Finally,
in an effort to achieve a fairer, more viable remedy, the Article pro-
poses an expansion of the established elements and a shift in focus to
the individual equities of each case.
I. RELATED EQUITABLE REMEDIES AND THEIR USE IN FEDERAL
TAX LrrIGATION
Courts have applied several equitable remedies in federal tax con-
troversies when the bounds of fairness might otherwise have been ex-
ceeded and a potentially unconscionable injury might have resulted.
These remedies are all flexible and are applied on an ad hoc basis,
which presents several problems in application. First, there is no ab-
solute right to an equitable remedy. The right exists only when the
court decides that the facts warrant it. Thus, the application tends to
be inconsistent.32 Second, judicial decisions frequently fail to indicate
that an equitable remedy has been applied even though the result may
indicate otherwise.33 When this happens, there is no clear precedent,
and therefore no substantive body of law upon which to draw in sub-
sequent cases. Third, courts frequently take very restrictive views of
equitable remedies and often refuse to apply them even in cases of
unfairness so fundamental that an equitable remedy otherwise seems
tailor-made.3' The result is an inadequate remedy, in turn leading to
31. See, e.g., William Q. de Funiak, Handbook of Modem Equity (1950); Henry L
McClintock, Handbook of the Principles of Equity (2d ed. 1948); Thomas W. Water-
man, A Treatise on the Law of Set-off, Recoupment, and Counter Claim (2d ed.
1872).
32. See Lawrence J. Brannian, Note, Finality of Informal Tax Settlements-Estop-
pel as a Bar to Refund, 21 Sw. L. 350, 358 (1967) (criticizing the lack of consistency
among circuits in regard to whether an informal settlement agreement is binding).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674-
75 (1973) (applying estoppel, ostensibly to allow PICCO to present proof that it was
misled by a government agent into committing a criminal act); United States v.
Hodgekins, 28 F.3d 610, 614-15 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying estoppel, ostensibly to pre-
vent the government from changing a term in a closing agreement to the taxpayer's
detriment).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 598 (1990) (refusing to apply
equitable recoupment where taxpayer was double taxed on money derived from an
estate); Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 701-02 (4th Cir. 1995) (refusing to apply
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confusion and inconsistency in the law. Fourth, some equitable reme-
dies are closely related and their elements may overlap. Thus, the
wrong remedy may easily be applied. This creates a problem in some
cases because the choice of remedy could determine the ultimate
result.
35
A. Estoppel and Quasi-Estoppel
Estoppel, or some form of it, has long been applied to prevent one
party from obtaining an unfair advantage as a result of that party's
earlier misleading conduct.36 Estoppel has been said to "cut[ ] across
substantive principles in order to promote an assumed fairness
thought to be more important than an adherence to conventional legal
considerations. 37
Despite this broad language, estoppel has proven to be a generally
inadequate remedy in federal tax controversies because historically it
has been applied unevenly in favor of the government.38 One reason
equitable tolling where government refused to refund gift taxes paid on behalf of
defrauded taxpayer because statute of limitations had run), petition for cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1996) (No. 95-1360). For a full discussion of Dalm, see
infra text accompanying notes 366-74.
35. See Webb, 66 F.3d at 701 (refusing to apply principle of equitable tolling, rely-
ing on the reasoning of Dalm, an equitable recoupment case with different elements);
Richard de Y. Manning, The Application of the Doctrine of Estoppel Against the Gov-
ernment in Federal Tax Cases, 30 N.C. L. Rev. 356, 376-77 (1952) ("Unfortunately,....
the cases do not always make a distinction between the doctrine of election and that
of estoppel. Such a distinction is important, for some courts attach different legal
consequences to the two situations." (footnotes omitted)).
36. See generally Joseph M. Jones, Estoppel in Tax Litigation, 26 Geo. L.J. 868
(1938) (discussing the role of estoppel in litigation of federal tax cases); Manning,
supra note 35 (same).
37. Sugar Creek Coal & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 344, 346 (1934).
Estoppel is an affirmative defense that must be raised in the pleadings, but relatively
recently courts have allowed the defense to be raised for the first time in a motion for
summary judgment. Carland, Inc. v. United States, No. 84-0195-CV, 1988 WL 68047,
at *5 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 29, 1988); see also Barnwell & Hays, Inc. v. Sloan, 564 F.2d 254,
255 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (holding that failure to use specific terminology does
not necessarily mean that defendant's answer is insufficient to raise affirmative de-
fense of waiver).
38. See generally John M. Maguire & Philip Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar
Practices in Federal Taxation, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1935) (surveying various means,
including estoppel, courts use to keep pace with the rapidly changing federal tax sys-
tem). Maguire and Zimet explain this uneven application as attributable to public
policy:
The picture suggested is in part that of a revenue official not entirely free
from political insecurity, not very high up the departmental ladder, not very
well paid, not too sure he wishes to stay permanently in government service.
Persuasively opposed to the official is a lawyer or accountant-sometimes a
group of such men, visible or invisible-highly trained, acutely interested in
the particular case, keen from knowledge that fees depend on success. En-
tirely without any suggestion of impropriety or crookedness, the observer
will suspect that private interest is likely to be better served than public
interest.
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for this uneven application was that primary emphasis was placed on a
misrepresentation of fact intended to induce reliance and subsequent
action.39
Id. at 1301 (footnote omitted); see also Elrod Slug Casting Mach. Co. v. O'Malley, 57
F. Supp. 915, 920 (D. Neb. 1944) ("The assessment and collection of revenues is a
governmental function, and the doctrine of estoppel [against the government] has no
place here."); Grand Cent. Pub. Mkt., Inc. v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 119, 127 (S.D.
Cal.) ("[Courts have quite generally afforded relief to the government, by invoking
the doctrine of estoppel in those cases where the taxpayer has, by his past conduct,
induced the government to forego some right or remedy which it would have asserted
had it not been for the action or representation, express or implied, of the taxpayer."),
appeal dismissed, 98 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1938); Manning, supra note 35, at 357 (dis-
cussing whether estoppel is an appropriate remedy against the government and, if so,
when it should be applied); cf. Sugar Creek Coal, 31 B.T.A. at 347-48 (holding that the
government could not assert estoppel against the taxpayer where there was no fraud
involved and where the Commissioner was, to some extent, also wrong).
In Mt. Vernon Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 938 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296
U.S. 587 (1935), a taxpayer erroneously included an item of income in the taxable
year 1928 instead of in the correct year, 1929. A closing agreement executed for the
1928 taxable year barred a refund attributable to that year. The Commissioner as-
sessed a tax liability attributable to the 1929 taxable year. The taxpayer argued that
the Commissioner was estopped from collecting on this assessment because the tax
liability had already been collected in 1928, in accordance with the terms of the dos-
ing agreement. The court held that estoppel does not apply when the government
accepts an erroneous return. Id. at 940.
A contrary argument has been advanced in favor of the taxpayer but to little appar-
ent avail:
Of course, too, there is another and very different picture in which the tax-
payer, often a little fellow, yet sometimes of size and importance, is bewil-
deringly bludgeoned by governmental numbers, borne down by
departmental deadweight, blocked by stupid official obstinacy.
Maguire & Zimet, supra, at 1302.
39. See P.V. Baker & P. St. J. Langan, Snell's Equity 568 (29th ed. 1990) (discuss-
ing development of the doctrine of estoppel at common law). The misrepresentation
must be one of fact, rather than law. Such a misrepresentation may arise not only
from affirmative assertions, but also from inaction creating a mistaken impression. Id.
at 569; see also Commissioner v. Union Pac. R.R, 86 F.2d 637, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1936)
("An estoppel cannot originate in a mere statement of law or in silence due to an
error of law."). There is a presumption that everyone knows and generally under-
stands the law. Consequently, if one is misled by a misrepresentation of law, it is
because of one's own negligence; such a misrepresentation is considered merely the
opinion of an administrative official, and estoppel is not considered an appropriate
remedy. See Note, The Emerging Concept of Tax Estoppel, 40 Va. L Rev. 313, 315
(1954) [hereinafter Va. Note] (stating that taxpayer must know that tax liability is
"determined by the law and not by what some administrative official thought was the
law" (quoting Langstaff v. Lucas, 9 F.2d 691, 693 (W.D. Ky. 1925), affd, 13 F.2d 1022
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 721 (1926))). Because of the complexity of the tax
laws, however, this presumption should not apply to federal tax statutes. Note,
Estoppel of Taxpayer to Set Up Statute of Limitations Where Government is Led to
Defer Tax Assessment by Taxpayer's Misrepresentation of Law, 45 Yale LJ. 178, 180
(1935) [hereinafter Yale Note] ("[T]he present uncertainty in the tax law makes so
theoretical an assumption utterly inappropriate for the practical problem of collecting
revenue."); cf Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311, 317 (9th Cir. 1962) ("[A] per-
son might sustain such a profound and unconscionable injury in reliance on the Com-
missioner's action as to require, in accordance with any sense of justice and fair play,
that the Commissioner not be allowed to inflict the injury."). But see Leck Co. v.
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Estoppel does not apply to a mistake of law.4" It was relatively easy
for this essential element to work to the disadvantage of the taxpayer,
because omitting an item of income could be considered a misrepre-
sentation of fact,4' but it very seldom worked to the disadvantage of
the government.42 Another, and more important, reason for the gen-
eral difficulty in asserting estoppel against the government was that
most courts were reluctant to estop the government on the basis of
misstatements of its agents, unless fraud or malfeasance was proved.43
United States, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9694, at 82,250 (D. Minn. 1973) ("[W]aiver
and estoppel are applied with 'great caution' against the Government, particularly in
the tax field.").
Most courts continue to adhere to a double standard, however, when the govern-
ment is involved. See, e.g., Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S.
414, 419 (1990) ("From our earliest cases, we have recognized that equitable estoppel
will not lie against the Government as against private litigants."); Bosley v. United
States, No. C-89-081, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19810, at *3-4 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 1990)
(stating that if the government is the defendant, the taxpayer must meet an additional
burden and prove that the government's affirmative misrepresentation or conceal-
ment of a material fact caused a serious injustice to the taxpayer, and that the public
interest will not be damaged by the use of estoppel).
40. See Estate of Vitt v. United States, 706 F.2d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding
that government was not equitably estopped from asserting inconsistent position as a
matter of law). But see Yale Note, supra note 39, at 180 (noting that such an assump-
tion is inappropriate in tax law because of the law's uncertainty).
41. See Crane v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 640, 641 (1st Cir. 1934) ("[F]ailure, how-
ever innocent, to report this income, constituted in effect a statement that no such
income was received ... ."). But see Union Pac. R.R., 86 F.2d at 640 ("An unqualified
application of the rule that failure to report income creates estoppel would mean that
an equitable remedy can serve to nullify the substantive provisions of the statute of
limitations as well as the statutory policy that income is to be allocated to its appropri-
ate year, despite the loss of revenue." (citations omitted)).
42. See, e.g., Taylor v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 465, 467 (7th Cir.) (stating that,
although the proper year of inclusion is a question of law, not fact, it may of necessity
involve questions of fact), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 727 (1937); Shamrock Oil Co. v. Com-
missioner, 77 F.2d 553, 555-56 (5th Cir.) (holding that taxpayer was estopped from
denying transferee liability for tax and validity of executed waivers where taxpayer
had at all times held itself out as a consolidation of the predecessor corporation and
had obtained tax advantages as such), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 632 (1935).
When the court held in favor of the taxpayer, it often did so on the basis of very
unusual facts. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Yates, 86 F.2d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 1936) (hold-
ing that estoppel does not apply against the taxpayer to invalidate an executed closing
agreement when there is no evidence of fraud or malfeasance); Union Pac. R.R., 86
F.2d at 639-40 (holding that elements of estoppel are not present when misrepresenta-
tion rested on innocent mistake of law and the government, asserting estoppel, was
not ignorant of the true facts); Leck Co., 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 82,252 ("The
limited situations in which estoppel has been applied against the Commissioner usu-
ally have involved matters of a purely administrative nature.").
43. See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917)
(holding that estoppel did not apply against the government when taxpayer con-
demned federal land for purposes of harnessing hydroelectricity even though tax-
payer claimed to have acted on the assurances of government agents); Bookwalter v.
Mayer, 345 F.2d 476, 478 (8th Cir. 1965) (noting that there is no "tax" estoppel in
absence of false or fraudulent representations by government agents).
There have been several reasons proffered for this stance. First, taxes are the life-
blood of the government and must be collected despite the potential for an occasional
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Later, however, the elements were liberalized to provide a more
even application. The remedy then became known as "quasi-estop-
pel," and while its elements are theoretically the same as those of pure
estoppel,' in practice the principal focus has shifted from intent"5 to
injustice. Second, the agent generally has no power to bind the government infor-
mally. Third, judicial perception often casts the government agent as a low-paid,
overworked, politically insecure underdog laboring in the public interest, as con-
trasted to a well-paid, highly educated lawyer or accountant motivated by self-inter-
est. See Maguire & Zimet, supra note 38, at 1301-04. With respect to the latter
rationale, however, a contrary perception could be conjured of the lone, individual
taxpayer outgunned by the manpower and resources of the government and confused
by the complexity of the tax laws. See id. at 1302.
More recently, other reasons have been suggested to explain the double standard in
estoppel cases: (1) some courts adhere to the fading doctrine of sovereign immunity
and will grant relief to the taxpayer only in the most compelling situations; (2) the
taxpayer usually does not suffer a detrimental change of position by relying on the
statement of the government agent (instead, the taxpayer is merely forced to pay her
just share of the tax burden so she is, therefore, no worse off); and (3) most of the
more deserving cases are settled administratively and thus never get to court. See
generally Walter B. Melton & Yale F. Goldberg, Equitable Estoppel in Tax Adminis-
tration, 62 Taxes 77 (1984) (proposing that more estoppel cases should be settled ad-
ministratively by the IRS).
44. Most courts require (1) a misrepresentation by an agent of the government
acting within the apparent scope of his authority, (2) lack of contrary knowledge by
the taxpayer where he might reasonably be expected to rely on the agent's assertions,
(3) actual reliance, (4) detriment, and (5) a resulting unconscionable injury in the
absence of equitable relief. See Theodore S. Lynn & Mervyn S. Gerson, Quasi.Estop-
pel and Abuse of Discretion as Applied Against the United States in Federal Tax Con-
troversies, 19 Tax L. Rev. 487, 488-89 (1964) (discussing elements of estoppel); see also
Melton & Goldberg, supra note 43, at 78-82 (discussing elements determining when
the remedy should apply).
The general equitable defenses such as laches and unclean hands also apply to
quasi-estoppeL See Note, Displacement of the Doctrine of Laches by Statutes of Limi-
tations-Crystallization of the Equitable Rule, 79 U. Pa. L Rev. 341, 344-47 (1930)
[hereinafter Pa. Note] (discussing the erosion of the doctrine of laches and of equita-
ble remedies in general).
45. See, eg., McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. United States, 623 F.2d 700, 706 (Ct. CI. 1980)
(holding that equitable estoppel applies whenever the government cannot be placed
in the same position it was in when the agreement was executed); Bookiwalter, 345
F.2d at 478 (stating that there can be no tax estoppel without false or fraudulent rep-
resentations by government agents); cf. Joyce v. Gentsch, 141 F.2d 891, 897 (6th Cir.
1944) (holding that taxpayer was not estopped from filing refund claim where tax-
payer and government had reached an accord and satisfaction on a deficiency, be-
cause government had facts at its disposal in time to assess, although it failed to do
so); Lawrence Zelenak, Should Courts Require the Internal Revenue Service To Be
Consistent?, 40 Tax L. Rev. 411, 432 (1985) (discussing reasonable reliance).
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detriment.46 Thus, the facts and circumstances upon which the claim
is based must be so egregious as to override any remedy at law.47
46. See Maguire & Zimet, supra note 38, at 1321-28. Note that the party against
whom estoppel is urged need not have received any benefit. Id. at 1307. Instead, the
focus is on the claimant and the detriment that party has suffered or will suffer if
estoppel is not applied. See United States v. Asmar, 827 F.2d 907, 915 (3d Cir. 1987)
(reversing lower court on ground that there was no finding of detriment); Gentsch,
141 F.2d at 897 ("Estoppel is not properly invoked, moreover, for the reason that
appellee has failed to show that he has been damaged.").
47. See, e.g., Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311, 317-18 (9th Cir. 1962) (ap-
plying estoppel against government to prevent assertion of transferee liability against
taxpayer and concluding that if Commissioner prevailed, taxpayer would suffer
"profound and unconscionable injury" as a result of reliance on Commissioner's rep-
resentations); Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82, 88 (estopping tax-
payer from excluding income derived from earlier wrongful deductions because
taxpayer had misled the government), aff'd, 447 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1971). But see
Melton & Goldberg, supra note 43, at 82 (suggesting that estoppel should be more
liberally applied in taxpayers' favor and that most estoppel cases should be settled
administratively without resort to the courts).
Consider the statement of the district court in Grand Central Public Market, Inc. v.
United States, 22 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 98 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir.
1938):
Equitable estoppels are invariably invoked in order to further equity andjustice in a given case-by preventing a party from asserting his rights under
a technical rule of law, when he has so conducted himself that it would be
contrary to equity and good conscience for him to allege and prove the truth.
IL at 127.
There are three general circumstances in which estoppel has been applied in the tax
context: (1) when one party attempts to change its position to the detriment of the
other party, which can involve oral assertions by an IRS agent (although in this situa-
tion it is very difficult for the taxpayer to prevail), a retroactive revocation of a
favorable ruling, or a change of position by the taxpayer when the IRS is barred from
following suit; (2) when the taxpayer attempts to renege on an agreement with the
IRS (note that the agreement may or may not rise to the level of a binding closing
agreement); and (3) when a party who has a duty to act fails to do so. See id.
There are also general circumstances in which estoppel will not apply. First, the
mere acceptance of a return by the government will not give rise to an estoppel. Mt.
Vernon Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 938, 940 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S.
587 (1935); Va. Note, supra note 39, at 315 ("To constitute estoppel there must be a
representation of a fact or a wrongful misleading silence with respect to a fact.... A
person knowing the facts or in a position to know them can not claim the benefit of
estoppel." (quoting Gaylord v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 408, 416 (9th Cir. 1946))).
Second, the government may retroactively amend regulations and rulings in order "to
correct misinterpretations, inaccuracies, or omissions ... and thereby to affect cases in
which the taxpayer's liability had not been finally determined." Helvering v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 116 (1939); see also I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1994)(granting to Secretary of the Treasury the discretionary power to retroactively apply
any ruling or regulation relating to the internal revenue laws). Where the regulation
is not in harmony with the statute, the regulation is void ab initio. Thus, a subsequent
regulation may apply retroactively because, technically, the previous regulation never
took effect. See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 135
(1936) ("[T]he amended regulation in effect became the primary and controlling rule
.... "); see also Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 185-86 (1957) (hold-
ing that Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in retroactively revoking ruling
based on mistake of law); cf. Lesavoy Found. v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 589, 594 (3d
Cir. 1956) (holding that Commissioner abused his discretion when he retroactively
revoked individual ruling that had not been based on mistake).
[Vol. 65704
1996] EQUITABLE RECOUPMENT 705
In general, quasi-estoppel has been a more successful remedy for
the taxpayer, although it is still generally agreed that the government
may not be estopped on the same terms as a private litigant.48 For
instance, a party seeking estoppel against the government must also
establish affirmative misconduct beyond mere negligence.49 The mere
acceptance of a return by the government does not create an estoppel
against the government," nor, on the other hand, does the running of
the statute of limitations create an estoppel in its favor.5" Further,
there must be a balancing of the often conflicting interests of fair
treatment of taxpayers and protection of the federal fisc.1
There is currently a split among the circuits as to whether the government is es-
topped from denying an express promise in an unofficial government publication as to
the prospective application of any subsequent adverse modification of a specific regu-
lation. Compare Gehl Co. v. Commissioner, 795 F.2d 1324, 1334 (7th Cir. 1986) (hold-
ing that government is estopped from applying regulation retroactively) and LeCroy
Research Sys. Corp. v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (same) with
CWT Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 755 F.2d 790, 804 (11th Cir. 1985) (upholding
retroactivity), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986).
48. See, e.g., Howard Bank v. United States, 759 F. Supp. 1073, 1078 (D. Vt.)
("[Ejolding the government accountable for the mistakes of its officials has an impact
on taxpayers generally, and courts are reluctant to provide an incentive for an individ-
ual taxpayer to gain advantage from such mistakes."), affd, 948 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir.
1991); Bosley v. United States, No. C-89-081, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19810, at *3(E.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 1990) (stating additional criteria that should be applied to the
government); Leck Co. v. United States, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) Cl 9694, at 82,250
(D. Minn. 1973) ("Even if there are proper grounds for invoking [estoppel] against
private citizens, 'the government stands in a different position.'" (quoting United
States v. Globe Indem. Co., 94 F.2d 576, 578 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 575
(1938))); cf. Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984) (leaving
open question of whether estoppel applies against the government); Miller v. United
States, 949 F.2d 708, 712 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[Courts expressly have prohibited the ap-
plication of the doctrine of equitable estoppel in cases involving the IRS."); Va. Note,
supra note 39, at 313 (noting that some courts have expressed doubts about whether
estoppel applies at all against the government).
There are some circumstances under which it has been acknowledged that the gov-
ernment cannot be estopped-for instance, in the case of a retroactive revocation or
amendment of a regulation in order to correct "misinterpretations, inaccuracies, or
omissions." R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. at 116.
49. Mere misstatement of the law does not represent the government's position
and therefore is not binding on the government. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-26-002 (Feb. 14,
1994) (ruling that IRS agent's statement that pension income was taxable did not
create an estoppel against the government).
50. See supra note 47.
51. See Van Antwerp v. United States, 92 F.2d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 1937) (holding
that government was not entitled to assert estoppel against taxpayer who filed refund
claim one day before expiration of statute of limitations; no misrepresentation was
involved, and Commissioner neglected to reaudit return); Davis v. Commissioner, 29
T.C. 878, 896 (1958) (postulating that detriment must be "real and substantial" and
stating that it is not enough that the statute of limitations has run).
52. See Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311, 317 (9th Cir. 1962) ("[T)he policy
in favor of an efficient collection of the public revenue outweighs the policy of the
estoppel doctrine in its usual and customary context."); Bosley, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19810, at *3 (stating that estoppel will apply against the government only
where the "government's wrongful act will cause a serious injustice, and the public's
interest will not suffer undue damage by imposition of the liability").
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Nevertheless, estoppel has been applied against the government to
lift the bar of the statute of limitations when the government has
made misrepresentations that have induced taxpayers to act to their
detriment.5 3 For instance, the Commissioner was estopped from
claiming the protection of the statutory bar when he inadvertently
misrepresented the amount of time remaining under the statute to file
a claim for refund where the taxpayer, relying on the Commissioner's
assertions that the statute was open, filed its claim after the statute
had run. 4 Similarly, where the misrepresentations of an IRS agent
caused a taxpayer to rely to its detriment on the integrity of a refund
claim, the government was subsequently estopped to raise the ground
of failure to perfect a claim as a basis to deny the refund.
Quasi-estoppel has, of course, also been applied against the tax-
payer in a variety of circumstances. The most common case arises
when the taxpayer attempts to renege on a formal agreement with the
government.5 6 Moreover, if a taxpayer maintains that a tax liability is
53. See, e.g., Bosley, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19810, at *7 (estopping government
from asserting validity of federal tax lien where taxpayer purchased property upon
assurances from government that underlying tax liability had been satisfied); United
States v. Borg-Warner Corp., 39-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9794, at 10,949 (7th Cir.
1939) (estopping government from claiming that statute of limitations precluded tax-
payer's refund suit). Conversely, quasi-estoppel has also been applied against the
government to impose such a bar. See Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 283, 289
(D.C. Cir. 1951) (precluding government from asserting that statute of limitations
never ran when taxpayer's failure to file a gift tax return was due to government's
actions).
54. See Staten Island Hygeia Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. United States, 85 F.2d 68,
70-71 (2d Cir. 1936) (holding that closing agreement did not lift the bar of the statute
of limitations, where government argued that statute did not apply because taxpayer
had executed closing agreement, because the government had made misrepresenta-
tions on which the taxpayer had relied to its detriment). But cf. United States v. Gar-
butt Oil Co., 302 U.S. 528, 535 (1938) (holding that refund claim filed after expiration
of statute of limitations did not constitute amendment of original, timely filed claim).
55. See Smale & Robinson, Inc. v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 457, 466-67 (S.D.
Cal. 1954) (considering case of taxpayer who relied on IRS agent's assertions that a
credit carryback would be allowed to generate a refund in a year in which the tax-
payer was being audited but who had not otherwise filed a refund claim).
56. See, e.g., Elbo Coals, Inc. v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 745, 749 (E.D. Ky.
1984) ("The bottom line is that both parties made mutual concessions, and both par-
ties agreed to be bound by those concessions."), affd, 763 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1985);
Kretchmar v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 191, 196-98 (1985) (imposing quasi-estoppel
against taxpayer who signed a Form 870-AD and discussing elements of a binding
closing agreement). There is a conflict among some of the lower federal courts and
the Court of Claims as to whether quasi-estoppel may apply in the absence of a for-
mal agreement. Compare Stair v. United States, 516 F.2d 560, 565 (2d Cir. 1975)
(holding that taxpayer could not renege on informal settlement agreement to detri-
ment of government; otherwise "outcome would arm the taxpayer with both a shield
and a sword," and he would have "no chance of losing"), McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. United
States, 623 F.2d 700, 706 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (noting that under its liberal view of estoppel,
the doctrine will apply whenever the government cannot be placed in the same posi-
tion it was in when the agreement was executed), and Guggenheim v. United States,
77 F. Supp. 186, 196-97 (Ct. Cl. 1948) (applying estoppel to prevent taxpayer from
reneging on informal agreement to detriment of the government after statute of limi-
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attributable to a particular taxable year, or to a particular person, and
the government acquiesces, the taxpayer should not be allowed to
change that position by maintaining that the tax liability is attributable
to an earlier, closed year after the statute of limitations has run.
Apart from an honest mistake, if the taxpayer was acting in good
faith, she would have made arrangements to pay the tax liability
before the statute of limitations expired.5' If the taxpayer was not
acting in good faith, estoppel might apply.
Because estoppel is an equitable remedy, it cannot override a direct
statutory provision. Thus, it does not open an otherwise closed taxa-
ble year in order to adjust inequities or inconsistencies. It also does
not correct any earlier mistakes nor, in fact, is it very concerned with
the existence of those mistakes.5 9 It merely prevents a change of posi-
tion by one party when such a change could prejudice an innocent
party. Strict interpretation of tax statutes is of secondary importance.
Instead, the focus of estoppel is primarily on issues of fairness and the
protection of reasonable reliance.60
tations had expired), cert denied, 335 U.S. 908 (1949) with Uinta Livestock Corp. v.
United States, 355 F.2d 761, 767-68 (10th Cir. 1966) (holding that estoppel does not
apply against taxpayer in absence of formal, binding agreement). But cf. Botany
Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282,289 (1929) (leaving open the question of
whether a taxpayer may be estopped in the absence of a formal closing agreement).
57. See, e.g., Swartz v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1934) (estopping
taxpayer from asserting, after statute of limitations had run against assessment, that
he, not third party, was the real owner of income and should have been taxed accord-
ingly); Commissioner v. Garber, 50 F.2d 588, 591 (9th Cir. 1931) (holding that tax-
payer could not change position and claim that income was actually taxable in an
earlier year, the assessment of which was then barred by the statute of limitations).
58. This is the clear implication of Garber. 50 F.2d at 590-91.
59. The question has arisen, however, whether estoppel is an appropriate remedy
if equitable recoupment applies. See Morris White Fashions, Inc. v. United States, 176
F. Supp. 760, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding that estoppel is inappropriate if govern-
ment can use recoupment to sufficiently offset taxpayer's claim). But see D.D.I., Inc.
v. United States, 467 F.2d 497, 500 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (stating that recoupment will not
override estoppel where compromise agreement is a "package deal" because there
would be no full right of setoff), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 830 (1973).
60. See, e.g., R.H. Steams Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1934). The
Court stated:
Sometimes the resulting disability has been characterized as an estoppel,
sometimes as a waiver. The label counts for little. Enough for present pur-
poses that the disability has its roots in a principle more nearly ultimate than
either waiver or estoppel, the principle that no one shall be permitted to
found any claim upon his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong.
Id.; see also Smale & Robinson, Inc. v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 457, 463 (S.D. Cal.
1954) ("Justification for equitable estoppel is found in equity, common honesty and
good conscience.").
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B. Equitable Tolling
A similar remedy is equitable tolling, which tolls the statute of limi-
tations in certain exceptional circumstances. 61 Unlike estoppel, how-
ever, the elements of equitable tolling have never been defined,
although the Supreme Court has stated that the rebuttable presump-
tion of equitable tolling applicable to suits between private litigants
should be extended in the same manner to suits against the govern-
ment.62 There is presently a conflict among the courts as to whether
equitable tolling applies at all in federal tax cases,63 and if so, under
what conditions it applies.61 These issues are currently pending before
the U.S. Supreme Court,65 however, so a resolution should be forth-
coming. An interesting issue to watch is whether the Supreme Court
will follow the mistakes of some of the lower courts and confuse equi-
table tolling with equitable recoupment.66
C. Election
The doctrine of election applies to prevent a change of position
where there was initially a choice between two legitimate, alternative
61. The U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the principal in suits against the govern-
ment in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 93-96 (1990).
62. IdL at 95-96. The doctrine has been applied only in narrow circumstances such
as in cases of senility, mental incompetence, and where the law in a circuit is unclear.
Barker v. United States, [U.S. Tax Cases Advance Sheets] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (96-2
U.S. Tax Cas.) (CCH) 50,421, at 85,406 (S.D. Cal. June 17, 1996).
63. Compare Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 263 (9th Cir. 1995) (ex-
tending the principle to tax refund cases "where 'extraordinary circumstances beyond
the plaintiffs' control [make] it impossible to file the claims on time' (quoting Seattle
Audobon Soc'y v. Robertson, 931 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1991))), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 1875 (1996) with Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 698-99 (4th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that equitable tolling is not applicable in tax cases), petition for cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1996) (No. 95-1360) and Oropallo v. United States, 994
F.2d 25, 28 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[T]ax laws have been viewed as technical laws which
are not subject to general principles of equity." (citing Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner,
349 U.S. 237, 249 (1955))), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1050 (1994).
64. Compare Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96 (holding that principle should be applied
"where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective
pleading during the statutory period, or where complainant has been induced or
tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass") and
Medellin v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 199, 204 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[M]isconduct on the part of the
agency or gross, but good-faith, error on the part of the claimant should justify [equi-
table tolling].") with Brockamp, 67 F.3d at 262-63 (applying equitable tolling to per-
mit recovery for mental incompetence) and Dillard v. Runyon, 928 F. Supp. 1316,
1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that equitable tolling should be available when a failure
to meet a deadline is someone else's fault but not when claimant fails to use due
diligence).
65. See Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116
S. Ct. 1875 (1996).
66. See, e.g., Webb, 66 F.3d at 698 (relying on Dalm to hold equitable tolling inap-
plicable); Vimtilla v. United States, 931 F.2d 1444, 1447 n.1 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting
that Irwin and Dalm are seemingly contradictory). But see Schwartz v. United States,
67 F.3d 838, 841 (9th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing the two principles correctly).
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theories.67 The concept has been applied against the government to
prevent a subsequent reassessment of a tax liability on the same item
or transaction under a different theory from the initial assessment af-
ter the statute of limitations has run, preventing the taxpayer from
filing a claim for refund with respect to the initial assessment. For
instance, in Vestal v. Commissioner,6 shareholders of a liquidating
corporation formed a partnership to receive corporate assets. The
partnership later sold the assets, with the individual partners paying
an income tax on the gain. The IRS subsequently characterized the
partnership as an association, taxable as a corporation, and issued a
notice of deficiency under that assumption. The taxpayers then ap-
pealed to the Board of Tax Appeals, which held in their favor.69
In the meantime, some of the taxpayers filed a protective claim for
refund of the tax liability they had paid earlier. These claims were
denied. After the statute of limitations had run against any further
refund claim, the IRS assessed a second tax on the sale against the
same individuals, this time classifying the asset sale as a sale by the
corporation, with the taxpayers holding the proceeds as transferees.7 °
The taxpayers brought suit in the Tax Court, which held in favor of the
government. On appeal, the court held that the government had
made a binding election. It had collected a tax under one theory, and
it could not subsequently reassess another tax liability under an alter-
native theory after the statute of limitations barred recovery by the
taxpayers.
7 1
While election may be viewed as a form of estoppel, technically, the
difference between the two remedies is that election involves a choice
between two or more valid alternatives, while estoppel does not. Ac-
cording to the appellate court, the government's alternatives in Vestal
were threefold: (1) to assert that the sale was made by the corpora-
tion and to assess a tax against the individuals as transferees; (2) to
assert that the sale was made by the partnership and to assess a tax
against the individual partners; or (3) to place the issue before the Tax
Court by issuing notices of deficiency in the alternative. 72 The Com-
missioner initially assessed a tax liability under the second alternative
67. See, e.g., Radiant Glass Co. v. Burnet, 54 F2d 718, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (not-
ing that once the taxpayer files a return he executes his choice of status and cannot
switch to another whenever it appears advantageous to do so); Buttolph v. Commis-
sioner, 29 F.2d 695, 696 (7th Cir. 1928) (holding that taxpayer, having filed a joint
return, could not subsequently file separate returns). It has been said that the choice
must be based on a Code provision, a regulation, or a U.S. Supreme Court case. See
Manning, supra note 35, at 377.
68. 152 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
69. Id. at 133.
70. The statute of limitations at that time provided that the statutory period was
extended one year for assessment against transferees, thus the government's claim
was timely if the sale was, in fact, a sale by the corporation. Id. at 134.
71. Id. at 136.
72. 1& at 135.
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and denied the taxpayers' protective refund claims. When the Com-
missioner subsequently changed the theory of liability from the sec-
ond alternative to the first, it was too late for the taxpayers to refile
their claims for refund.
Vestal clarifies that election is a limited remedy. But where the gov-
ernment is cognizant of the facts and aware of the problem involved,
an election to collect a tax under one theory will be binding unless
there is both an erroneous interpretation of a statute and the amount
of tax liability initially collected can be refunded to the taxpayer.73
Presumably, it is the latter factor that is more important. Because the
government, in this case, made the initial decision and later changed
its position, it must treat the taxpayers fairly in order to act on that
change of position.74
Another important difference between election and estoppel is that
taxpayers are generally more successful with election than with estop-
pel.75 This is probably because election, unlike estoppel, does not in-
volve an affirmative misrepresentation. Thus, the evidentiary burden
is not as great. Instead, for the doctrine of election to apply against
the government, by definition, the government must have chosen one
of two or more legitimate alternatives and must subsequently have
attempted to gain an advantage by changing its position to the detri-
ment of the taxpayer. Thus the equities of the taxpayer's position in
an election case are usually more compelling than in an estoppel case.
D. Duty of Consistency
A concept related to estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and election is the
duty of consistency. The concept has often been confused with estop-
pel.76 The duty of consistency and estoppel differ, however, in that
the latter involves a more holistic approach, concerned primarily with
detriment and the conduct of the parties, whereas the former focuses
more on the actual prior choices and the effect that a subsequent
73. Id at 136-37.
74. Note that election has also been applied against the taxpayer. See Moran v.
Commissioner, 67 F.2d 601, 602 (1st Cir. 1933) (considering case where taxpayer ar-
gued that, under the doctrine of constructive receipt, income was properly includable
in earlier years currently barred by the statute of limitations, and holding that tax-
payer had made a binding election in including income in later year).
75. Manning, supra note 35, at 376-77.
76. See, e.g., Robbins v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 403, 407 (Ct. Cl. 1937) (refer-
ring to "quasi-estoppel" to prevent taxpayer from changing position to his advantage
after statute of limitations barred correction of the effects of his earlier position);
Hughes & Luce v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1169, 1171 (1994) (stating that
the doctrine of quasi-estoppel is the same as the duty of consistency), aff d, 70 F.3d 16
(5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996); see also Hess v. United States, 537
F.2d 457, 462 (Ct. Cl. 1976) ("[T]he evidence before the court here strongly indicates
an estoppel . . . ."), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
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change of position will have on the opposing party.' Like estoppel,
though, the duty of consistency is not primarily concerned with the
technically correct tax treatment in the current year. For instance, in
Alamo National Bank v. Commissioner,78 the taxpayers received a
corporate liquidating distribution on which they paid a tax liability,
but they mistakenly failed to include a franchise they received in the
distribution. Thus, no tax liability was paid on the value of the
franchise. The taxpayers operated the business under the franchise
for ten years. After that time, they sold the business and maintained
that the value of the franchise was properly includable in the year of
the liquidating distribution, now barred by the statute of limitations,
and that their basis should reflect the value of the franchise as of the
date of the distribution, thus reducing their current gain. The Com-
missioner countered that the taxpayers were estopped from increasing
their basis because, initially, they had not included the value of the
franchise in income.79
The Fifth Circuit upheld the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals
in favor of the Commissioner, stating that "honesty, good faith, and
consistency are due in tax accounting. '' s° The taxpayers were aware
that they had received the franchise. They continued to operate their
business under it, and only after the statute of limitations had run did
77. The duty of consistency has poorly defined elements that have been linked to
estoppel. See Johnson, Duty of Consistency, supra note 9, at 549-69 (discussing devel-
opment of the doctrine). Its most commonly accepted elements are as follows: (1)
the taxpayer has made a representation of fact or reported an item for tax purposes in
one taxable year, (2) the Service acquiesced in or relied on that fact for that year, and
(3) the taxpayer desires to change the representation, previously made, in a later taxa-
ble year after the first year has been closed by the statute of limitations. McMillan V.
United States, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9720, at 93,838 (S.D.W.V. 1964); see also
Beltzer v. United States, 495 F.2d 211, 212-13 (8th Cir. 1974) (upholding McMillan);
Johnson, Duty of Consistency, supra note 9. at 549-69 (discussing the various
elements).
There is not as much confusion between election and the duty of consistency as
there is between election and estoppel, because election involves a choice between
two alternative legal theories in which the person making the choice is aware of the
facts and the problems involved. The duty of consistency, on the other hand, involves
a mistake in an earlier taxable year. Thus, election would not apply. Because election
requires optional legal remedies, it is more limited in application and, therefore, ap-
plies less frequently than the duty of consistency.
A concept related to the duty of consistency is the tax benefit rule, in which a
recovery of an amount deducted in a prior taxable year will result in an income inclu-
sion in the year of recovery attributable to the previous tax benefit. Although the tax
benefit rule is a judicially created doctrine, a portion of it is now codified in I.R.C.
§ 111 (1994), providing for the exclusion from gross income of an amount of recovery
that did not result in an earlier tax benefit. For exceptions to the tax benefit rule, see
Canelo v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 217, 223-30 (1969), acq., 1971-1 C.B. 2, aff d, 447
F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1971); Streckfus Steamers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1, 8-9
(1952). For a discussion of the relationship between the duty of consistency and the
tax benefit rule, see Johnson, Duty of Consistency, supra note 9, at 543-44.
78. 95 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 304 U.S. 577 (1938).
79. Id. at 622.
80. Id. at 623.
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they allege that it had value initially. The taxpayers were then es-
topped from changing their position after the statute of limitations
had run and a sale had occurred. The court went on to state that "the
value then fixed cannot be departed from unless on a general correc-
tion of all the results of the mistake, if mistake there was."81
Although the court used the term "estoppel" throughout the opin-
ion, the important aspect of the case was the focus on the correction
of the earlier mistake. In this sense, the remedy was similar to elec-
tion because the court focused on the earlier choice and the effect of a
change in position.
The duty of consistency has been applied against the government as
well, but such cases are rare.8 z As a remedy, the duty of consistency
has been criticized on the ground that equity is best served by al-
lowing a correction of the earlier mistake.83 This objection, in turn,
has been criticized on the ground that the duty of consistency should
be viewed from the perspective of tax policy, rather than from the
perspective of equity.84 If the earlier mistake is corrected after the
statute of limitations has run, not only will the statute be circum-
vented, but the correction also will result in a distortion of income for
the subsequent annual accounting period, which could have a detri-
mental effect on voluntary compliance.
On the other hand, the aggressive use by taxpayers of the statute of
limitations in order to avoid tax liability victimizes those taxpayers
who do pay their fair tax share. If these opposing policy considera-
tions are balanced, the duty of consistency should apply in favor of the
taxpayer only where the earlier, incorrect return is filed in good faith,
81. i at 624; accord Fabacher v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9317,
at 86,223 (S.D. Miss. 1971), affd in part, vacated in part per curiam, 454 F.2d 722 (5th
Cir. 1972). Note that while the Fifth Circuit in Alamo National Bank referred to the
remedy as "estoppel," it was neither a pure estoppel nor a quasi-estoppel principle
that was applied because the court was not concerned with detriment nor, for that
matter, with benefit, but rather, with consistency, i.e., with the earlier mistake. Cf.
Orange Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 662, 663 (5th Cir. 1942) ("[Tlhere is a
duty of consistency on both the taxpayer and the Commissioner... whether or not
there be present all the technical elements of an estoppel."). Note that in Orange
Securities Corp., the court applied the duty of consistency to prevent the taxpayer
from changing position with respect to the "same fact or transaction." Id.; see also
Koppen v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 72, 76 (1995) (applying duty of consis-
tency to prevent taxpayer from reelecting the one-time exclusion of gain on the sale of
a personal residence when previous election occurred before taxpayer reached age
55).
82. See IBM Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 923 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (holding,
narrowly limited to its facts, that similarly situated taxpayers must be treated simi-
larly), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966).
83. See Manning, supra note 35, at 378. Such a correction would be similar to the
corrective treatment under the Internal Revenue Code for the receipt of a tax benefit,
see I.R.C. § 111 (1994); supra note 77, or for the return of property held under a claim
of right. See I.R.C. § 1341 (1994).
84. See Johnson, Duty of Consistency, supra note 9, at 544-49.
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and where such return includes enough information to place the gov-
ernment on reasonable notice of the error. 5
I. RECOUPMENT AND SETOFF
Recoupment originated as a limited equitable remedy allowing a
defendant to mitigate or defeat a plaintiff's claim for damages when
there was no statute that directly prevented its application, and when
the defendant affirmatively claimed that damages should be reduced,
in whole or in part, because of an earlier payment or recovery. s6 Re-
coupment, like other equitable remedies, is regarded as a fairness doc-
trine designed to "promote justice, and to prevent useless litigation."'
It allows the court to examine the transaction as a whole and to deter-
mine whether the facts warrant the application of an equitable rem-
edy. If the opposing claims arise out of the same subject matter and
can be resolved in one action, the character of the claims is
inconsequential.'
Recoupment, as an equitable remedy in federal tax cases, has been
confused with other equitable remedies, such as estoppel s9 It has also
been confused with the remedy of setoff, which arose in the tax con-
text in the case of Lewis v. Reynolds,9" which in turn, paved the way
for the application of recoupmentY'
85. This has been suggested with respect to estoppeL See Yale Note, supra note 39,
at 179. This premise should apply, though, whenever the statute of limitations is cir-
cumvented through the use of an equitable remedy.
86. See Waterman, supra note 31, at 476-77. In England, recoupment was origi-
nally a defense to a charge of fraud. Later, it was used as a defense to charges of
breach of contract, assumpsit, and negligence. Id. at 481-581. For a novel recoupment
argument, see United States v. Stutsman County Implement Co., 274 F.2d 733, 735
(8th Cir. 1960), where plaintiff argued that equitable recoupment should apply to lift
federal tax liens from property it had purchased.
87. Waterman, supra note 31, at 481.
88. That is, a tort claim may be set up against a contract claim and vice versa. Id.;
McConnell, supra note 7, at 578.
89. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 261 (1935) (citing United States v.
McDaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1 (1833) as a recoupment case; however, a careful reading
reveals that estoppel was applied). Recoupment and estoppel may be pleaded in the
alternative. See Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 534 (1937) (discussing case where gov-
ernment pleaded both recoupment and estoppel); see also McEachern v. Rose, 302
U.S. 56, 58 (1937) (discussing case as a recoupment case, but the pleadings were based
on estoppel). If recoupment and estoppel are pleaded in the alternative, recoupment
may apply even if the elements of estoppel are not met because, with recoupment, the
claimant does not have to prove reliance on his part or misrepresentation on the part
of the opposing party.
90. 284 U.S. 281, modified, 284 U.S. 599 (1932).
91. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 565 F.2d 507, 512 (8th Cir. 1977)(noting that the Supreme Court first addressed equitable recoupment in the Leivis
case); Springfield St. Ry. v. United States, 312 F.2d 754, 758 (CL Cl. 1963) ("The
doctrine of equitable recoupment was first set forth in Lewis v. Reynolds ....");
Routzabm v. Brown, 95 F.2d 766, 770 (6th Cir. 1938) (citing Stone v. White, 301 U.S.
532 (1937) for the proposition that although a "suit is one at law for the recovery of an
overpayment of taxes," it is controlled by equitable principles).
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A. Setoff
In Lewis v. Reynolds, an estate brought suit in federal district court
to recover an alleged overpayment of income taxes. In its income tax
return for the taxable year 1920, the estate had claimed several deduc-
tions, including attorney's fees and state inheritance taxes. After au-
dit, the Commissioner disallowed all deductions except the attorney's
fees. The estate paid the resulting deficiency then shortly afterward
filed a claim for refund.92 At the time the refund claim was filed, the
statute of limitations for assessment of the 1920 taxable year had ex-
pired.93 The Commissioner disallowed the refund claim on the
ground that there was no overpayment for the 1920 taxable year, and
thus the taxpayer was not entitled to a refund. The Commissioner
based his conclusion on the finding that the deduction for attorney's
fees had been improperly allowed and the deduction for state inheri-
tance taxes had been improperly disallowed.94 The proper deduction
for the state inheritance taxes was less than the amount of the attor-
ney's fees the estate had claimed. This resulted in a deficiency for the
1920 taxable year, from which the Commissioner was barred from as-
sessing because of the expiration of the statute of limitations.
The estate argued that the Commissioner was also barred from re-
determining the total tax liability for 1920 because of the expiration of
the statutory period.95 The Commissioner countered that while he
was barred from assessing and collecting any further tax attributable
to the 1920 taxable year, he could nevertheless redetermine the total
tax liability for that year in order to ascertain whether there had been
an overpayment with respect to that taxable year, as the taxpayer had
alleged."6
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts in holding for the
Commissioner.97 The opinion quoted the appellate decision: "The ac-
tion to recover on a claim for refund is in the nature of an action for
92. Collinson v. Reynolds, 43 F.2d 395, 395 (D. Wyo. 1930), afJ'd sub nom. Lewis
v. Reynolds, 48 F.2d 515 (10th Cir. 1931), affd, 284 U.S. 281, modified, 284 U.S. 599
(1932).
93. At the time, the statute of limitations was five years from the date the return
was filed. Lewis, 284 U.S. at 282 n.1 (citing Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 277,44 Stat.
9).
94. Collinson, 43 F.2d at 395.
95. Id. at 396.
96. Id.
97. Lewis, 284 U.S. at 283. Note that while Lewis v. Reynolds represents a victory
for the government, it is also available to the taxpayer in limited circumstances. The
most useful example is its role as a defense to the government's use of a setoff against
the taxpayer's refund claim. Thus, a taxpayer may use Lewis to raise offsetting de-
fenses to counter the government's use of Lewis, even though such issues were not
originally raised in the timely filed refund claim. See Union Pac. R.R. v. United
States, 389 F.2d 437, 447 (Ct. Cl. 1968). But a taxpayer may not increase her refund if
the government fails to prove a legitimate offset. Id.
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money had and received, and it is incumbent upon the claimant to
show that the United States has money which belongs to him.""
It is important to note that the Supreme Court allowed the Com-
missioner to offset only the amount of the alleged overpayment by the
amount of the deficiency. No excess deficiency attributable to the
1920 taxable year could be assessed. It is also important to note that
the overpayment at issue in Lewis was an overpayment on the merits.
Any overpayment made after the expiration of the statute of limita-
tions would constitute a statutory overpayment to which Lewis would
not apply.99
There appears to be some confusion as to whether setoff is an equi-
table remedy. 1°° The issue is important in determining whether the
Tax Court has incidental refund jurisdiction over setoff claims, be-
cause the issue of whether or not the Tax Court has equity jurisdiction
remains unresolved. 101 Because Lewis v. Reynolds appears to be a
case of statutory interpretation, it follows that setoff is not an equita-
ble remedy in the tax context, and hence it is not subject to the equita-
ble defenses such as laches and unclean hands.'0 2 Nor should the
application of setoff be subject to judicial discretion after weighing the
equities of the individual case. 03
98. Lewis, 284 U.S. at 283 (quoting Lewis v. Reynolds, 48 F.2d 515, 516 (10th Cir.
1931)).
99. See LR.C. § 6401 (1994); see also Ewing v. United States, 914 F.2d 499, 502-05
(4th Cir. 1990) (discussing distinction between payment and deposit for purposes of
determining an overpayment), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 905 (1991).
100. Some courts have stated that setoff is not subject to equitable considerations.
See e.g., Fisher v. United States, 80 F.3d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("The IRS's right
to ... interest cannot be defeated by reference to the alleged 'equities' of the tax-
payer's case."); Dysart v. United States, 340 F.2d 624, 627 (Ct. Cl. 1965) ("Although
the origin of these defenses may be traced to equitable principles, the right to raise a
setoff is not subject to equitable considerations as the taxpayers contend."); Missouri
Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 954, 961 (W.D. Mo. 1965) (same), affd,
370 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1967). Other courts and commentators have regarded it as a
general equitable defense akin to estoppel. See, e.g., Pacific Mills v. Nichols, 31 F.
Supp. 43, 44-45 (D. Mass. 1939) (noting several times that Lewis v. Reynolds is an
equitable doctrine); Jones, supra note 36, at 868 (noting that the Supreme Court has
pointed out that "in the absence of true estoppel, the use of a general equitable de-
fense in refund cases must be limited to a relatively narrow class of cases, typified,
perhaps, by Lewis v. Reynolds"); Note, Equitable Recoupment in Tax Law, 42 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 537, 542 (1967) [hereinafter NYU Note] (stating that setoff is an equitable
adjustment of tax liability justified by statutory interpretation sanctioned both by
Lewis and by an equitable policy against unjust enrichment).
Setoff, on occasion, has also been confused with recoupment. See supra text accom-
panying note 90.
101. See infra part VI.B (discussing Tax Court jurisdiction).
102. For a criticism of this position, however, see Richard M. Johnson, Comment,
Burden of Proof in Tax Litigation" Offset and Equitable Recoupment, 15 Buff. L Rev.
616, 624-25 (1966) [hereinafter Johnson, Burden of ProoA.
103. See Dysart, 340 F.2d at 628-29 ("The Supreme Court has never suggested
that-in a refund suit in which the setoff involves the same tax, the same year, and the
same taxpayer-the court may, or should, weigh 'equities' to decide whether it would
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Further, the elements of estoppel were lacking in Lewis because
there was no misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact by
the taxpayer, nor was there detrimental reliance by the Commissioner.
Instead, there was a mistake by the Commissioner in the determina-
tion of the tax liability. At first blush, the Commissioner's position
appears unreasonable from a fairness perspective because his error
created the situation for which he now requests relief. From a tax
policy perspective, however, if the estate's claim for refund had been
allowed, the estate would have been unjustly enriched because it
would have been able to hide behind the statute of limitations and
thereby avoid its fair share of the tax burden. 1°4
A taxpayer is entitled to a refund only in the event of an overpay-
ment. An overpayment or underpayment usually must be determined
on the basis of an annual tax accounting period.'0 5 Setoff, as exempli-
fied by Lewis, is a narrow doctrine defining an overpayment.10 6
Under Lewis, the determination involves a single taxpayer, a single
be fair, in the individual circumstances, to permit the government to assert the
defense.").
104. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935) ("[T]axes are the life-blood
of government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious need.").
105. See I.R.C. § 441 (1994) (setting out the statutory period). An annual account-
ing period may either be a calendar year or a fiscal year. Under some circumstances,
an accounting period may be less than a year, but this is not the usual situation. See
I.R.C. § 443 (1994) (authorizing short period returns).
106. See I.R.C. § 6511 (1994) (pertaining to refunds for overpayments of tax liabil-
ity); cf. I.R.C. § 6514(a) (1994) (prohibiting refund after expiration of statute of limi-
tations and further prohibiting the crediting of a barred refund against an open
deficiency); I.R.C. § 6514(b) (1994) (prohibiting the credit of an open refund against a
barred deficiency).
The rationale behind Lewis is that I.R.C. § 6514(b) is designed to prohibit the cred-
iting of an open refund claim of one taxable year against a barred deficiency of a
different taxable year. It does not prevent the court or the IRS from offsetting an
open refund against a barred deficiency if both arise in the same taxable year, because
such an offset merely determines the amount of the overpayment for that taxable
year. See Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 954, 961 (W.D. Mo.
1965) ("[T]he right of the government is based on the broader principle that a tax-
payer is not entitled to a refund unless he has in fact overpaid the particular tax
....), afd, 370 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1967); see also Allen v. United States, 51 F.3d
1012, 1015 (11th Cir. 1995) (permitting the government to offset an improper fraud
penalty against unassessed negligence and delinquency penalties).
Procedurally, a question arises as to whether a taxpayer may claim a setoff without
first complying with the statute and filing a refund claim. See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1994);
Jones v. Fox, 162 F. Supp. 449, 464-65 (D. Md. 1958) (stating that taxpayer must first
file claim for refund, but there taxpayer was requesting refund attributable to differ-
ent taxable years). Because the use of setoff by the taxpayer would be defensive, the
first issue should be whether the taxpayer owes an additional amount. Thus, setoff
should be appropriate in order to determine the correct amount of tax due without
the necessity of filing a refund claim.
It has been held that the IRS is not required to issue a notice of deficiency before
raising a setoff defense against a taxpayer's refund claim. Walt Disney Prods. v.
United States, 549 F.2d 576, 582 (9th Cir. 1977).
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taxable year,1 7 and a single taxs' That different transactions may be
involved is of no consequence.
B. The Equitable Recoupment Decisions of the Supreme Court
Lewis v. Reynolds reveals that the statute of limitations is not al-
ways an absolute bar and that, under limited circumstances, items in
closed years can affect open claims. Similarly, recoupment allows con-
sideration of the effect of a barred claim on an open claim. But unlike
setoff, which involves a single taxpayer, a single taxable year, a single
tax, and could involve more than one transaction, recoupment in-
volves a single taxpayer (or two or more taxpayers with an identity of
interest), two or more taxable years, generally more than one type of
tax, and a single transaction.
Lewis set the stage for an extension of the offset remedy under eq-
uitable principles. Three years after the Supreme Court decided
Lewis, it confronted the issue of whether equity would permit an ex-
amination of items in a barred year in order to determine the tax con-
sequences in an open year.
1. Bull v. United States'1 9
Archibald H. Bull died in 1920 holding a partnership interest that
entitled him and consequently, his estate, to participate in the profits
and losses of the partnership."10 Partnership profits that accrued to
the date of the decedent's death were included in the estate tax return,
as part of the gross estate. The Commissioner valued the decedent's
partnership interest much higher, however, after including the addi-
tional amount of profits that had accrued from the date of the dece-
107. But see Blansett v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 637, 644 (W.D. Mo. 1960) (al-
lowing the government to offset a refund claim attributable to a credit earryback).
108. Cf. Fisher v. United States, 80 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (allowing gov-
ernment to offset previously unassessed interest against valid refund on the ground
that the Internal Revenue Code treats interest as "an integral part of the liability
itself"); Allen, 51 F.3d at 1015 (allowing offset of fraud penalty refund that had been
improperly assessed, with newly assessed negligence and delinquency penalties for
same taxable year after expiration of statute of limitations); Loftin & Woodward, Inc.
v. United States, 577 F.2d 1206, 1247 (5th Cir. 1978) (allowing government to offset
refund claim with increased delinquency penalty). But see Morristown Trust Co. v.
Manning, 104 F. Supp. 621, 628 (D.NJ. 1951) (applying Lewis to bar estate tax re-
fund), affd, 200 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1952), cert denied, 345 U.S. 939 (1953).
109. 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
110. Under the partnership agreement, if a partner were to die, the remaining part-
ners would continue the business for one year. The estate of the deceased partner
would have the right to share in profits and losses to the same extent as the decedent,
unless the estate exercised its option under the agreement to opt out of the partner-
ship within thirty days of the probate of the will. The Bull estate did not exercise this
option, thus it was entitled to share in the partnership profits and losses to the same
extent Bull would have if he had lived. Because there was no capital contribution of
any kind by any of the partners, there was no capital interest. Id. at 251.
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dent's death to the end of the partnership period one year later. The
estate then paid the additional estate tax assessment.
The amount of partnership profits that had been included in the
gross estate were not included in the decedent's final income tax re-
turn. The Commissioner subsequently determined, however, that the
amount of profits earned during the decedent's last taxable year was
income taxable without reduction for the estate tax already paid on
that same amount.'
The estate appealed the deficiency to the Board of Tax Appeals,
which sustained the Commissioner's determination."' In 1928, the es-
tate paid the income tax deficiency, with interest. Shortly thereafter,
the estate filed a claim for refund on the ground that the partnership
profits represented corpus of the estate, which was not subject to an
income tax. The estate's claim was rejected in 1929. The following
year, the estate brought suit in the Court of Claims, requesting a re-
fund of the income tax paid in 1928, or in the alternative, a credit
against the income tax liability for the amount of the estate tax paid in
1921 on the partnership profits earned after the decedent's death.113
The Court of Claims held in favor of the Commissioner, opining that
the profits earned before the decedent's death constituted both corpus
and income to the estate and thus were properly taxable as such in
1921.11 According to the court, the income tax attributable to the
post-death profits should have reduced the gross estate. Because it
had not, the estate tax was overpaid. The court nonetheless refused to
consider the credit issue because the statute of limitations for filing an
estate tax refund claim had expired." 5
The estate then appealed to the Supreme Court, which concurred
with the Court of Claims on the characterization of the pre- and post-
death profits." 6 The government argued that it was entitled to both
the estate tax and the income tax, on the ground that the decedent's
right to receive future profits constituted an asset taxable to the estate
as corpus, while the profits themselves represented taxable income.
Indeed, this had been the case with the pre-death profits." 7
The Court decided, however, that the Commissioner had subjected
the actual profits, rather than the right to receive the profits, to both
111. Id. at 252-53.
112. Bull v. Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 993, 1002 (1927).
113. Bull v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 141, 143 (Ct. Cl. 1934), rev'd, 295 U.S. 247
(1935). Procedurally, the Bull situation cannot arise today because of the finality of
Tax Court jurisdiction. See Estate of Ming v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 519, 521 (1974)
("[Miere filing of the petition in the Tax Court is enough to deprive a U.S. District
Court of jurisdiction." (citing Dorl v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 720, 721-22 (1972))). For
a further explanation of the procedural technicalities involved, see Andrews, supra
note 13, at 599 n.20.
114. Bull, 6 F. Supp. at 143-44.
115. Id. at 143.
116. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 254 (1935).
117. Id. at 255.
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the estate tax and the income tax. Because the decedent had no capi-
tal interest in the partnership, there was no taxable corpus in the post-
death profits. Thus, the post-death profits could not be subject to an
estate tax liability." 8
The government further argued that if a mistake had been made in
1921, it was too late to correct it because the statute of limitations had
expired." 9 The Court, in response, stressed the fundamental impor-
tance of the revenue raising function of the tax system' 20 and noted
that while a tax liability results in a debt owed by the taxpayer to the
government, the usual procedural formalities associated with debt re-
coveries are reversed when federal taxes are involved. 2' The Court
went on to explain that, despite the reversal of procedure, the ultimate
issue in a deficiency action is the "recovery of a just debt owed the
sovereign."'" When the sovereign extracts more than its due, how-
ever, the recovery is not just. Recovery under such circumstances of-
fends "morality and conscience" and amounts to a "fraud on the
taxpayer's rights." 23 The Court, in holding for the taxpayer, con-
cluded: "[R]ecoupment is in the nature of a defense arising out of
some feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff's action is
grounded. Such a defense is never barred by the statute of limitations
so long as the main action itself is timely."' 24 Because the partnership
profits had already been subject to the estate tax, they could not be
further subject to the income tax.2
a. The Nature of the Remedy
The Court equated the government's actions to a fraud on the tax-
payer's rights. 26 If this analogy is taken at face value, the government
118. 1& at 255-57.
119. IL at 258.
120. The Court stated: "[T]axes are the life-blood of government, and their prompt
and certain availability an imperious need." Id at 259.
121. Because of the overriding need for an efficient functioning of the revenue rais-
ing process:
[T]he usual procedure for the recovery of debts is reversed in the field of
taxation. Payment precedes defense, and the burden of proof, normally on
the claimant, is shifted to the taxpayer. The assessment supersedes the
pleading, proof and judgment necessary in an action at law, and has the force
of such a judgment. The ordinary defendant stands in judgment only after a
hearing. The taxpayer often is afforded his hearing after judgment and after
payment, and his only redress for unjust administrative action is the right to
claim restitution.
MEd at 260.
122. Id
123. Id. at 260-61.
124. lt at 262.
125. Cf. Duffield v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 944, 945-46 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (holding
that equitable recoupment did not apply where estate assessed on value of contracts
decedent held at death).
126. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 261 (1935).
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would then be compelled to refund the taxpayer's money under a con-
structive trust theory.127 The Court did not take this approach, how-
ever. Instead, it appeared to be admonishing the government to use
due diligence in its dealings with taxpayers. In other words, when the
government takes a proactive position, fails to use due diligence, and
then tries to hide behind the statute of limitations to avoid correcting
its mistake, there is a fraud on the taxpayer's rights, which, in turn,
should entitle the taxpayer to relief.
Note that it would have been far easier for the Court to have held
that the Commissioner had made a previous binding election in treat-
ing the partnership income as corpus of the estate, thus precluding the
subsequent characterization of the same money as income after the
statute of limitations prohibited the taxpayer from recovering the
overpayment. There are, perhaps, two reasons that the Court did not
choose this path. First, given the integrity of the taxable year, some
commentators believe it is more desirable to maintain the correct tax
treatment in each year, even though it may occasionally produce ineq-
uitable results. 128 A mistake in one taxable year may have collateral
consequences that may affect several taxable years. Perhaps the
Court thought it more desirable to require the correct treatment in the
later year because of the implications for other transactions, as well as
the implications for other pending cases. Furthermore, both the
Board of Tax Appeals and the Court of Claims had stressed that the
income tax treatment was the proper treatment by the estate.' 29
Moreover, the integrity of the tax system is better served by impos-
ing a tax on the proper amount of income in a particular taxable year,
rather than by imposing a tax on an incorrect amount. This leads to a
further possible reason: the remedy of election should apply only
when the taxpayer or the Commissioner has a clear choice between
two legitimate, alternative courses of action.130 In Bull, the Commis-
sioner initially made a mistake in characterizing income of an estate as
corpus. Thus, there was only one technically correct way to treat this
item: as income, not as corpus. This meant that there was no alterna-
tive to elect. Moreover, estoppel was an equally unsatisfactory rem-
edy because there was no misrepresentation of fact.
That the Court mentioned the procedural aspect of the taxing sys-
tem is significant. The Court implied that the overriding public policy
interest in the efficient functioning of the federal government justifies
the reversal of the normal procedural rules for debt collection in the
127. Indeed, this appeared to be the case in United States v. State Bank, 96 U.S. 30
(1877), cited in Bull, 295 U.S. at 261.
128. See Manning, supra note 35, at 378.
129. Bull, 295 U.S. at 253-54.
130. See Maguire & Zimet, supra note 38, at 1289 ("The view does seem to be
indicated that if the taxpayer's choice was actuated by a material and non-culpable
mistake, it may not finally bind him, and he may seize a later occasion for really fair
choice.").
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case of federal taxes. What the Court did not mention is the fact that
there was a one-month period after the executor was notified of the
asserted income tax deficiency in which the estate could have filed a
claim for refund of the estate taxes.13' Thus, the estate sat on its rights
in not asserting a timely refund claim. That the Court did not consider
this important indicates that primary emphasis was placed on balanc-
ing the equities of the case as a whole.'2 The government's lack of
due diligence resulted in an initial error in the examination of the es-
tate tax return. Because the additional estate tax liability, attributable
to the post-death profits interest, had been paid nearly four years
before the Commissioner decided to subject the same interest to an
income tax liability, it was reasonable for the taxpayer to focus on the
income tax liability at hand, rather than on the previous estate tax
liability.
In sum, the government's lack of diligence potentially produced a
windfall while causing the taxpayer to suffer substantial detriment.
Because the facts were so egregious, the Court decided the taxpayer
was morally entitled to recoup the barred overpayment against the
open deficiency.
b. Bull Contrasted with Lewis
There is a similarity between Lewis and Bull: both cases authorized
a credit of a barred claim against an open claim. There are, however,
important differences between the two cases. Lewis defined an over-
payment, on the merits, of a single tax by a single taxpayer in a single
taxable year. The government may scrutinize any transaction during a
single taxable year to determine whether there has been an overpay-
ment within the definition of the statute. That the statute of limita-
tions bars further assessment with respect to the particular taxable
year is inconsequential because the underlying policy rationale of the
statute (i.e., preventing stale claims with its inherent problems such as
memory lapse and lost records) is not violated when the person whom
the statute was designed to protect (in this case the taxpayer) raises
the issue. In that event, the taxpayer should not be heard to complain
that all transactions in that year are beyond scrutiny in determining
the amount of the refund.
In Bull, the Court, while considering the equities, viewed the trans-
action as a whole in determining the overpayment. Because Bull in-
volved two taxable entities, two different taxes, and two taxable years,
it did not present a Lewis situation. Thus, there was the further re-
131. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 601 n.27.
132. Other minor technicalities apparently unimportant to the Court were the fact
that there were two different taxes involved and that the taxpayer technically was
required to file a claim for refund, rather than to offset the income tax by the estate
tax. The complexity of the federal tax laws may also have been considered sub rosa
by the Court.
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quirement of a single transaction in order to avoid the bar of the stat-
ute of limitations and to allow an offset of the open claim by the
barred claim. The single transaction requirement of Bull could be re-
garded as equivalent to the single taxable year requirement in Lewis.
Both allowed an examination of an otherwise barred claim because
the person the statute was designed to protect had demonstrated that
such protection was unnecessary based on the claim. The issue was,
however, a much narrower one in Bull than in Lewis. Under Lewis,
all transactions in the taxable year in question may be scrutinized.
With equitable recoupment, only the transaction that is the subject of
the claim is open to scrutiny. Moreover, recoupment does not apply
when both taxes are imposed in a single taxable year,133 nor does it
apply when the inconsistent taxes are income taxes, because that issue
has been preempted by the statutory mitigation provisions. 3 Ques-
tions have arisen, however, as to whether mitigation is an exclusive
remedy that preempts the application of recoupment. 35
Lewis is purely a case of statutory interpretation. As such, it is not
primarily concerned with issues of fairness and equity. With recoup-
ment, however, as with all equitable remedies, fairness should be a
paramount consideration.
2. Stone v. White'36
Two years after Bull, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Stone
v. White, a case involving a testamentary trust with the surviving wife
as the sole beneficiary. The wife elected to take her interest under the
will in lieu of a dower or statutory interest. Under applicable case
law, trust income paid in periodic installments to the wife was consid-
ered an annuity purchased by the surrender of her dower interest,
which was not taxable to her until she had recovered the value of that
interest.' 37 In reliance on these cases, the wife did not pay any income
tax on the trust income distributed to her.
In 1931, after the statute of limitations had run against assessment
of an income tax deficiency against the wife, the Commissioner as-
sessed a deficiency against the trust. Such assessment was attributable
133. This situation is covered under either the Lewis doctrine or under the statu-
tory mitigation provisions. See I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1994).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 262-85.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990) ("It is undisputed
that Daim's action does not come within these [statutory mitigation] provisions; were
we to allow her to maintain a suit for refund on the basis of equitable recoupment, we
would be ... overriding Congress' judgment as to when equity requires that there be
an exception to the limitations bar."); O'Brien v. United States, 766 F.2d 1038, 1050
n.14 (7th Cir. 1985) (reserving ruling on government's argument that mitigation pro-
vides the exclusive remedy); see also infra note 281 (stating that mitigation provisions
only apply in limited situations, but when they do apply, it is unlikely that Congress
intended the situation to be remedied exclusively under these provisions).
136. 301 U.S. 532 (1937).
137. Id at 533.
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to the periodic income payments to the wife. The trust paid the as-
sessment under protest. 13s In 1933, the Supreme Court decided the
case of Helvering v. Butterworth,3 9 which held such trust income was
properly taxable to the beneficiary. 140
In reliance on Butterworth, the trust then brought suit for a refund
of the income tax wrongfully collected.'4' The Commissioner argued
that the trust was not entitled to a refund because the income tax that
should have been paid by the beneficiary (now barred by the statute
of limitations) was greater than the tax collected from the trust. Be-
cause any refund to the trust would inure solely to the wife's benefit,
the wife would then be unjustly enriched to the detriment of the
government. 142
a. The Balance of Equities
The Supreme Court, in holding for the government, discussed the
equitable nature of the refund action. 43 The Court again appeared to
be considering the holistic situation.'" Although the tax code regards
the trust and the beneficiary as two separate and discrete taxable enti-
ties, the Court, in applying equitable recoupment, stated that the trust
and beneficiary are discrete entities only for purposes of assessment
and collection of the tax liability. 45 Because a court of equity can
consider the realities of the situation as a whole, the identity of inter-
est of the trust and beneficiary may be acknowledged. The Court
stated: "[E]quity does not countenance the idle ceremony of allowing
recovery by the trustee only to compel him to account to the benefici-
ary who would then have to pay the proceeds to the original
defendant."'1
138. Id.
139. 290 U.S. 365 (1933).
140. Id. at 370.
141. Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 533-34 (1937). The district court held in favor of
the trust, but the decision was reversed on appeal to the Frst Circuit. Stone v. White,
8 F. Supp. 354, 355 (D. Mass. 1934), rev'd, 78 F.2d 136 (1st Cir.1935), affd, 301 U.S.
532 (1937).
142. Stone, 301 U.S. at 534.
143. The Court acknowledged that the action was an action at law, but went on to
state: "It is the lineal successor of the common count indebitatus assumpsit for money
had and received." Id. "The statutes authorizing tax refunds and suits for their recov-
ery are predicated upon the same equitable principles that underlie an action in as-
sumpsit for money had and received." I&. at 535.
144. The Court stated:
Since, in this type of action, the plaintiff must recover by virtue of a right
measured by equitable standards, it follows that it is open to the defendant
to show any state of facts which, according to those standards, would deny
the right, even without resort to the modem statutory authority for pleading
equitable defenses in actions which are more strictly legal.
Id. (citations omitted).
145. Id. at 537.
146. Id.
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The Stone Court appears to have been weighing three considera-
tions: (1) compelling public policy; (2) the actions of the party seeking
the equitable remedy; and (3) the actions of the opposing party in
light of any compelling facts that speak for or against the application
of the remedy.
1) Public Policy
If the trust had prevailed, the result would have been the avoidance
of the beneficiary's just share of tax liability. This would be contrary
to the public interest.147 The Court reasoned that the tax burden on
neither the trust nor the beneficiary was increased by denying the
trust's claim for refund, because the trust was merely a conduit, or
fund, for the beneficiary. 148 Thus, the equitable result was reached-
that is, the beneficiary ultimately footed at least some portion of her
fair tax bill.1 49 The ultimate result was that the integrity of the federal
tax system was preserved, and the federal fisc was protected.
2) The Actions of the Party Seeking Recoupment
Because the government was the party requesting recoupment in
Stone, the actions of the government must be carefully scrutinized.
The first question should be whether the government used due dili-
gence, or whether its actions or inactions contributed to its dilemma.
The Supreme Court did not address this issue as clearly as the appel-
late court did. Because of the then prevailing lower court opinions
holding that payments from a trust to a beneficiary in lieu of a dower
interest constituted a nontaxable return of capital to the extent of the
value of the dower interest, the government could not assess the bene-
ficiary. Therefore, it took the only available course of action and as-
sessed the trust. When the Supreme Court later clarified that the
beneficiary was the proper taxable entity, it was then statutorily too
late for the government to assess the beneficiary. Thus, neither the
defense of laches nor the defense of unclean hands could be applied
against the government.
The second question should be whether the government would be
unjustly enriched if it prevailed in its request for recoupment. Under
the reasoning of the Supreme Court, the answer was no. The govern-
ment was clearly entitled to a tax on the income distributed to the
beneficiary, and but for the statute of limitations, the government
would have been able to assess this liability.'50 According to the
147. Md
148. Id. at 537-38.
149. The Court stated: "Since in equity the one taxpayer represents and acts for
the other, it is not for either to complain that the government has taken from one with
its right hand, when it has, because of the same error, given to the other with its left."
Id. at 538.
150. Id. at 537-38.
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Court, the underassessment of the beneficiary and the overassessment
of the trust were the result of "excusable" error on the part of the
government because of the "persistent judicial declarations."151 Thus,
the Court found no facts upon which to deny the government the right
to recoup from the trust the tax that the beneficiary was obligated to
pay.' 2
3) The Actions of the Opposing Party: Are There Factors for or
Against the Use of Recoupment?
The next question should be whether it is fair to the opposing party,
the trust in this case, to allow the government to use equitable recoup-
ment. Because of the identity of interest between the trust and the
beneficiary in Stone, the logical conclusion was that the beneficiary
would be unjustly enriched if the trust prevailed. This conclusion
brings us back full circle to the public policy argument because the
parties cannot be considered in isolation. If the beneficiary is unjustly
enriched by avoiding her fair share of tax liability, such a result could
ultimately have a detrimental effect on the taxpaying public.
b. Elements Applied in Stone
There are two further interesting aspects of the Stone decision.
First, while the Court did not hesitate to apply an equitable remedy
and to reach an equitable result, it struggled with the label to be ap-
plied to the remedy. In one instance the label was estoppel.153 In
another, it was a defense "comparable to an equitable recoupment or
diminution of petitioners' right to recover."'1 Thus, it becomes diffi-
cult to articulate clearly the elements of the remedy when even the
Court was not certain what the remedy was.
The other interesting aspect of Stone is what the Court did not say.
Nowhere did it directly mention the single transaction issue which
predominated the opinion in Bull, although a single transaction was
also clearly at issue in Stone. One rationale is that the Court did not
151. Id. at 537.
152. Note that the government was allowed to recoup only the amount of income
tax liability that had been paid by the trust. The shortfall, representing the difference
between the amount the beneficiary owed and the amount the trust paid, was for-
feited because the statute of limitations prevented the government from collecting
that amount from the beneficiary. It could not be collected from the trust because it
was not an obligation of the trust. Md at 534.
For a contrary decision, see Smith v. United States, 373 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1966),
where under similar circumstances to those of Stone, the government was denied the
use of equitable recoupment. In Smith, the beneficiary had only a limited interest in
the trust (he could not encumber the trust and the trust was not liable for his debts),
and his entire interest had been distributed to him. Because the beneficiary was not
before the court, the trustee and remainderman stood to be adversely affected if the
government prevailed and the beneficiary did not repay the trust. Id. at 423-24.
153. Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 538 (1937).
154. Id. at 539.
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consider itself confined to this element. Nevertheless, it is odd that
the Court did not mention the issue for two reasons. First, it had
taken such pains to stress the issue in Bull, a case decided only the
previous year by the same court. Second, it would appear that in
Stone the single transaction element would be even more crucial than
in Bull, because in Stone the Court had to come to grips with the fact
that there were two separate taxpayers involved, with the transaction
as the unifying theme. Instead, the Stone Court appeared to be more
concerned with viewing the case as a whole and applying the remedy
in a manner designed to achieve the greatest equity. The significance
of this broad-spectrum remedy is that it provides great flexibility while
furthering both the revenue-raising function of the tax laws and the
public perception of fairness.
3. McEachern v. Rose'
A few months after the Stone decision, the Supreme Court again
addressed the issue of equitable recoupment in McEachern v. Rose.
In McEachern, an estate filed income tax returns and paid an income
tax attributable to taxable years 1928 through 1931, on amounts re-
ceived in those years under an installment obligation of the decedent,
treating each year's receipt as a sale. This treatment was, in fact, erro-
neous. Instead, the administrator should have included in income the
difference between the fair market value of the obligation on the date
of the decedent's death in 1928, less the basis of the obligation. 56 An
income tax was due on this difference in 1928, the year of the dece-
dent's death, but no tax was due on the obligation after that time.
The estate filed a claim for refund of the amount of income taxes
paid in taxable years 1929 through 1931. At the time the refund claim
was filed, the assessment and collection of the 1928 income tax were
barred by the statute of limitations. 57 The Commissioner denied the
estate's claim on the ground that the estate was not entitled to a re-
fund as a matter of equity because the barred deficiency exceeded the
amount of the overpayment. 58
The estate then brought suit against the Commissioner in the fed-
eral district court. The court held in favor of the taxpayer, but its
decision was reversed by the Fifth Circuit. 5 9 The Fifth Circuit rea-
soned that the taxpayer owed the tax liability and "ought not in good
conscience ... have [it] back."' 60 The Supreme Court reversed, up-
155. 302 U.S. 56 (1937).
156. The basis of the obligation was defined as the excess of the face amount of the
obligation over the amount returnable as income if the obligation is satisfied in full.
L at 58 n.1.
157. Idt at 57, 60.
158. Id at 58.
159. See McEachern v. White, 86 F.2d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 1936), rev'd sub nom. Mc-
Eachern v. Rose, 302 U.S. 56 (1937).
160. Id
[Vol. 65
1996] EQUITABLE RECOUPMENT 727
holding the integrity of the statute of limitations.t 6' The Court distin-
guished Stone by characterizing the McEachern income tax
overpayments as statutory overpayments, ascertained and credited af-
ter the expiration of the 1928 statute of limitations.' "
Most commentators view the McEachern decision as severely re-
stricting the application of recoupment because the Court did not ap-
ply the remedy, nor did the opinion even mention recoupment.1 63
Consequently, the decision has created much confusion, emanating
primarily from a strained interpretation of the term "single transac-
tion."' ' The Supreme Court, however, did not mention the single
transaction element, nor did it appear to take such a narrow view of
the limitations of recoupment. 65
161. McEachem v. Rose, 302 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1937).
162. Id; see also Lyeth v. Hoey, 112 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1940) (citing McEachern in
holding that the government was not entitled to recoup a barred estate tax deficiency
against an open refund claim arising from an illegal assessment).
163. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 13, at 606 ("McEachern left almost the entire
viability of equitable recoupment in federal taxation in grave doubt."); NYU Note,
supra note 100, at 545 ("The pall cast on recoupment by McEacizern was reflected in
the lower federal courts, which subsequently denied recoupment to both taxpayer and
Commissioner."). But see McConnell, supra note 7, at 594-600 (arguing that McEach-
ern was not a recoupment case).
164. Consider for instance, Professor Andrews's statement:
Although the overall transaction-the sale and use of the installment
method-might be broadly viewed as a single [transaction], nonetheless the
death of the decedent can reasonably be treated as a separate event, even
though it triggered the acceleration. So also can the administrator's continu-
ing to report on the installment method for each of the post-death years be
reasonably construed as events distinct from the decedent's death.
Andrews, supra note 13, at 611. He then adds that McEachern is "at least potentially
reconcilable on the basis that the failure of the same or single transaction element ...
resulted in the inapplicability of equitable recoupment." Id.
Such a construction strains the bounds of logic, however. Both the overpayment
and the subsequent refund claim relate to a single event-the transfer of the install-
ment obligation to the estate. This event should have triggered an estate tax liability,
but the administrator instead treated the payments as income. Under Andrews's the-
ory, a decedent's death will usually be considered a separate event, which would mean
that recoupment would rarely be considered an appropriate remedy when an estate
tax is involved. Yet Andrews uses the estate taxlincome tax model as an example of
the modem application of recoupment. I at 598; see also Estate of Vitt v. United
States, 706 F.2d 871, 875 (8th Cir. 1983) (describing government's argument that ini-
tial events were the deaths of husband and wife but holding that single transaction
was transfer of property by the estate to the children).
165. Instead, in both Stone and McEachern the Court focused on the timing of the
payment of the tax liability. In Stone, the assessment and payment of the income tax
by the trust were made within the statutory period, in accordance with then applicable
case law. It was not until Butterworth v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 365 (1933), two years
later, that the proper taxable entity was identified. Stone thus begs the question of
what constitutes a statutory overpayment.
In McEachern, on the other hand, the issue was more complex. The estate had
made payments of income tax from 1928 through 1931. The statute of limitations for
assessment of the 1928 income tax liability expired after the estate made the 1929
income tax payment. Thus, the payments made in 1930 and 1931 were clearly statu-
tory overpayments, made after the collection of the 1928 tax was barred. The 1928
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On the other hand, the Court did give significant weight to the fact
that the open claim was a refund claim and the refund at issue was
attributable to a statutory overpayment, rather than an overpayment
on the merits.' 66 According to the statute, such an overpayment must
be "credited or refunded to the taxpayer if claim therefor is filed
within the period of limitation for filing such claim.' 67 Recoupment,
as an equitable remedy, cannot override a statute that is directly appli-
cable. Thus, it was appropriate under this theory that recoupment was
not applied in McEachern.
The failure of the Supreme Court to apply recoupment in McEach-
ern raises the issue of whether Bull and Stone are inconsistent with
McEachern. If so, are Bull and Stone still valid decisions? If not, why
did the reasoning of McEachern not apply in Stone where the defi-
ciency against the trust was paid after the statute of limitations had
run against further assessment of the beneficiary?
If the Court had employed the same strict statutory rationale in
Stone that it had in McEachern, recoupment would not have applied
because the income tax payment of the trust was made after the expi-
ration of the statute of limitations against further assessment of the
beneficiary. Thus, the income tax payment in Stone, under the ration-
ale of McEachern, should also have constituted a statutory overpay-
ment to which recoupment would not apply. But although a different
result was reached in Stone, McEachern did not explicitly overrule
Stone. Perhaps this is because Stone and McEachern are not necessar-
ily inconsistent. The Stone Court engaged in a legal fiction to con-
clude that the trust and the beneficiary were one taxable entity. This
effectively transformed what would have been a statutory overpay-
ment into no overpayment at all.' 68 Because of this legal fiction, the
statute remained open for assessment against the trustees; thus the
open refund could be timely credited against the otherwise barred de-
ficiency in the manner of Lewis v. Reynolds.
This raises the question of why a similar legal fiction was not em-
ployed in McEachern. The answer to that question is that Stone in-
volved a trust and a single beneficiary, while McEachern involved a
decedent and an estate. The tax against the trust in Stone affected
only the single beneficiary. In McEachern, a tax against the estate
and 1929 payments were potentially available to offset the estate's refund claim. The
problem, however, was that at the time the payments were made, the tax liability had
not been ascertained or assessed. Therefore, any credit of these payments against any
outstanding tax liability would occur after the statute of limitations on assessment had
expired. McEachern, 302 U.S. at 60-62.
166. Ia- at 60.
167. lId (quoting Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 607, 45 Stat. 791, 874).
168. Instead, the overpayment arose later, in 1933, after the Supreme Court de-
cided that such trusts were not the proper taxpayers. The Stone Court apparently
decided that its 1933 decision did not have sufficient retroactive effect to transform
the payment by the trust into a statutory overpayment.
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would affect the residual beneficiaries. The identity of interest ele-
ment of Stone has been strictly construed by the courts to apply only
when no third parties would be adversely affected by the
recoupment.169
On the other hand, the equities in Stone favored the application of
recoupment because the government had raised questions about the
deficiency prior to the lapse of the statute of limitations (i.e., it had
exhibited some degree of diligence). This was not the case in
McEachern.
It is strange that the McEachern Court did not mention the Bull
decision. This suggests either that Bull was tacitly approved or that
the facts of Bull were substantially different from those of McEach-
em.170 It has been postulated that McEachern is reconcilable with
Bull because McEachern did not involve two different, inconsistent
taxes imposed on a single transaction; therefore, recoupment was not
an appropriate remedy in McEachem. 7 1 But the Supreme Court has
neither stated nor implied that recoupment applies only to cases in-
volving two different taxes, although admittedly, the majority of the
subsequent lower court cases seem to support the two tax theory.
On the equities alone, however, McEachern is distinguishable from
Bull and Stone. In McEachern, the government requested recoup-
ment because the taxpayer's actions were inconsistent-the taxpayer
initially admitted that it owed an income tax liability, then later re-
quested a refund. But the taxpayer's inconsistency was the result of
an honest mistake. The estate was not trying to avoid its fair share of
tax liability. This was evident because it had flagged the existence of
the installment sale income on multiple income tax returns."7
169. See supra note 152.
170. See Boyle v. United States, 355 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1965) (concluding, on
facts similar to Bull, that McEachern did not apply because it presented a different
situation from Bull, which was verified by McEaczern's failure to mention Bull); see
also McConnell, supra note 7, at 594-95 (postulating that McEachern was not a re-
coupment case because recoupment was neither pleaded by the parties nor mentioned
by the Court). But see American Light & Traction Co. v. Harrison, 142 F.2d 639, 642
(7th Cir. 1944) (noting that the Court did address the substance of the defense of
recoupment, regardless of the label).
171. See McConnell, supra note 7, at 597-98 (stating that McEaciern did not in-
volve a single transaction because there were two tax claims with different bases; nor
was recoupment at issue because it was not pleaded); Legatzke, supra note 20, at 872
("Because McEachern did not involve the subjection of a single taxable event to two
inconsistent theories of taxation, a requirement of the equitable recoupment doctrine,
the case failed to qualify under that doctrine."). But see Andrews, supra note 13, at
611 (suggesting that the death of the decedent, the sale of stock, and use of the install-
ment method for each of the post-death years all constituted separate transactions).
172. The Court noted the fact that the taxpayer/estate had not made erroneous
statements that caused the government to fail to assess the income tax deficiency.
McEachern v. Rose, 302 U.S. 56, 59 (1937); cf Lofquist Realty Co. v. Commissioner,
102 F.2d 945, 948 (7th Cir. 1939) (denying recoupment to taxpayer and distinguishing
McEachern on ground that in case at bar, government's failure to assess was attributa-
ble to taxpayer's wrongful omissions).
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On the other hand, the government missed two opportunities to as-
sess the deficiency in a timely manner: once when the estate filed the
initial income tax return, including only a partial gain from the install-
ment sale, and a second time when the estate filed an income tax re-
turn for the taxable year 1929, again including only the partial gain.
Thus, the government was not diligent in McEachern, as it had been in
Stone, nor was there any fundamental unfairness which offended the
sensibilities in McEachern, as there had been in Bull.
Another factor in McEachern which distinguishes it from Bull and
Stone is that McEachern involved multiple tax years. Clearly, the es-
tate owed an income tax liability in 1928, part of which it paid. The
taxpayer was not entitled to a refund of that amount. The 1930 and
1931 payments, however, constituted statutory overpayments, remit-
ted by the estate and credited by the government after the statute of
limitations had lapsed against assessment of the 1928 income tax lia-
bility. Both Bull and Stone involved overpayments on the merits.
This is a significant distinction because an equitable remedy cannot
override a statutory provision on point.173 To allow the government
to use recoupment to defeat the taxpayer's refund attributable to
those years would be tantamount to using recoupment as an in-
dependent action, rather than as a defense, as it was intended.
The 1929 payment, however, did not constitute a statutory overpay-
ment at the time it was remitted by the estate. Nevertheless, the
Court characterized the payment as such because the government did
not attempt to ascertain the amount of the deficiency and to credit the
income tax overpayment against it until the statute of limitations for
assessment against the estate had lapsed. 74
173. See G.W. Keeton, An Introduction to Equity 96 (6th ed. 1965) ("If equity was
free to accept or reject the common law rules according to whether these rules fitted
in with the more progressive policy of the Court of Chancery or not, equity was not
similarly free to accept or reject the provisions of a statute.").
174. See McEachern, 302 U.S. at 61-62; cf. Elbert v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 892, 896
(1943) (citing McEachern and its reasoning and refusing to allow taxpayer to recoup
barred refund against open deficiency). Note that the point at which an overpayment
was deemed credited was not defined or explained under the Revenue Act of 1928.
Instead, the courts looked to the administrative practice of the IRS to determine
when this point was reached. See, e.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 282 U.S. 468, 475-
76 (1931) (stating that date of allowance for overpayment of taxes was date on which
the Commissioner approved the certified schedule); United States v. Boston Buick
Co., 282 U.S. 476, 478 (1931) (same with respect to allowance of credit for interest).
The problem this raises, though, is that a case can be overruled and an administrative
practice can be changed, thereby effectively amending the statutory interpretation.
Compare Weinroth v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 430, 434-40 (1980) (strictly interpreting
I.R.C. § 6212, which provides that a notice of deficiency must be sent to taxpayer's
last known address) with Looper v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 690, 696-97 (1980) (hold-
ing a notice of deficiency valid, despite that it was not sent to taxpayer's last known
address, because taxpayer received notice in time to file a Tax Court petition, and
thus, was not prejudiced), acq., 1984-2 C.B. 1.
Moreover, there is currently a split in the circuits as to whether a payment or a
deposit has been made if the taxpayer has paid an admitted liability in advance of a
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This raises the interesting question of why a similar characterization
was not employed in Bull, where the statute of limitations on the es-
tate tax refund had lapsed when the estate tax overpayment was
credited against the open income tax deficiency. A strict construction
of the statute in Bull would have produced the same result as in Mc-
Eachern; however, McEachern did not present the compelling equities
of Bull.
If one focuses on the equities and assumes that the application of
recoupment depends upon compelling facts, McEachern then be-
comes a case of statutory construction to which recoupment does not
apply. This is borne out by the fact that the Court does not mention
recoupment in the McEachern decision, even though McEachern was
decided shortly after Bull and Stone by roughly the same court.175
Further proof of the importance of the equities lies in the Court's dis-
tinction of Stone on the ground that "[e]quitable considerations not
within the reach of the statutes denied a recovery" to the taxpayer. 76
4. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co.'17
The Electric Storage Battery Co. had paid excise taxes on the sale
of its storage batteries from 1919 to 1926 under the mistaken belief
that such taxes were owed. In 1926, it filed a claim for refund of the
taxes paid between 1922 and 1926, the prior years being barred by the
statute of limitations. After successfully litigating the issue, the tax-
payer received a refund in 1935 of the excise taxes paid for the years
in question. 178 Because the excise tax payments had been deducted by
the taxpayer in calculating its income tax liability, the refund repre-
sented a return of a tax benefit. Thus, the taxpayer had taxable in-
timely assessment. Compare Ewing v. United States, 914 F.2d 499, 505 (4th Cir. 1990)(holding that payment made pursuant to a closing agreement without assessment con-
stituted a payment, not a deposit), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 905 (1991) with Ford v.
United States, 618 F.2d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that there can be no payment
of taxes prior to assessment, but noting that the precedent upon which it relied should
be overruled). The Supreme Court had decided that a payment under protest consti-
tutes a deposit, not a payment. Rosenman v. United States, 323 U.S. 658, 662-63
(1945). Lower courts are divided, however, on the significance of Rosenman.
175. Bull, Stone, and McEachern were all decided within a two-and-a-half year pe-
riod, with Stone and McEachern decided just months apart. The composition of the
Court was identical in the Bull and Stone cases, and the composition of the McEach-
ern court was not substantially different. In Bull and Stone, Charles Evans Hughes
was Chief Justice with Associate Justices Louis Brandeis, Harlan Stone, Owen Rob-
erts, Willis Van Devanter, James McReynolds, Benjamin Cardozo, Pierce Butler, and
George Sutherland. There was one change in the McEachern court: Hugo Black had
replaced Willis Van Devanter.
176. McEachern, 302 U.S. at 63. The Court added: "It was enough, in the peculiar
facts of the case, that the trustees had suffered no burden and that the Government
was not unjustly enriched." Id
177. 329 U.S. 296 (1946).
178. The ultimate amount of the refund was $1,395,515.35. Of this amount,
$852,151.52 represented tax, and the balance represented interest. Id. at 298.
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come attributable to the refund. The government then assessed an
additional amount of income and excess profits taxes, with interest, on
this income. 17 9 The taxpayer sought to recoup the barred excise tax it
had previously paid against the current income and excess profits tax
deficiency, but its claim was denied.180
The Supreme Court, citing Bull and Stone and emphasizing the sin-
gle transaction aspect, opined:
[Recoupment] has never been thought to allow one transaction to
be offset against another, but only to permit a transaction which is
made the subject of suit by a plaintiff to be examined in all its as-
pects, and judgment to be rendered that does justice in view of the
one transaction as a whole.'81
The Court also rejected the conclusion of the appellate court that re-
coupment was a fairness doctrine, to be broadly applied and not to be
limited to the narrow confines of a single transaction.182 Instead, the
Court stressed the importance of the integrity of the statute of limita-
tions, concluding that the statute itself was a fairness doctrine based
on compelling public policy that should not be undermined.18 3
The Court further noted that many cases involve either hardships to
the taxpayer or loss of revenue to the government. 18 The fact that
such considerations are involved does not necessarily mean that re-
coupment is an appropriate remedy. In fact, it is only in extraordinary
cases, in which a strict application of the law would so offend the sen-
sibilities, that recoupment is appropriate. 85 In Rothensies, for exam-
ple, if one were looking solely to factual fairness, a case could be made
for both parties. The taxpayer had overpaid its tax liability for the
three taxable years in question and clearly would have been entitled
to a refund if a claim had been timely filed. The taxpayer's income tax
deficiency arose because of the recovery of the earlier tax benefit-
the deductions of excise tax payments against its income tax liability
179. The additional income and excess profits taxes plus interest totaled
$229,805.34, which the Commissioner attributed to the 1935 taxable year because that
was the year the refund was received by the taxpayer. Id
180. Id.
181. Id at 299.
182. Id. at 300-01.
183. The Court reasoned:
It probably would be all but intolerable, at least Congress has regarded it as
ill-advised, to have an income tax system under which there never would
come a day of final settlement and which required both the taxpayer and the
Government to stand ready forever and a day to produce vouchers, prove
events, establish values and recall details of all that goes into an income tax
contest. Hence, a statute of limitation is an almost indispensable element of
fairness as well as of practical administration of an income tax policy.
Id. at 301.
184. Id at 302.
185. The Court stated: "If there are to be exceptions to the statute of limitations, it
is for Congress rather than for the courts to create and limit them." Id. at 303.
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for the taxable years 1922 through 26.1s1 The taxpayer argued that the
amount of excise tax it had erroneously overpaid for the now barred
taxable years 1919 through 1922, which the taxpayer could not other-
wise recoup, should offset the amount of the current income tax defi-
ciency because the deficiency was triggered by an excise tax refund.'87
Solely from the taxpayer's perspective, the government had received
more net revenue from the taxpayer than it was entitled to receive.
Therefore, the government should be estopped from arguing that the
taxpayer now owes more.
From the government's perspective, while the taxpayer would
clearly have been entitled to a refund of the excise taxes for the taxa-
ble years in question if the claim had been timely filed, nevertheless,
the fact was that the taxpayer never filed such a claim. Instead, the
taxpayer sought recoupment of the overpaid taxes sixteen years after
their recovery was precluded by the statute of limitations.' ss
The statute of limitations was designed to prevent such a considera-
tion of stale claims. The Court pointed out that occasionally the limi-
tations bar will result in unfairness, but the greater good is served by
maintaining the integrity of both the statute and the fis.1 s9 Thus, re-
coupment is an extraordinary remedy.
In determining whether recoupment should apply, a court must not
only weigh the equities, but it must also consider tax policy. A prob-
lem for the Electric Storage Battery Co. was that there were multiple
tax years involved. The excise tax payment and its corresponding in-
come tax deduction in each year constituted a single transaction.
When the taxpayer received a refund of excise taxes paid in taxable
years 1922 through 1926, the refund with respect to each taxable year
represented a separate return of a tax benefit, giving rise to a discrete
income tax deficiency in each of those years. The earlier excise tax
payments in taxable years 1919 to 1922 had generated their own in-
come tax deductions. Thus, the earlier tax years involved separate
considerations. The excise tax overpayments from these earlier years
and the income tax deficiency attributable to the later taxable years
did not constitute a single transaction. 90 Therefore, the earlier over-
payments could not offset the later deficiency. The shortcoming of the
186. IL at 298.
187. Id
188. Although the Supreme Court did not characterize the case directly as a laches
case, preferring instead to decide the issue under the single transaction element, Roth-
ensies is characterized as a laches case in Boyle v. United States, 355 F.2d 233,236 (3d
Cir. 1965). Moreover, the Rothensies Court implied the laches argument: "Ibat
claims dead so long can be resurrected under this doctrine, is enough to show its
menace to the statute of limitations ..... Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co.,
329 U.S. 296, 303 (1946).
189. Rothensies, 329 U.S. at 302.
190. Note, however, that three justices, Murphy, Black, and Rutledge, dissented in
Rothensies on the ground that they believed the claim for refund attributable to the
taxable years 1919-22 was part of the same transaction as the government's assess-
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Rothensies decision is that the Court did not discuss the single transac-
tion issue, nor did it elaborate on why the equities compelled the
result.
Many commentators regard McEachern and Rothensies as a retreat
by the Supreme Court from its earlier view that recoupment might be
accorded a broad scope.191 But the equities in Bull and Stone were so
heavily weighted in favor of the prevailing party that they compelled
the application of an equitable remedy. It was under these factual
circumstances that the equitable remedy overrode the statutory bar.
In Rothensies, on the other hand, the equities were not weighted in
favor of either party. The excise tax overpayments in the earlier years
were the result of an honest mistake on the part of both the taxpayer
and the government. The taxpayer requested recoupment, yet the
taxpayer's honest error and lack of diligence had caused its dilemma.
The government, on the other hand, was not attempting to hide its
own mistake (i.e., lack of diligence) behind the statutory bar. Neither
of the parties would be unjustly enriched if the remedy were not ap-
plied. On the contrary, if equitable recoupment had applied, it would
have had the effect of lifting the statute of limitations to cure the tax-
payer's own inadvertence and lack of diligence. Moreover, the tax-
payer's overpayments were tempered somewhat by the tax benefit the
taxpayer obtained with respect to those overpayments.
Under purely equitable considerations, the primary inquiry should
be whether public policy concerns demand application of the remedy
or, stated differently, whether the integrity of the federal tax system
would be injured if the remedy were not applied. Because the pur-
pose of the statute of limitations is to prevent the litigation of stale
claims, this purpose would have been thwarted in Rothensies if the
taxpayer had prevailed.
III. SUBSEQUENT CASES AND THE RESULTING ELEMENTS
Based on the four Supreme Court cases, two important elements
determine the applicability of equitable recoupment: (1) an inconsis-
tency based on a single transaction and (2) a single taxpayer or an
identity of interest sufficient to consider two taxpayers as a single unit.
A third element has emerged from the subsequent lower court cases-
ment in 1935 of additional taxes for the taxable years 1922-26. Id. at 303 (Murphy,
Black, & Rutledge, JJ., dissenting).
191. See, e.g., Wood v. United States, 213 F.2d 660, 661 (2d Cir. 1954) ("The gap in
statutes of limitation created by the recoupment doctrine in tax cases seemed at one
time to be fairly wide. But the gap has been narrowed markedly by McEachern v.
Rose and Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co." (citations omitted)); Babcock &
Wi6lcox Co. v. Pedrick, 212 F.2d 645, 648-49 n.1 (2d Cir. 1954) ("Rothensies... shows
that novel extensions of the doctrine thus applicable in the instance of the barred
claim will not be tolerated in tax litigation:"), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 936 (1955); see
also Gindes v. United States, 661 F.2d 194, 200 n.18 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (attributing this
retreat to the enactment of the mitigation provisions).
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two different taxes-because these cases have largely involved pre-
cisely this situation. In addition, the Supreme Court has recently
stressed that recoupment is a defense, not an affirmative remedy.192
Further, there is apparently a growing trend requiring the party re-
questing recoupment to have engaged in self-help before bringing
suit.19
3
While these three elements are easily articulated, they are not as
easily applied, primarily because they have been inconsistently inter-
preted by the lower courts. The most important element, albeit the
most problematic, is the single transaction.
A. Single Transaction
If inconsistent tax treatment arises out of a single transaction, the
claimant should not require the protection of the statute of limitations
in seeking relief. Because of the single transaction, the claimant, by
definition, has the necessary records and witnesses. The recoupment
defense can be addressed adequately without resort to stale records or
different proof. Therefore, the remedy should be available only in
cases in which "both the plaintiff's course of action and the defend-
ant's claim in reduction thereof [are] susceptible of adjustment in one
adjudication."' 94
The problem, however, is that the term "single transaction" is sus-
ceptible to inconsistent interpretations." 5 The result is an inadequate
192. See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1990) (quoting Rothensies,
329 U.S. at 299 and Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1935).
193. See, e.g., Estate of Mann v. United States, 731 F.2d 267, 279 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding that government could not recoup barred income tax deficiency against open
estate tax overpayment because it failed to protect itself against the statute of limita-
tions on bad debts); Kellogg-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United States, 330 F.2d 635, 639
(Ct. CL 1964) (denying taxpayer relief because taxpayer failed to act for 10 months
and allowed statute to run without filing protective refund claim); Holzer v. United
States, 250 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Wis.) (denying taxpayer recoupment because taxpayer
failed to file timely protective claim which would have preserved right to refund),
affd per curiam, 367 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
194. McConnell, supra note 7, at 584 (citing Wheat v. Dotson, 12 Ark. 699, 703
(1852)); accord Mills v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 738, 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1940) (finding
that doctrine of recoupment is appropriate if the claims arise out of the same subject
matter). But see United States v. Cummins Distilleries Corp., 166 F2d 17, 22-23 (6th
Cir. 1948) (disregarding single transaction element and instead concentrating on un-just retention in holding that taxpayer is entitled to offset a barred refund against an
unrelated tax liability).
195. The U.S. Supreme Court itself has admitted the difficulty of defining the term:
"'Transaction' is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many
occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as
upon their logical relationship." Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610
(1926), quoted in McConnell, supra note 7, at 584; see also supra note 190 (discussing
Rothensies dissent).
Part of the problem with the single transaction element is that many courts inter-
pret the Rothensies decision as strictly limiting equitable recoupment in general, and
the single transaction element in particular. See e.g., Estate of Mitchell v. United
States, 645 F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D. Fla. 1986) ("Rosenthies [sic] thus established that
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remedy. Thus, while the single transaction is considered the most im-
portant element, it also has caused the most confusion among the
lower courts.
Much of this confusion has been attributed to the Supreme Court's
indications in Rothensies that recoupment is a narrow remedy.196 The
depth of the confusion is illustrated by two decisions of the Court of
Claims.
1. Ford v. United States'97
In Ford v. United States, the plaintiffs were brother and sister who,
as minors, had inherited stock in a Brazilian corporation from their
father. This stock was included in the gross estate at a value of
$11,857.50. Shortly before the estate tax statute of limitations expired,
the IRS sent plaintiffs a statutory notice of deficiency. In this notice,
the IRS proposed a significant increase in estate tax liability, 98 attrib-
utable primarily to the inclusion in the estate of the proceeds of cer-
tain life insurance policies. There was also a proposed increase in the
valuation of the Brazilian stock to $23,715.199
The plaintiffs filed suit in the Tax Court, complaining of the inclu-
sion of the insurance proceeds. They did not complain about the in-
crease in the stock valuation or the resulting estate tax deficiency.20°
The Tax Court ultimately held in favor of the plaintiffs on the exclu-
sion of the insurance proceeds, and the plaintiffs paid the resulting
deficiency attributable to the increased stock valuation.
In 1947, the plaintiffs sold the stock in question, filing an income tax
return, using as their basis $13,809.02.2°1 Subsequently, the plaintiffs
filed a claim for refund alleging that they had misstated their basis.
They maintained that the basis had been miscalculated originally, ar-
equitable recoupment is not a flexible doctrine, but.., is to be strictly limited to those
cases presenting facts similar to Bull. Consequently, the doctrine is only allowed as a
defense to an asserted claim and only when it arises out of the same transaction.");
Mann v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 1132, 1140 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (citing Rothensies for
the proposition that equitable recoupment "is not a flexible doctrine, but a doctrine
strictly limited, and limited for good reason"), aff'd, 731 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1984).
196. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 301 (1946) (opining
that the lower court misconstrued the limitations of recoupment); see also Wood v.
United States, 213 F.2d 660, 661 (2d Cir. 1954) ("[We think [the remedy] lacks all
vitality unless there has occurred a 'single taxable event."'); Wood v. United States,
121 F. Supp. 769, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (holding that government mischaracterized
bond premium deduction as two transactions-purchase and sale-and citing Rothen-
sies), affd, 213 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1954).
197. 276 F.2d 17 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
198. The original estate tax liability was calculated to be $439.61. The deficiency
notice proposed increasing the liability to $52,221.61. Id at 19.
199. This proposed increase was attributable to a discrepancy in the conversion fac-
tor used by the estate for converting Brazilian currency into U.S. dollars. Id.
200. In fact, the executors, in briefs filed before the court, affirmatively approved
the new valuation. Id.
201. I at 20. It is unclear how plaintiffs derived this figure.
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guing that the true basis was greater than both that determined in the
earlier Tax Court proceeding and the amount realized on the sale of
the stock.' Their refund claim was denied by the IRS, and the plain-
tiffs filed suit in the Court of Claims.
The government argued first that the doctrines of estoppel, release,
waiver, or res judicata should apply to deny the plaintiffs the right to
change the basis which they had effectively misrepresented and which
had already been determined by the Tax Court.2 In holding for the
plaintiffs, however, the Court of Claims emphasized the true value of
the stock and the correct tax treatment 2°4
On its own motion, the court further considered the issue of
whether recoupment applied to credit the open refund attributable to
the overpayment of income tax against the resulting barred underpay-
ment of estate tax. The court reasoned that the remedy would have
been appropriate if not for Rothensies, because Rothensies had indi-
cated that the scope of recoupment was a narrow one. 05 Therefore, it
concluded, recoupment was not available to the government in this
case. Beyond this limited reasoning, however, the court did not give
any further indication of why recoupment should not apply.
But the established elements for the application of recoupment
were all met. The subsequent increase in the basis of the stock di-
rectly caused an automatic estate tax deficiency, the collection of
which was barred by the statute of limitations. Thus the single trans-
action element appeared to have been met; yet, the court summarily
dismissed any further consideration of recoupment.2 6
Another factor favoring the application of recoupment is that the
main claim, the refund claim, was timely filed. Thus, there was neither
a statutory overpayment as in McEachern nor an initial statute of limi-
tations problem to prevent the consideration of recoupment. If the
statute of limitations were not a bar to a consideration of all the is-
sues, the taxpayers should clearly have lost. In that event, there would
202. IL
203. 1L at 21.
204. The Ford decision is inconsistent with the decision of the Court of Claims in
Robbins v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 403 (CL CI. 1937), in which the court considered
the issue of basis where the taxpayer had improperly failed to report a gain upon
receipt of stock. After the statute of limitations had run, the taxpayer sold the stock
and attempted to use the higher market value at the time of receipt as the true basis.
The court, holding in favor of the government, concluded that "'in good conscience
and honest dealing' a party ought not to be permitted to repudiate his previous state-
ments, declarations, or actions." Id at 407 (paraphrasing Rothschild v. Title Guar. &
Trust Co., 97 N.E. 879, 881 (N.Y. 1912)).
205. Ford v. United States, 276 F.2d 17, 23 (Ct. CL 1960).
206. Id Admittedly, the court did not go so far as to state that the single transac-
tion element had been met, although that clearly seems to be the direction in which it
was heading. The reasoning, however, is obscured by the discussion of Rothensies.
Note that two of the dissenting judges thought that recoupment should apply. I& at
23-24 (Jones, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id at 24-25 (Littleton, J.,
dissenting).
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have been an estate tax underpayment which would have inured to
the benefit of the taxpayers, much as the exclusion of income by the
trust inured to the benefit of the beneficiary in Stone.
The court apparently attached significance to the fact that the gov-
ernment had in its possession data from which to make a correct de-
termination of the value, and thus the basis of the stock. The court
correctly concluded, however, that it was incumbent upon the execu-
tors to report the stock's true value and to pay the correct amount of
estate tax.20 7 Not only did the executors not do this, but they also
acquiesced in the recalculated valuation in the Tax Court proceed-
ing.208 It was only later, after further estate tax assessment was
barred, that the taxpayers contested the Tax Court determination.
Because the basis of the stock had a direct bearing on both the income
tax overpayment and the estate tax deficiency, the court should have
concluded that the single transaction element was satisfied. There-
fore, it should have applied recoupment in favor of the government
because the elements were met and the equities weighed more heavily
in the government's favor. The court did not see it this way, however.
As a result, the taxpayers were unjustly enriched at the expense of the
government.
From a public policy perspective, both the revenue raising function
and the integrity of the tax system are undermined if taxpayers can
avoid their fair share of tax liability by hiding behind the statute of
limitations. The plaintiffs in Ford raised the main claim as a refund
action. In essence, the plaintiffs were conceding that they did not
need the benefit of the statute of limitations because they had their
records in support of the main claim. Thus, with the threshold re-
quirements met, and the equities balanced against the taxpayers, the
government should have prevailed.
It is interesting to note that other equitable remedies might have
applied in Ford, and indeed, their application was urged by the gov-
ernment.20 9 But the court chose to disregard these remedies, reason-
ing that the plaintiffs were minors at the time the estate tax return was
filed, and thus they had no knowledge of what was filed in the re-
turn. 10 Such reasoning is odd, because the plaintiffs were represented
by competent executors-a relative and a corporate fiduciary-cho-
sen by their father to represent their interests. In addition, they may
have had guardians appointed for them.
207. Il at 22.
208. Id. at 19.
209. See supra text accompanying note 203. In addition, laches might have been
applied against the taxpayers because the government was prejudiced in its position
by the taxpayers' failure to act. Moreover, the taxpayers' inaction was not merely
passive because they had, in effect, conceded the basis determination in the earlier
Tax Court proceeding.
210. Ford v. United States, 276 F.2d 17, 22 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
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The Court of Claims' implication that the plaintiffs should be
viewed as distinct from the executors is contrary to the identity of
interest rationale in Stone. Indeed, in Ford as in Stone, the plaintiffs
benefitted directly and improperly from the valuation error.
The court also implied that the government sat on its rights by not
acting on information within its possession, and by not assessing an
additional estate tax on the higher stock valuation. But this argument
would have been based on a passive lack of diligence. In such cases,
the government should not be charged with constructive knowledge of
the estate tax return because of the administrative difficulty of exam-
ining every return.
Finally, it should be noted that the facts of this case are similar to
those of Alamo National Bank.211 But unlike the Fifth Circuit, the
Court of Claims summarily dismissed the argument that the taxpayers
had a duty of consistency in dealing with the government.212
2. Wilmington Trust Co. v. United States213
The lower court decision that has caused the most confusion is Wil-
mington Trust Co. v. United States, in which the government sought to
recoup a barred estate tax deficiency against an open income tax re-
fund. The first issue presented in the consolidated cases of Wilming-
ton Trust was whether certain expenses incurred in connection with
timber sales were ordinary or capital in nature. The taxpayer in each
case had treated the expenses as ordinary and had deducted them
against ordinary income. After the deaths of these taxpayers, the gov-
ernment assessed an income tax deficiency against the estates on the
ground that the expenses represented capital expenditures. The es-
tates paid the deficiencies, deducted the amounts from the respective
gross estates, and subsequently sued for a refund of the income taxes
paid. The lower courts rendered conflicting decisions,214 and an ap-
peal was made to the Court of Claims.
The Court of Claims decided the expenses were ordinary in nature,
thereby entitling the taxpayers to an income tax refund attributable to
211. Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 95 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 304
U.S. 577 (1938). For a discussion of Alamo National Bank, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 77-81.
212. Ford, 276 F.2d at 21-22. But see Hess v. United States, 537 F.2d 457, 462-64
(Ct. CL 1976) (retreating from Ford in holding that the duty of consistency applied on
facts similar to those in Ford), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977). For a discussion of
Ford and Hess in the context of privity of consistency, see Johnson, Duty of Consis-
tency, supra note 9, at 550-52. For a case in accordance with Alamo National Bank,
see Lefever v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 525, 541-46 (1994) (preventing taxpayers from
subsequently changing position with respect to special use valuation after statute of
limitations had run against correction of earlier mistake).
213. 610 F.2d 703 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
214. Id. at 705-07. In the cases of Wilmington Trust and Schutt, the court held the
expenses were capital, while in the case of McMullan, the court held the expenses
were ordinary. Id.
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the foregone corresponding deduction. This raised a problem for the
government: A refund of the entire amount of the income tax over-
payment would create an estate tax deficiency because the income tax
payment initially had been deducted from the gross estate. Further
assessment and collection of the estate tax, however, was precluded
under the statute of limitations.
The government then sought to recoup the barred estate tax defi-
ciency against the open refund claim. The court refused to permit re-
coupment, allowing the taxpayers to collect their full refund without
any estate tax offset and summarily dismissing the government's claim
under the rationale that the single transaction element was not met.2 15
The court based its decision on Rothensies which, it opined, narrowed
the concept of the single transaction.1 6
Professor Andrews correctly criticizes the Wilmington Trust deci-
sion as too narrow a construction of Rothensies.1 7 Andrews argues
that the direct effect of one tax on another is sufficient to constitute a
single transaction. On this issue, Andrews is correct, and the reason-
ing of the Court of Claims is wrong. There was only one set of ex-
penditures involved in Wilmington Trust. The determination that
these expenditures represented expenses deductible against ordinary
income automatically resulted in the estate tax deficiency. Further,
the statute of limitations was not a direct bar to recoupment in either
case.
It is difficult to fathom how the court could conclude that such a
direct connection did not constitute a single transaction. The flaw in
the court's reasoning is apparent from its struggle with the concept of
the single transaction. The court acknowledged that under its view
there are areas in which it is difficult to categorize two events as a
single transaction.2"' Moreover, in neither Wilmington Trust nor Ford
did the Court of Claims provide any substantive reasoning to support
its conclusion.
Professor Andrews regards the Wilmington Trust decision as incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's equitable recoupment cases.2 19 But
while the conclusion of the Court of Claims is inconsistent with the
215. But see McMullan v. United States, 686 F.2d 915, 924 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (granting
relief to government under principle of equitable estoppel in companion case to Wil.
mington Trust).
216. Wilmington Trust, 610 F.2d at 713-15; accord Mann v. United States, 552 F.
Supp. 1132, 1141 (N.D. Tex. 1982) ("'[T]he fact that a single tax determination may
affect the taxes on two transactions does not convert the two transactions into a single
one.' If it did, the doctrine of equitable recoupment would be drastically expanded
beyond the 'limited scope' dictated by Rothensies.. . ." (citation omitted) (quoting
Wilmington Trust, 610 F.2d at 714)), affid, 731 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1984).
217. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 641-43.
218. See Wilmington Trust, 610 F.2d at 714 (stating that some cases are easy to
determine, others are not, and there is a wide range in between; when a case falls in
between, the policy considerations must be examined).
219. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 641-47.
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underlying theory of those cases, the ultimate result in Wilmington
Trust is not necessarily inconsistent.
The Court of Claims indicated in dicta that even if the single trans-
action element had been met, laches might apply against the govern-
ment.2 -0 In fact, the government had sat on its rights in each of the
consolidated cases without acting, and had allowed the statute of limi-
tations to run to its detriment. Moreover, this was not a case of igno-
rance in which the government did not have adequate notice or
knowledge of the claim, as in Ford. Instead, in Wilmington Trust the
expense issues had been litigated; thus, the government was familiar
with the cases, and knew or should have known that the statute would
expire shortly and that its interests were best served by a timely pro-
tective assessment.2 1 Because the government failed to protect itself,
laches could properly have been applied to prevent the application of
equitable recoupment in its favor.
One might at this juncture question the application of laches against
the government in Wilmington Trust when it clearly did not apply
against the taxpayer in Bull. But Bull can be distinguished in several
respects. First, the period of delay in Bull was one month, whereas, in
Wilmington Trust, the period was longer-more than eight months in
one case, and more than one year in the other.mn This distinction
alone, however, may not be very significant because there is no defi-
nite time period to determine the application of laches. Instead,
courts must consider each case on its merits. In Bull, the taxpayer
requested recoupment, so the equities initially should be construed
against the taxpayer. But the government had mistakenly made the
initial determination that there was an estate tax underpayment attrib-
utable to the decedent's partnership interest, and subsequently an in-
come tax deficiency was assessed against this same interest.
The equities were clearly weighted in favor of the taxpayer because
the government had assessed a double tax liability without crediting
220. Wilmington Trust, 610 F.2d at 714.
221. See McMullan v. United States, 686 F.2d 915, 924 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (discussing
protective assessment by the government); see also United States v. Boyle. 469 U.S.
241, 251-52 (1985) (opining that even laymen are held to knowledge of statutory
deadlines).
In informal conferences with the IRS, as well as in the Tax Court, the district court,
or the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, the taxpayer has the burden of proof. The ex-
ception is that the IRS bears the burden in a fraud case, or where new matters or an
additional amount of deficiency are raised after the case has been docketed. Arthur
L Boelter, Representation Before the Appeals Division of the IRS § 7-5.90 (1993).
Moreover, the choice of forum determines the degree of proof. In the Tax Court, the
taxpayer must prove that the IRS is incorrect in its deficiency determination. In re-
fund actions in the district court and the Court of Claims, the taxpayer must prove
that she overpaid her tax liability, that she is entitled to a specific amount of refund
under an appropriate and correct theory for relief, and that her claim for refund was
wrongfully denied. Michael Mulroney, Federal Tax Examinations Manual § 12.3(b)(2)(1985).
222. Wilmington Trust, 610 F.2d at 714-15.
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the earlier tax that had been paid by the taxpayer, and without any
consideration of the fact that it was the government's error that had
caused the estate tax overpayment. It is thus likely that an even
longer delay by the taxpayer would not have prevented the applica-
tion of recoupment. After all, the government has a duty to deal fairly
with its citizens and vice versa? 3
In Wilmington Trust the equities were not as compelling as they
were in Bull. It is unfortunate that the Wilmington Trust court only
obliquely addressed the issue of lack of diligence before dismissing it.
Because recoupment is an extraordinary remedy, it should apply only
to promote fundamental fairness and only when the parties otherwise
have acted diligently and in good faith. It should not be used to cure a
lack of diligence. This reasoning is consistent with the public policy
considerations underlying both the statute of limitations and the fed-
eral tax system.
Professor Andrews notes that the Court of Claims in Wilmington
Trust wisely did not rely upon the government's lack of diligence. 24
He further notes that in the Supreme Court cases, "some lack of dili-
gence on the part of either the taxpayer or the government in the
timely pursuit of its claim does not foreclose the application of equita-
ble recoupment."'' - 5 But this issue was not significant in any of the
four Supreme Court cases. Moreover, the Supreme Court has never
stated or even implied that the issue has no significance. But under
the current recoupment elements, neither lack of diligence nor any of
the other equitable defenses are relevant. 26 In the application of
most other equitable remedies, however, laches is an important de-
fense.227 Perhaps the complexity of the tax laws is the reason that
laches does not appear to have significance in the recoupment cases.
The average taxpayer should not be held to a high standard of dili-
gence with respect to substantive tax provisions, particularly when the
equities are otherwise in the taxpayer's favor. Thus, where the gov-
ernment attempts to extract a double tax by hiding behind the statute
of limitations, the taxpayer's case should not be thwarted by mere pas-
sive inaction. Indeed, equity allows all considerations to be weighed.
223. See, e.g., Rock Island Ark. & La. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143
(1920) ("Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government.");
Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 283, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ("Taxpayers expect,
and are entitled to receive, ordinary fair play from tax officials.").
224. Andrews, supra note 13, at 640.
225. Id. at 618. This opinion is echoed by Tierney, supra note 28, at 127-29.
226. See, e.g., Holzer v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 875, 878 (E.D. Wis.) ("[Liaches
is not a defense to a claim for equitable recoupment.. . ."), affd per curiam, 367 F.2d
822 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Bowcut, 287 F.2d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 1961) (provid-
ing equitable relief to executor even though he did not take advantage of one-month
period to file protective claim for refund after Commissioner asserted an income tax
deficiency).
227. See McClintock, supra note 31, at 71-76.
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B. Single Taxpayer or Identity of Interest
Under Stone, it may be inferred that the single taxpayer element is
defined to include an identity of interest.2' Such an interpretation is
consistent with an examination of the whole situation in light of equi-
table considerations. When presented with separate taxpayers with an
identity of interest, however, courts have very strictly construed the
Stone definition,2 9 displaying none of the flexibility and creativity of
the earlier Supreme Court decisions.
For instance, in Kramer v. United States,73° the Court of Claims held
there was no identity of interest between an estate and a single benefi-
ciary. In Kramer, executors of an estate brought suit against the gov-
ernment alleging that the value of a widow's right to receive weekly
payments from the decedent's employer was wrongfully included in
the gross estate. After the estate paid the estate tax on this inclusion,
the widow filed a claim for refund of the income taxes she had paid on
this amount, alleging that she was entitled to an offset of the estate
taxes attributable to the receipt of income in respect of a decedent. t
The widow's claim was granted.
The Court of Claims subsequently determined that the value of the
widow's right to receive the payments had been improperly included
in the gross estate and that the estate was entitled to a refund of the
estate tax attributable to this amount.232 This produced a correspond-
ing deficiency in the income tax liability, which the government was
barred from assessing at the time of the suit because the statute of
limitations had run. The government then sought to recoup the
barred income tax deficiency against the open estate tax overpayment.
The court held for the estate, concluding that there was insufficient
identity of interest between the estate and the widow because there
were several beneficiaries who, potentially, would be affected by the
recoupment. 33
But while Mrs. Kramer held only a life estate in the corpus with her
children as remaindermen, her interest was actuarially determinable.
As a result of the Court of Claims' decision, Mrs. Kramer was unjustly
enriched at the expense of the government. It was clear that the sin-
gle transaction element had been met. What was not clear was why
228. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
229. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 373 F.2d 419, 422 (4th Cir. 1966) (refusing to
apply recoupment because remainderman was not represented and would be affected
if recoupment were permitted against income beneficiary); Sewell v. United States, 19
F. Supp. 657, 663 (Ct. Cl. 1937) (refusing, on facts similar to Stone, to allow govern-
ment to recoup barred deficiency of income beneficiary against open overpayment of
trust because there was a remainderman, in addition to the income beneficiary, who
would have been injured if recoupment were applied).
230. 406 F.2d 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
231. Kramer, 406 F.2d at 1364-65; see I.R.C. § 691(c) (1994).
232. Kramer, 406 F.2d at 1371.
233. Id
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the court did not give more serious consideration to the offset of the
widow's portion of the overpayment.
Unfortunately, some courts view McEachern and Rothensies as re-
stricting the application of recoupment.3 The reason is that 'the
boundaries of equitable recoupment have not been clearly delineated
by the Supreme Court. Consequently, many lower courts have at-
tempted to fit the remedy into narrowly defined elements and, as a
result, recoupment has become an inflexible, quasi-legal remedy.
C. Two Different Taxes
In his article, Professor Andrews postulates that recoupment, by
definition, most commonly applies when two different types of taxes
are involved in a single transaction. 235 According to Professor An-
drews, there are two different situations in which recoupment is gen-
erally warranted. The first, exemplified by Bull, is where two different
taxes are imposed upon a single item of income that is subject to only
one tax,236 which Andrews refers to as the "two tax effect. ' 237 The
second situation, not yet addressed by the Supreme Court, is where
the imposition of one tax produces an automatic inequity with respect
to another tax on the same item of income or expenditure. Because
the Supreme Court addressed only the issue of the two tax effect in
Bull, Professor Andrews proposes, with considerable acumen, that the
Bull result should be extended to cases involving two different, incon-
sistent taxes which automatically produce an inequitable result.238
The cases he uses to exemplify this theory are United States v. Her-
ring2 39 and United States v. Bowcut,24° both of which involved income
tax deficiencies and additions to tax attributable to fraud, which in
turn, caused a corresponding estate tax deficiency. In both cases, the
courts allowed the estates to recoup the barred estate tax overpay-
ments against the open income tax deficiencies. Professor Andrews
234. See, e.g., Gindes v. United States, 661 F.2d 194, 200 (Ct. Cl. 1981) ("Nine years
after Stone ... the Supreme Court held in Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co.
that the doctrine had a far more circumspect application to tax cases." (citation omit-
ted)); Wood v. United States, 213 F.2d 660, 661 (2d Cir. 1954) (noting that the gap in
statutes of limitations had been "narrowed markedly by McEachern v. Rose and Roth-
ensies" (citations omitted)).
In Gindes, the Court of Claims theorized that the statutory mitigation provisions,
I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314, enacted in 1938, account for the Supreme Court's seeming shift
in direction in Rothensies. Gindes, 661 F.2d at 200 n.18. The problem with this theory,
however, is that the shift occurred in McEachern, which the Court decided before the
enactment of the mitigation provisions.
235. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 623-24.
236. Id. This situation may also arise through the denial of an appropriate
deduction.
237. Id. at 630.
238. IME at 645-47.
239. 240 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1957).
240. 287 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1961).
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notes that these decisions are correct because "if the estate had been
able to file the estate tax refund claim in timely fashion, the existence
of fraud with respect to the decedent's income taxes would not have
precluded the estate tax recovery."2' 1
There are many situations under the income tax laws in which tax
consequences would be different but for the statute of limitations.
While Professor Andrews's statement is technically true, it must be
noted that recoupment is an extraordinary remedy. Thus, it should
apply only to prevent a fundamental unfairness. As Professor An-
drews points out, the statutes of limitations on the income tax defi-
ciency and the estate tax refund are coterminous.2 42 Therefore, the
Herring and Bowcut issues could arise procedurally only when the
statute of limitations on the income tax deficiency is extended for
some reason.
243
In both Herring and Bowcut, the statute of limitations for assess-
ment of the income tax deficiency was extended because of fraud.
Fraud, by definition, arises from intentional wrongdoing.2' In both of
these cases, the fiduciary/surviving spouse was also charged with the
fraud. Yet the Bowcut court rejected the government's argument that
the doctrine of unclean hands should constitute a defense to recoup-
ment.245 There, the court noted that the spouse was charged with
fraud only because she signed the joint income tax return, stating:
"[Clonsidering the limited extent to which a wife normally is an active
and knowing participant in the representations contained in a joint tax
return, we doubt that any rational inference of knowledge or fraudu-
lent intent can be drawn from this fact."246
The court's statement is correct because fraud cannot be imputed,
but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.247 Thus, the
decedent's fraud would not be imputed to the survivor. Nevertheless,
under statutory law both spouses are jointly and severally liable for an
understatement of tax liability, including penalties (except fraud) and
241. Andrews, supra note 13, at 619.
242. Id at 633.
243. Id at 633-34.
244. See Estate of Spruill v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1197, 1241-42 (1987) ([Fraud
is the intentional commission of an act or acts for the specific purpose of evading a tax
believed to be owing."). For the criminal fraud offense, the elements are the existence
of a deficiency, an attempt to evade or defeat a tax in any manner, an affirmative act
of fraud, and willfulness. See Michael I. Saltzman, IRS Practice and Procedure I
7A.02 (2d ed. 1991).
245. United States v. Bowcut, 287 F.2d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 1961) (holding that the
facts did not warrant a finding of unclean hands, and thus unclean hands could not
serve as a defense to recoupment).
246. Id
247. Saltzman, supra note 244, 1 7B.01[1I] (stating that the standard of proof is
"clear and convincing evidence"); see also I.RC. § 7454 (1994) (providing that the
burden of proof is on the IRS).
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interest,2 48 even though the results of such a provision are sometimes
harsh. 4 9 Unfortunately, the Herring court did not discuss the full ef-
fect of the civil fraud, and in Bowcut the fraud issue was only cursorily
considered and dismissed. Thus, it is not clear from the facts how in-
volved in or knowledgeable about the fraud the surviving spouses ac-
tually were. But because the Bowcut decision predated the enactment
of the innocent spouse provision, it made no difference legally
whether Mrs. Bowcut participated in or had actual or constructive
knowledge of the fraud. Because she had signed the joint return, the
effect of the fraud was statutorily imputed to her, and she should have
been held liable for the understatement of tax liability attributable to
the fraud. It is doubtful that the Bowcut court would reach the same
result today if the spouse/fiduciary were to fail to qualify for relief as
an innocent spouse.2
248. See Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447, 476 (enacting I.R.C.
§ 6013 (1994)). There were some limited exceptions for a joint return filed under
duress or mistake, or where the joint signature was obtained by fraud. Huelsman v.
Commissioner, 416 F.2d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1969). Even where the spouse failed to
sign the return, joint and several liability could be imposed if the return was intended
to be a joint return. Kann v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 1032, 1045 (1952), affid, 210 F.2d
247 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954).
While the innocent spouse provision, see I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1994), provides some
limited relief from joint and several liability, that provision had not been enacted at
the time of the Bowcut decision. See Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84
Stat. 2063 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1994)).
Ironically, the Ninth Circuit had held, prior to the enactment of the joint and sev-
eral liability provision, that the government could not impose joint and several liabil-
ity on an innocent spouse. Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1935),
rev'g 29 B.T.A. 602 (1933). The Cole decision had been voided by the statutory joint
and several liability provision, however. For a discussion of I.R.C. § 6013, see Richard
C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability for Income
Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 317, 349-64 (1990); Note, Innocent
Spouses' Liability for Fraudulent Understatement of Taxable Income on Joint Returns,
56 Va. L. Rev. 1268, 1281-87 (1970).
249. See Beck, supra note 248, at 323-31, 348-64; see also Huelsman v. Commis-
sioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 436, 437 (1968) (stating that it has "no equitable power to
grant relief to petitioner, however distasteful the result"); Joan Pryde, "Innocent
Spouse" Rule Is Too Narrow To Be Workable, Treasury Official Says, 107 Daily Tax
Rep., June 4, 1996, at G-3 (discussing Treasury official's comments on the problems
inherent in the innocent spouse provision and noting that the IRS and the Treasury
Department plan to address the issue in a joint internal study on the tax treatment of
divorced or separated taxpayers). But see Wiksell v. Commissioner, 90 F.3d 1459, 1463
(9th Cir. 1996) (affirming tax court's finding that taxpayer had reason to know of
substantial understatement of tax, but apportioning relief on grounds that an inequi-
table result would be produced otherwise because a spouse would be denied relief
altogether "if culpability can be shown even as to a minute portion of the understate-
ment"); Huelsman, 416 F.2d at 480-81 ("We are not convinced... that the statute is so
inflexible that an innocent wife who has been victimized by a dishonest husband must
be subjected to an additional appallingly harsh penalty by the United States
Government.").
250. To qualify for such relief, the spouse must prove (1) that there was a joint
return filed for the taxable year in question, (2) that there was a substantial under-
statement of tax (greater than $500) attributable to grossly erroneous items of one
spouse, (3) that the other spouse, in signing the return, did not know or have reason
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A further complicating factor in Bowcut should have been the issue
of diligence, which, again, the court raised but summarily dismissed.
What the court did not discuss was the fact that for more than two
years prior to the expiration of the estate tax statute of limitations, the
surviving spouse/fiduciary had been dealing directly with the IRS on
the issues of the income tax deficiency, the fraud, and the additions to
tax.251 Thus, the five-week window period, that the court considered
unimportant to the application of recoupment, 2 should not have
been the reference period for the consideration of the taxpayer's lack
of diligence. Indeed, the revenue agent handling the case had advised
both the taxpayer's attorney and her accountant to file a protective
claim for refund of the estate tax overpayment before the estate tax
statute of limitations expired.253 The taxpayer failed to heed this ad-
vice, however.
Given the fact that McEachern was probably not a recoupment case
at all, because the remedy did not apply and was never mentioned by
the Court, Professor Andrews is correct in noting that recoupment
seems to apply only in cases of two different types of taxes imposed
under inconsistent theories. But the established elements raise sev-
eral general problems for the application of the remedy. First, while
the two tax theory provides a neat, concise test, it obscures what
should be the main thrust of the remedy-a consideration of the equi-
ties. Recoupment is, after all, an equitable remedy. Second, it rele-
gates recoupment to the status of a legal or quasi-legal remedy if it
applies automatically without a consideration of the equities. Third, it
allows no consideration of the effect of equitable defenses such as
laches and unclean hands. Thus, this author is of the opinion that the
two tax effect should not be considered a leading indicator of the ap-
plication of recoupment, but rather, a relatively inconsequential ele-
ment of the recoupment cases.
IV. EQUITABLE RECOUPMENT UNDER PROPOSED NEw ELEMENTS
Bull was a cutting-edge decision, providing a flexible equitable rem-
edy to alleviate the inequity that would result from a strict adherence
to the law. Indeed, the hallmarks of equity are flexibility and fair-
to know that there was a substantial understatement, and (4) that it is inequitable,
after taking into account all the facts and circumstances, to hold the other spouse
liable for the deficiency in tax, including penalties, interest, and other amounts. I.R.C.
§ 6013(e) (1994). For a criticism of the innocent spouse provision, see Beck, supra
note 248, at 348-69.
251. The taxpayer and her accountant first met with the revenue agent on May 21,
1954 to discuss the proposed income tax deficiency. Bowcut v. United States, 175 F.
Supp. 218, 218 (D. Mont. 1959), affd, 287 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1961). Throughout the
next two years the taxpayer had dealings with the IRS on this issue. Id. at 218-19.
252. United States v. Bowcut, 287 F.2d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 1961).
253. Bowcut, 175 F. Supp. at 218-19.
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ness. 54 Since the Bull decision, however, lower courts have focused
more on artificial elements than on either flexibility or fairness. The
true purpose of an equitable remedy is to grant relief when there is no
satisfactory legal remedy. 55
Historically, statutes of limitation have been overridden by the eq-
uitable plea of concealed fraud, which included any "wilful wrongdo-
ing... unknown to the plaintiff when it [was] committed."''- 6 Thus,
equity shifted the point at which the statute normally began to run
(i.e., when the underlying cause of action arose) to the point at which
the plaintiff discovered the wrongdoing. In this manner, equity
"sought to make the parties conform to a standard of social conduct
prescribed by itself. It operated upon the 'conscience of the
wrongdoer.'12 57
A. Is There an Adequate Legal Remedy?
In determining whether the statute of limitations applies directly,
the initial inquiry should focus on the point at which the main claim
arises. If, at that point, the statute applies, recoupment is not an ap-
propriate remedy.258 This was the case in McEachern. On the other
hand, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that as long as the main
claim is timely and a single transaction is involved, the defense of re-
coupment is never barred by the statute of limitations.- 9
This statement does not mean that recoupment should always be
applied when a single transaction is at issue and the main claim is
timely. It merely means that the statute of limitations is not a bar to
such a remedy. Whether the remedy should apply is a matter of eq-
uity and, thus, the facts as a whole must be considered from an equita-
ble perspective.
254. "The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do
equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility
rather than rigidity has distinguished it." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329
(1944).
255. See George W. Keeton & L.A. Sheridan, Equity 41 (3d ed. 1987) ("Where the
rule of law was satisfactory, equity would apply it. Where the rule was defective, or
operated harshly, equity would evolve another solution.").
256. Id at 107. Ordinarily, the statute of limitations could be tolled by fraudulent
concealment at law, but the concealment itself had to have constituted an actionable
fraud. The equitable plea of concealed fraud was more flexible. Id.
257. Keeton, supra note 173, at 22.
258. See, e.g., United States v. Tomar Hills, Inc., 783 F.2d 753, 754-55 (8th Cir.
1986) (holding that recoupment does not apply to permit a taxpayer to retain an over-
payment mistakenly refunded after the statute of limitations has run); United States
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 485 F.2d 331, 333 (3d Cir. 1973) (same). Recoupment should not
apply to lift the statutory bar in order to grant relief where the requesting party was
remiss. See Rushlight v. United States, 259 F.2d 658, 659 (9th Cir. 1958) (holding that
the court is powerless to allow recoupment to taxpayer because contracts at issue
were subject to Renegotiation Act), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 952 (1959).
259. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1935).
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In McEachern, the main claim was a refund claim attributable to a
statutory overpayment. Recoupment, as an equitable remedy, can ap-
ply only to an overpayment on the merits, never to a statutory over-
payment. Thus, in McEachern, recoupment was barred by direct
application of the statute of limitations. This was not the case in
Stone. In Stone, the main claim was a refund action filed by the trust-
ees to recover an amount that had been timely assessed by the IRS.'
There was no statutory overpayment in Stone. Thus, the threshold
requirement for the application of recoupment was met.
In Bull, the statute of limitations was open when the government
initially assessed the estate tax, as well as later when the income tax
was assessed. Thus, the statute did not apply directly to bar either
assessment. Moreover, in Bull, the government, in both instances, was
the aggressor. It was attempting to collect a second tax on the same
item of income with no consideration either of its earlier mistake or of
the fact that, cumulatively, the estate had overpaid its tax liability.
Thus, no revenue would be lost if recoupment were allowed.
One of the maxims of equity is that "equity will not suffer a wrong
without a remedy." In Bull, the government had erred, yet it was at-
tempting to hide behind the statute of limitations and collect a double
tax. But for the statute of limitations, the taxpayer would clearly have
prevailed. It was also clear that the taxpayer had no other legal rem-
edy. In applying recoupment, the Court stated: "While here the
money was taken through mistake without any element of fraud, the
unjust retention is immoral and amounts in law to a fraud on the tax-
payer's rights."261 Because the estate had clearly been victimized by
the government, the Court fashioned a remedy to provide relief to the
taxpayer; otherwise, strict adherence to the applicable law would have
produced an unfair result.
The application of recoupment has been further complicated by the
statutory mitigation provisions.262 These provisions, enacted in 1938
to "supplement the equitable principles" and to take "the profit out of
inconsistency," 3 represented a congressional nod to the issues of in-
equities caused by the operation of the statute of limitations and the
inadequacy of the common law remedies.
Mitigation is not a panacea to these problems, nor was it intended
to be. The mitigation provisions are cumbersome, 2  narrowly con-
260. The assessment against the trust had occurred within the limitations period
applicable to both the trust and the beneficiary. Also, the IRS was diligent in acting
in accordance with then current law. See supra part II.B.2.a.2.
261. Bull, 295 U.S. at 261.
262. See I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1994).
263. S. Rep. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 49 (1938).
264. In general, before mitigation can apply, there must be two proceedings: one to
establish the determination and the other to effect the adjustment. Beneson v.
United States, 385 F2d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1967). Some courts, however, have circum-
vented this process and have allowed the adjustment claim to be raised in the deter-
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strued provisions that apparently apply only to income taxes. 265
While an in-depth discussion of the mitigation provisions is beyond
the scope of this Article,266 there are some similarities and differences
between mitigation and recoupment worth noting. For instance, they
both require a single or closely related taxpayer, a single transaction,
and an inconsistency arising from a closed taxable year. They differ in
two very important respects. First, if mitigation applies, it opens the
statute of limitations with respect to the error or item in issue, and
provides for an adjustment attributable to that item.267 Thus, mitiga-
tion is an independent action, rather than a defense, and it provides a
more exact adjustment than recoupment. 268 Second, the mitigation
provisions are intended to provide more objective criteria to alleviate
inequities caused by an operation or rule of law. This does not mean,
however, that the mitigation provisions themselves have not fostered
some inconsistencies in application.269
For mitigation to apply, a determination 270 must be made which re-
quires tax treatment that is inconsistent with that of a previous year.271
Correction of the error in the previous year must be barred by an
operation or rule of law.272 In addition, the facts must fit one of the
seven circumstances of adjustment described under the Internal Reve-
nue Code.273 Generally, the mitigation provisions are not concerned
with the existence of a single transaction; nevertheless, the circum-
mination proceeding. See Esterbrook Pen Co. v. United States, 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9609, at 77,608 (D.NJ. 1960) (holding that refund claim, filed before deter-
mination proceeding and pending at the time of the determination, provided ade-
quate notice to the IRS of the grounds for adjustment).
265. There is some disagreement on this point. See Chertkof v. United States, 676
F.2d 984, 993-94 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that an erroneous stock basis determined as
a result of an estate tax misvaluation produced an income tax inconsistency to which
the mitigation provisions applied); cf Hall v. United States, 975 F.2d 722, 726-27 (10th
Cir. 1992) (reversing Tax Court's application of mitigation provisions to windfall
profit taxes). But it has been persuasively argued that the mitigation provisions apply
only to income taxes. See Willis, Limits, supra note 13, at 651-52. But see Hoffman F.
Fuller, Finality and Equity in Tax Litigation, 10 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 51, 59-61 (1992)
(suggesting that Willis's view is too restrictive).
266. For a discussion of mitigation, see Saltzman, supra note 244, J 5.07.
267. The statute of limitations is treated as remaining open for one year from the
date of the determination. Recoupment, on the other hand, "causes a later matter to
be equally wrong in the opposite direction;" thus two wrongs make a right. Willis,
Limits, supra note 13, at 633.
268. Because of differing tax rates, differing filing status, and the time value of
money, recoupment could result in a very imprecise adjustment.
269. See generally WIlis, Limits, supra note 13 (discussing the misapplication of
mitigation in Chertko).
270. I.R.C. § 1313(a) (1994). A "determination" is defined as follows: (1) a final
decision by the Tax Court or a final judgment, decree, or other order by any court of
competent jurisdiction; (2) a § 7121 closing agreement; (3) a final disposition of a
claim for refund; or (4) an agreement between the IRS and the taxpayer. Id.
271. I.R.C. § 1311(a) (1994).
272. Id.
273. I.R.C. § 1312 (1994).
[Vol. 65
EQUITABLE RECO UPMENT
stances of adjustment must necessarily arise from a single transac-
tion.274 This requirement is more clearly defined under the mitigation
provisions than under the recoupment elements, thus resulting in
fewer inconsistencies with mitigation in determining whether a single
transaction exists.
Regardless of whether the adjustment results in a refund or credit,
on the one hand, or an additional assessment, on the other, an incon-
sistent position by the party prevailing in the determination is re-
quired. If the adjustment would produce a refund or credit in the
closed year, the determination must establish that the government
maintained a position inconsistent with the position it maintained in
the closed year. If the adjustment would produce an additional assess-
ment, the determination must establish that the taxpayer maintained
the inconsistent position.275
There is currently a conflict among the lower courts as to whether
the inconsistency must be active or whether it may be passive. 76 For
instance, assume a taxpayer erroneously omits an item of income in a
closed year, and the IRS accepts the return. Is this a sufficient incon-
sistency for the IRS to invoke the mitigation provisions if the taxpayer
later files a claim for refund in an open year in which the item was
erroneously included and the refund claim is granted? The better
view, based on the legislative history and the policy rationale behind
the mitigation provisions, is that an active inconsistency is not re-
quired.277 Thus, in the above example, the taxpayer's passive inconsis-
tency (good faith omission of income) should not prevent the IRS
from using the mitigation provisions to assess a deficiency in the ear-
lier, closed year.
The mitigation adjustment also may be applied to a party other than
the taxpayer who sought the determination if the requisite relation-
ship exists between the two taxpayers. 78 The delineated relationships
274. See id. Only § 1312(7) refers directly to a transaction, but considering the na-
ture of the other circumstances, they must all involve a single transaction.
275. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1311(b)-i (as amended in 1962).
276. Compare Chertkof v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 1981) (con-
cluding that inconsistency could be established passively through the determination
position urged by party who benefitted) with Brigham v. United States, 470 F.2d 571,
574 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (requiring active inconsistency of Commissioner, based on reading
of legislative history of mitigation provisions), cert denied, 414 U.S. 831 (1973).
277. The statute requires only that the position maintained and adopted in the de-
termination must be inconsistent with the erroneous treatment in the closed year, and
that the person in whose favor the determination operates must have derived the
benefit of the erroneous treatment in the closed year. Saltzman, supra note 244, q
5.07[2][a][i]. Also, according to Saltzman, the active-inconsistency view fails to con-
sider the purpose of the statute of limitations, which is to bar the litigation of stale
claims. The party who successfully maintained the position adopted in the determina-
tion does not need the protection of the statute, for the evidence should be available,
and not stale, because it has been successfully used in the determination proceeding.
Thus, the normal justification for the statutory bar is removed. Id.
278. I.R.C. § 1313(c) (1994).
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are those in which issues of income allocation and determination of
the proper taxable party are likely to arise.279 The relationship must
also have been in existence at certain designated times.28
Because the mitigation provisions apply only in limited situations,
they do not supplant recoupment. It is generally agreed, however,
that they do preempt the application of recoupment where the facts fit
one of the seven circumstances of adjustment, even if mitigation does
not otherwise apply.28'
Although several commentators have suggested that the solution to
the problem is for Congress to extend the mitigation provisions to
cover some of the recoupment scenarios,282 this is easier said than
done. First, the mitigation provisions are very complex-so complex
that mitigation opportunities are frequently missed.283 Second, the
provisions are sometimes very narrowly construed, thus resulting in
inconsistencies.2 4 Third, there is a benefit to having a more flexible
remedy in which the equities (or inequities) of the situation may be
considered. Particularly if the Tax Court changes its view with respect
to its equity jurisdiction,z85 many of the recoupment problems may be
alleviated without resorting to legislation that ultimately may lead to a
more rigid, inflexible remedy.
279. Saltzman, supra note 244, 1 5.07[4].
280. See I.R.C. § 1313(c) (1994) (providing that, when the government requests
mitigation for erroneous tax treatment, the relationship must have been in existence
during the time the taxpayer's inconsistent position was first maintained).
281. See, e.g., Brigham v. United States, 470 F.2d 571, 577 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (holding
that recoupment could not apply because the case fell within § 1312, although mitiga-
tion did not apply either because the Commissioner had failed to maintain an incon-
sistent position), cert denied, 414 U.S. 831 (1973); Benenson v. United States, 385
F.2d 26, 34 (2d Cir. 1967) (acknowledging that the mitigation procedure would be
long and costly and noting that "once a situation is arguably covered by the mitigation
provisions it is likely that Congress intended that the situation be remedied exclu-
sively under those provisions"); Gooding v. United States, 326 F.2d 988, 995-96 (Ct.
Cl.) (stating that mitigation provisions supersede any common law recoupment reme-
dies, including those issues which mitigation technically does not cover), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 834 (1964).
Because § 1314(c) provides that the mitigation adjustment shall not be diminished
by any setoff other than "the one which was the subject of the adjustment," any Lewis
v. Reynolds offset is also preempted by the mitigation provisions. First Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 565 F.2d 507, 518 (8th Cir. 1977).
282. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 265, at 70 ("[T]he statutory mitigation provisions
... should be expanded to cover inconsistencies other than those of income tax deter-
minations alone."); Willis, Limits, supra note 13, at 661 ("Congress should either
amend the present mitigation provisions or write new ones to allow reopening of
barred returns affected by inconsistent estate tax and income tax treatment.").
283. See Steven J. Wifflis, The Tax Benefit Rule: A Different View and a Unified
Theory of Error Correction, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 575, 615-18 (1990) (postulating that the
mitigation provisions should have applied in some cases decided under a tax benefit
theory).
284. See id; see also supra text accompanying note 269 (stating that the mitigation
provisions have fostered some inconsistencies in application).
285. See infra part VI.B.
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B. Is There an Inconsistent Theory of Taxation, as a Matter of
Law, by the Opposing Party on a Single Transaction
Producing a Double Tax, or a Double Benefit,
on the Same Dollars?
If the statute of limitations does not preclude the application of re-
coupment, the next inquiry should be whether there is an inconsis-
tency, as a matter of law (as opposed to fact), s6 relating to a single
transaction involving the same elements of proof. The purpose of this
element is twofold: (1) to avoid multiplicity of action by ensuring that
the matter is capable of resolution without raising new issues of proof
(i.e., because recoupment is a defense to the main claim, the party
raising the main claim cannot be prejudiced by lapse of memory or
lack of records from the earlier year) and (2) to further preserve the
integrity of the statute of limitations by ensuring that mistakes of fact
fall outside recoupment (as should fraud).2
1. Inconsistency
The purpose of recoupment is not to provide a means to correct all
mistakes or inconsistencies that arise after the expiration of the statu-
tory period. That would denigrate the statute of limitations. Instead,
its purpose is to provide protection against an offensive use of the
statute of limitations that would produce an inequity tantamount to a
fraud. Thus, where the opposing party asserts an inconsistent position
and then seeks to use the statute of limitations to prevent any correc-
tion of the inconsistency, as in Bull, recoupment is an appropriate
remedy.' The remedy is not appropriate, however, where there is no
inconsistency s 9 or where the inconsistency arises from a defensive use
286. See, e.g., Gindes v. United States, 661 F.2d 194,202 (CL C. 1981) (holding that
recoupment was not available to taxpayer because there was no inconsistency, merely
bad choice by the taxpayer); Minskoff v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1146, 1149
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that the "doctrine of equitable recoupment is available only
when a litigant seeks to take advantage of inconsistent legal theories," not to correct
erroneous factual matters), affid, 490 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1974).
287. It further ensures good faith by the requesting party, which is more difficult to
monitor when dealing with a mistake of fact.
288. See Kolom v. United States, 791 F.2d 762, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1986) (-The doc-
trine of equitable recoupment prevents unjust enrichment-it is invoked either by the
taxpayer to recover a twice paid tax or by the Government to prohibit tax
avoidance.").
289. See, e.g., United States v. Tomar Hills, Inc., 783 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding that refund granted in error after expiration of statute of limitations is not an
appropriate case for recoupment); Gindes, 661 F.2d at 202 (concluding that there was
no inconsistency between the failure to make an election and inclusion of income in
the estate); Minskoff, 490 F.2d at 1285 (holding that income tax deficiency was prop-
erly attributable to pre-death income and did not produce estate tax overpayment).
But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-10-004 (Apr. 28, 1980) (ruling that the major purpose of
recoupment is to avoid inequitable results and stating that it has "never been thought
that equitable recoupment applies only in situations in which the opposing party has
taken inconsistent positions"); cf. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-36-002 (May 18, 1990) (holding
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of the statute of limitations, such as where the party requesting re-
coupment asserted or otherwise brought about the inconsistent posi-
tion.290 Similarly, where the party requesting recoupment fails to take
steps to protect itself, recoupment is not an appropriate remedy.291
The test should be whether the case would have been an appropriate
one for the application of estoppel, if estoppel applied to inconsisten-
cies as a matter of law. If the answer is yes, then recoupment should
apply.
2. Single Transaction
By definition, the inconsistency must arise from a single transaction.
If not, there is no ground for asserting that the opposing party has
taken an inconsistent position. Thus, the focus of the single transac-
tion requirement should be on whether the taxpayer is double taxed,
or has received a double benefit on the same dollars.2g In practice,
however, the single transaction element has caused the most confu-
sion. In some instances, the determination of whether two events con-
stitute a single transaction may be a relatively easy one, but in other
instances it is not so simple. 93 One problem is that courts often apply
very narrow, restrictive tests to determine the existence of a single
transaction, rather than to examine the tax consequences from the
that, although double tax was imposed on a single transaction, the initial tax was at-
tributable to taxpayer's error and therefore there was no inconsistency against which
to recoup the overpayment).
290. See Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363, 1371 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (precluding
government from offsetting estate tax overpayment with widow's barred income tax
deficiency, although case was decided on basis of lack of identity of interest).
291. See, e.g., Estate of Mann v. United States, 731 F.2d 267, 279 (5th Cir. 1984)
(stating that government failed to protect itself against seven-year statute of limita-
tions on bad debts, thereby barring recoupment; nature and size of estate indicated
that this was not a mere acceptance of a return by the government); Kellogg-Citizens
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 330 F.2d 635, 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (holding that there was
no reason to extend the normal limitations period because plaintiff failed to file a
protective refund claim within the statutory period). Note that Mann was decided on
the basis of the failure of the single transaction element.
292. The mere relation of items has been determined to be insufficient to support a
claim of recoupment. See, e.g., Mills v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 738, 739 (N.D.N.Y.
1940) ("The doctrine of recoupment is not limited to a claim arising directly from the
particular contract sued upon. It is sufficient if it arises out of the same subject mat-
ter, and that the claims are susceptible of adjustment in one action."); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
93-11-002 (Oct. 28, 1992) (ruling that, despite the disallowance of depreciation deduc-
tions that caused corresponding overpayment of income tax on sale of property, the
deficiency and overpayment did not arise from the same transaction).
293. See, e.g., Wilmington Trust Co. v. United States, 610 F.2d 703, 714 (Ct. Cl.
1979) ("As the decided cases show, there is no litmus paper test for determining
whether two tax claims arose out of the same transaction. Some cases clearly are
within that category, and some cases clearly are without it."); Pond's Extract Co. v.
United States, 134 F. Supp. 476, 479 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (stating that the "task of distin-
guishing between factual situations that warrant the application of equitable recoup-
ment in tax cases is admittedly a difficult one, and the distinction when made in some
cases will be a tenuous one").
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standpoint of double tax or double benefit. When the important ini-
tial determination rests on a technical issue upon which reasonable
minds may differ, inconsistency is likely to result.29
Much of the confusion has been generated by the Supreme Court
because in discussing the single transaction element, the Court has
used the terms "transaction" and "taxable event" interchangeably. 295
In addition, commentators have used the term "item. '296 But there
has been no attempt to define these specific terms. An examination of
the various situations in which the issue of recoupment has arisen
reveals that the definition of the applied term may have a bearing on
the outcome. For instance, the term "transaction" includes the act of
conducting business, which encompasses sales, leases, mortgages,
lending, and borrowing.297 A "taxable event" is a realization of taxa-
ble income, a severance of income from capital.298 Usually the precip-
itating event is a disposition of property, such as a sale or exchange. 299
The term "item" implies a part of a whole.30 Because of the under-
standable confusion generated over the use of these terms, some
courts have interpreted them very narrowly,30 1 while others have mis-
understood them entirely. For instance, there are some situations that
do not fall within the scope of the element, such as a depreciation
294. Compare United States v. Herring, 240 F.2d 225, 228 (4th Cir. 1957) (granting
the taxpayer's request for recoupment of income tax against barred estate tax, noting
that government made two claims against monies held by the estate and that it is
impossible to determine the amount of the estate tax without adjusting the deduction
caused by the income tax) with Kojes v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 762, 765 n.11
(E.D.N.Y. 1965) (reaching a result opposite to Herring, concluding that it is not obli-
gated to follow it).
295. See Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 300 (1946) (dis-
cussing "single transaction or taxable event"). In addition, the Court has used the
term "single error." Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 537 (1937).
296. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 13, at 613.
297. Black's Law Dictionary 1496 (6th ed. 1990).
298. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920).
299. See id. (holding that mere appreciation in value of property is not taxable).
300. The term is defined as "[o]ne of the portions, equal or unequal, into which
anything is divided, or regarded as divided .... A separate entry in an account or a
schedule, or a separate particular in an enumeration of a total." Black's Law Diction-
ary, supra note 297, at 832.
The definition was addressed in the mitigation case of Gardiner v. United States,
536 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1976), where the Tenth Circuit stated:
The meaning of an item of gross income is, under Section 61 of the 1954
Code, limited to specific items and does not include everything that results in
an increase in tax. It is restricted to positive items and does not include
negative elements such as deductions (like depreciation), the omission of
which results in increased taxes.
Id- at 906.
301. See, e.g., Estate of Mann v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 1132 1141-42 (N.D.
Tex. 1982) (holding that income tax refund and corresponding estate tax deficiency
were not part of same transaction), aff'd, 731 F2d 267 (5th Cir. 1984); Twitchco, Inc.
v. United States, 348 F. Supp. 330, 337 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (holding that, despite double
tax benefit on single piece of property, the sale was not the same transaction as the
purchase).
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miscalculation, or an inventory misvaluation. While a mistake in de-
preciation deductions and inventory valuation may have a direct and
automatic effect on another taxable year, the question is whether such
mistakes amount to "transactions" or "taxable events."
Both terms imply a single, discrete event, rather than an event that
is spread out over an entire taxable year or beyond. Events that affect
an entire taxable year should be confined to that taxable year. °
Thus, one year's depreciation deductions cannot be offset by another
year's depreciation deductions. 30 3 Moreover, depreciation deductions
and inventory valuations do not, in themselves, constitute transac-
tions. Rather, they are the by-products of transactions. While the
ending value of inventory in one taxable year will directly determine
the beginning value in the next taxable year, the valuation itself is not
a transaction. Thus, the misvaluation of inventory should not be an
appropriate circumstance for the application of recoupment.3°
According to Professor Andrews, the test should be whether two
taxes operate interdependently such that if one tax is applicable the
other is not, thereby automatically producing, or resulting in, the
302. See Dixie Margarine Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 445, 447 (6th Cir. 1940).
review dismissed, 127 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1942). In Dixie Margarine, a corporate tax-
payer paid license and stamp taxes for taxable years 1923-31 under the Oleomarga-
rine Act. Subsequent judicial decisions established that the taxpayer was not subject
to this tax, so the taxpayer filed a claim for refund. The government granted refunds
for the open years but disallowed the taxpayer's claims for taxable years 1923-31 be-
cause these years were closed. The government then assessed a deficiency against the
taxpayer in 1932, on the ground that the refund constituted income in the year re-
ceived under the tax benefit doctrine. The taxpayer argued that it should be allowed
to recoup the barred tax against the open deficiency. The court held for the taxpayer,
noting that "[tlhe same transaction does not necessarily mean occurring at the same
time." Id. (quoting United States v. National City Bank, 83 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 563 (1936)). The court went on to note that "the transaction
may comprehend a series of many occurrences depending not so much upon the im-
mediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship." Id. (quoting Na-
tional City Bank, 83 F.2d at 239 (citing Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S.
593, 610 (1926))).
The court in Dixie Margarine was wrong in its analysis, however. The tax benefit
rule produced a deficiency in the year the refund was received because the refund
represented the return of a tax benefit attributable to the years of receipt. The ear-
lier, barred years had nothing to do with the years attributable to the refund. The
only logical connection was that the same type of tax was paid in each of those years.
But because each taxable year stands alone, the earlier excise tax payments did not
constitute a single transaction with respect to the later payments.
303. Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 954, 962 (W.D. Mo.
1965), affd, 370 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1967).
304. The Supreme Court disallowed recoupment in such a situation, but for juris-
dictional reasons. The Court never addressed the issue of whether the single transac-
tion requirement had been met. See Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co.,
320 U.S. 418, 421 (1943). But see Crossett Lumber Co. v. United States, 87 F.2d 930,
933 (8th Cir. 1937) (allowing government to recoup erroneous refund credit for one
taxable year against an overpayment for succeeding taxable year where both items
arose from single erroneous inventory adjustment).
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barred claim if both taxes apply.3 5 The beauty of such a test is that it
is simple both to state and to apply. The problem with the test is that
it has not alleviated the confusion generated over the single transac-
tion element because courts continue to adhere to unreasonably strict
definitions of the term "transaction."
Much of the problem lies in interpreting the single transaction re-
quirement by focusing on the tax consequences, rather than on the
actual transaction.30 6 This was a mistake made by the Court of Claims
in Wilmington Trust.307 The court was not specific in its reasoning why
the timber sale and the deductions generated from it did not consti-
tute a single transaction. Clearly, the precipitating transaction for the
first taxable event was the timber sale. This sale generated both taxa-
ble income and deductible expenses. The government's disallowance
of the expense deductions directly produced an income tax deficiency,
the payment of which had a direct effect on the estate tax. Thus, the
lowering of the estate tax liability was directly related to the income
tax deficiency, which stemmed from the disallowance of the deduc-
tions attributable to the timber sale transaction.
When the court determined that the taxpayer was correct initially,
the statute of limitations on the income tax refund claim was still
open, but the estate tax deficiency was closed. While the result in
Wilmington Trust is arguably correct,30s it is not because of the failure
of the single transaction requirement.
Perhaps a complicating factor in Wilmington Trust was that there
was more than one taxpayer involved: the decedent who made the
sale and deducted the expenses against ordinary income, and the es-
tate that was the beneficiary of the refund. But there was an identity
of interest between the two, similar to that in Stone, so on this ground
as well, the Wilmington Trust result is unwarranted under the estab-
lished elements.
305. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 627, 630. Andrews's view is inapposite to the
position of the Court of Claims and the Northern District of Texas, affirmed by the
Fifth Circuit. See Wilmington Trust Co. v. United States, 610 F.2d 703, 714 (Ct. Cl.
1979) (stating that the "fact that a single tax determination may affect the taxes on
two transactions does not convert the two transactions into a single one"); Estate of
Mann, 552 F. Supp. at 1141 ("[I]f the government were granted relief in this case[where a refund to plaintiff affected both the income tax and the estate tax], it would
be entitled to equitable recoupment in every case in which the estate of a deceased
taxpayer is successful in a tax refund suit." (emphasis omitted)).
306. See Rev. Rul. 55-226, 1955-1 C.B. 469, 470 (determining that IRS lacked au-
thority to apply equitable recoupment to open pre-death income tax liabilities of a
decedent with closed federal estate tax overpayment because such a situation did not
satisfy the single transaction requirement), revoked by Rev. Rul. 71-56, 1971-1 C.B.
404, 405.
307. For a full discussion of Wilmington Trust, see supra part MI.2.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 219-27.
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3. Identity of Interest
Since Stone, the courts have been relatively strict in requiring an
absolute identity of interest between the parties against whom the in-
consistent position was taken and those who stood to benefit from the
recoupment. 0 9 The degree to which the courts will delve into the
facts in determining the absolute identity, however, is unclear. For
instance, where the inconsistency is asserted against two related es-
tates, and the recoupment will benefit the beneficiaries of those es-
tates, it is unclear whether the courts will require absolute identity of
interest, or whether they may permit some deviation attributable to
changed circumstances, such as births, deaths, marriages, and di-
vorces.310 At least one court has implied that an absolute identity of
interest is not required.31'
The precise relationship that constitutes an identity of interest has
never been defined. The government has argued that Stone should be
interpreted as requiring a relationship of representative capacity.312
This argument has been rejected, however, in favor of a determination
of whether a "benefit to one taxpayer inures to the benefit of the
other taxpayer only. '313 If so, there is an identity of interest.
C. Does a Consideration of the Equities Favor the Application
of Recoupment?
Recoupment is based on principles of natural law, which require an
examination of the facts as a whole in order to determine whether a
claim should be "denounce[d] ... as unjust, immoral, and fraudulent
when the claimant is at the same time wrongfully withholding money
which in equity belongs to the other party. 3 14 Thus, the position of
309. See, e.g., Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363, 1371 (Ct. CI. 1969) (finding
insufficient identity of interest between widow and estate with multiple beneficiaries);
Schlemmer v. United States, 94 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir. 1938) (finding no identity of inter-
est between individual and closely held corporation); Sewell v. United States, 19 F.
Supp. 657, 663 (Ct. Cl. 1937) (finding insufficient identity of interest between income
beneficiaries and remainderman).
310. Estate of Vitt v. United States, 706 F.2d 871, 875 (8th Cir. 1983).
311. See id. at 875 n.3 ("[W]e believe sufficient identity of interest has been demon-
strated. In substance, the same parties detrimentally affected by the overpayment will
receive the proceeds from recoupment." (emphasis added)).
312. See Hufbauer v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 247, 250 (S.D. Cal. 1968) (consid-
ering government's argument that taxpayer was not entitled to recoupment because
relationship of sole proprietor to sole shareholder of corporation was not representa-
tive relationship).
313. Id at 251.
314. Crossett Lumber Co. v. United States, 87 F.2d 930, 932 (8th Cir. 1937). This
opinion goes on to state:
An action to recover taxes is in the nature of an action for money had and
received. Although in form it is an action at law, it is governed by equitable
principles. In such an action a plaintiff cannot recover unless he can show
that in equity and good conscience he is entitled, as against the defendant, to
the money. Such an action "aims at the abstract justice of the case, and
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each party should be scrutinized from the perspective of equity and of
what is moral, just, and nonfraudulent. In Bull, for example, the
Supreme Court hinted that not every case involving a single transac-
tion would give rise to recoupment, only those in which "the unjust
retention is immoral and amounts in law to a fraud on the taxpayer's
rights." 31
5
Recoupment is, thus, an extraordinary remedy that should be ap-
plied only in cases in which it is inequitable to allow the statute of
limitations to be used as a shield.3 16 A careful examination of the
important public policy considerations behind the statute of limita-
tions reveals that the statute is defensive in nature. Where it is used as
an offensive weapon, such use is inappropriate and should not be con-
doned by the courts. But where one party attempts to take advantage
of the statute of limitations in order to obtain a double benefit on a
single transaction under inconsistent legal theories, the result, almost
by definition, is an immoral, unjust retention amounting to a fraud on
the other party's rights.
The important issues in determining whether recoupment applies
should be whether one party is unjustly enriched and whether the op-
posing party is overly burdened.317 For instance, there is generally a
cost to inconsistent tax treatment. If the taxpayer is the inconsistent
claimant, and recoupment is not applied in favor of the government,
the taxpayer will be unjustly enriched at the expense of the govern-
ment.318 The taxpaying public will have to bear the loss, even though
the loss may be relatively small in an individual case. Conversely, if
the government is the inconsistent claimant, and recoupment is not
applied, the government will then be unjustly enriched at the expense
of the taxpayer. On a more general level, the public may perceive the
voluntary tax system as unfair.
In general, where there is a double tax liability or a double tax
avoidance on the same item attributable to a single transaction, the
looks solely to the inquiry, whether the defendant holds money, which ex
aequo et bono belongs to the plaintiff."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Claflin v. Godfrey, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 1, 6 (1838)).
315. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 261 (1935).
316. In most of the recoupment cases, the courts refer to unjust enrichment. How-
ever, unjust enrichment alone should not be sufficient to avoid the statute of limita-
tions. It has been suggested that the important factors to consider in determining
whether recoupment should apply are "the avoidance of multiplicity of suits, the
avoidance of circuity of action, and the doing of complete justice in one action." Mc-
Connell, supra note 7, at 597.
317. See Kolom v. United States, 791 F.2d 762, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The doc-
trine of equitable recoupment prevents unjust enrichment .... " (footnote omitted)).
318. Cf. Fisher v. Commissioner, 108 F.2d 707, 709 (6th Cir. 1939) (denying tax-
payer remedy of recoupment on grounds that taxpayer took inconsistent positions
and noting that recoupment is a claim in the nature of a refund which "should like-
wise not be allowed to create an unjust enrichment in favor of the taxpayer at the
expense of the Government"), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 627 (1940).
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potential for unjust enrichment is great. The equities are not as
strong, however, where the double tax or double benefit is attributa-
ble to a mistake on the part of the requesting party.319 In other words,
for the equities to favor recoupment, either the opposing (nonrequest-
ing) party must be the aggressor, as was the case in Bull, or the unjust
enrichment element must be strong and the party requesting recoup-
ment must have acted in good faith.320
Because of the important policy rationale behind the statute of limi-
tations, the remedy of recoupment should not be lightly applied. In
considering the public interests, an examination of the facts as a whole
should determine what is fair under all the circumstances. Further-
more, an equitable remedy should be individualized according to both
the specific facts and the party seeking equitable relief.
But most of the cases in which recoupment has been denied have
involved a failure of the single transaction element. The few reported
cases in which the courts have held that the single transaction element
was satisfied, but nevertheless denied the remedy, have usually in-
volved a failure of the identity of interest requirement.32' In no re-
ported cases in which these two elements have been met has an
equitable defense prevented the application of the remedy.32 This is
curious in light of the fact that recoupment is, after all, an equitable
319. See Kolom, 791 F.2d at 768 (denying recoupment to government who had au-
dited taxpayer's return for year in question and did not raise issue of inclusion);
O'Brien v. United States, 766 F.2d 1038, 1049 (7th Cir. 1985) (denying recoupment to
taxpayer who made mistake in valuing stock in gross estate and later made another
mistake when the stock was sold and gain was taxed using the lower basis). But see
Mills v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 738, 740 (N.D.N.Y. 1940) (allowing taxpayer to
recoup barred overpayment against open deficiency even though taxpayer's error
caused the overpayment and noting also that government could not escape
responsibility).
320. See Hufbauer v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 247, 251-52 (S.D. Cal. 1968) (find-
ing for taxpayer and noting that, although taxpayer's error created the situation, un-
like in Bull and Stone, the equities favored the application of recoupment because
otherwise the government would be unjustly enriched); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-41-
003 (June 6, 1984) (discussing elements of recoupment and noting that "the party
seeking equitable relief from the statute of limitations must not be unjustly
enriched").
321. See, e.g., Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363, 1370-71 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (deny-
ing recoupment to the government due to failure of identity of interest requirement);
Smith v. United States, 373 F.2d 419, 422 (4th Cir. 1966) (denying recoupment to the
government on facts similar to Stone on ground that beneficiary had only a limited
interest in the trust and to hold for the government would prejudice the
remainderman).
322. In fact, some courts have remarked on the failure of the equitable defenses.
See, e.g., Holzer v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 875, 878 (E.D. Wis.) (stating that laches
is not a defense to a claim for equitable recoupment), affd per curiam, 367 F.2d 822
(7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Bowcut, 287 F.2d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 1961) ("It is
apparently not the diligence of the taxpayer as to his legal rights which controls
.... "). In Dalm the remedy was denied on jurisdictional grounds. See infra part VI.A.
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remedy. It is also curious in light of the fact that the Supreme Court
appeared to decide Rothensies on the basis of laches. 3
1. Unjust Enrichment
Recoupment was not intended to cure inadvertence or to provide a
second opportunity for either the taxpayer or the government to cor-
rect mistakes that would otherwise become permanent because of the
lapse of time. Instead, it is anticipated that occasional injustices will
occur because of the lapse of the statute of limitations.2 4 Thus, re-
coupment was intended to be an extraordinary remedy to be applied
only in extraordinary circumstances where the situation as a whole
warrants its application.
Because of the public policy considerations behind the statute of
limitations, the term "unjust enrichment," in the recoupment sense,
should imply more than a mere passive retention by one party of
money that, technically, does not belong to it. It should also require
some egregious, affirmative misconduct by that party, such as an ag-
gressive use of the statute of limitations to retain money that does not
belong to it. It should also require that the party requesting recoup-
ment have engaged in some self-help, rather than sitting by passively
while the statute ran.32 A good case on point, from the government's
perspective, is Stone. There, a change in the case law resulted in the
government's being whipsawed when the taxpayer attempted to take
unfair advantage of the statute of limitations, even though the govern-
ment had taken every conceivable step to protect itself. If the party
seeking recoupment fails to do something it ought to have done, the
equities do not lie with that party.326 From the taxpayer's perspective,
323. See Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 303 (1946) ("We
cannot approve such encroachments on the policy of the statute out of consideration
for a taxpayer who for many years failed to file or prosecute its refund claim."); see
also Boyle v. United States, 355 F.2d 233, 236-37 (3d Cir. 1965) (distinguishing Roth-
ensies as a laches case).
324. The Supreme Court made note of this fact in Rothensies: "[Statutes of limita-
tions] are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between
the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable [avoidable] and unavoidable delay." 329
U.S. at 301 (quoting Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945)).
325. See, eg., Kellogg-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United States, 330 F.2d 635, 639 (Ct.
Cl. 1964) (considering taxpayer's request for relief based on recoupment-like princi-
ple, but denying such relief because taxpayer failed to act for 10 months and allowed
statute to run without filing protective refund claim), Holzer, 250 F. Supp. at 878
("Refund of overpayment of estate tax was barred in the instant case because taxpay-
ers, on learning of events which would likely occasion a decrease of estate tax liability,
failed to file timely protective claim which would have preserved the right to re-
fund."); cf. Lyeth v. Hoey, 112 F.2d 4, 8 (2d Cir. 1940) (rejecting government's argu-
ment that it should be allowed to recoup barred estate tax deficiency against open
income tax overpayment under McEachern because the estate tax claim was open
when the income tax refund claim was filed).
326. See Minskoff v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1146, 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (stating
that, in failing to report income which should have been reported, the "equities do not
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a case on point is Bull, where the taxpayer challenged the govern-
ment's characterization of includable income, but was whipsawed
nonetheless by the statute of limitations." 7
To test these theories, reconsider Wilmington Trust. There, the gov-
ernment was the requesting party. There was no egregious conduct on
the part of the taxpayer. Instead, the government initially erred in
categorizing the taxpayer's expenses as nondeductible and in assessing
an additional income tax. The taxpayer acted in complete good faith.
On the other hand, the government had ample opportunity to ex-
amine the facts and reach the correct conclusion. The fact that the
government guessed wrong and allowed the statute of limitations to
expire should not skew the equities in its favor, even though the single
transaction element should technically have been met. Thus, Wil-
mington Trust is not analogous to Bull where the inequity compelled
the remedy, for in Wilmington Trust, the government's own mistake
did not constitute a "fraud on [its] rights. '3 8 Therefore, the Wilming-
ton Trust decision was a correct one, although the reasoning of the
court was wrong.
Consider also the case of Boyle v. United States,329 in which an es-
tate received poor advice from its accountant, resulting in the inclu-
sion in the gross estate of an accumulated, undistributed dividend on
which the estate paid an estate tax. Both the estate tax return and the
tax were accepted by the government. Later, when the dividend was
distributed to the beneficiaries, they excluded it from their taxable in-
come in good faith because of the prior inclusion in the estate. After
the expiration of the statute of limitations for filing a claim for refund
of the estate tax, the government assessed an income tax deficiency
against the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries then filed suit for refund
in the district court alleging that they did not owe the income tax lia-
bility, or in the alternative, requesting recoupment of the estate tax
overpayment.330
The court held for the government on both the issues of liability and
recoupment. The taxpayers then appealed. The appellate court up-
held the district court's decision on the issue of liability, but it over-
ruled the district court with respect to recoupment, holding that
lie with the taxpayer who has only been 'hoist by his own petard'), affid, 490 F.2d
1283 (2d Cir. 1974).
327. See also Evans Trust v. United States, 462 F.2d 521, 526 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (holding
that equitable recoupment was not available to the taxpayer when no deficiency ex-
isted and taxpayer failed to raise the issue of recoupment during the settlement con-
ference); Dunigan v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 467, 470-71 (Ct. C1. 1938) (granting
recoupment to taxpayer because taxpayer had reserved a right to an adjustment prior
to the expiration of the statute, which amounted to a counterdemand by the taxpayer
which the government did not honor).
328. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 261 (1935).
329. 355 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1965).
330. Boyle v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 543, 545 (D.N.J. 1964), rev'd, 355 F.2d 233
(3d Cir. 1965).
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recoupment was warranted because the facts of the case were similar
to those of Bull.331 But in Bull, the government took an aggressive
position which it later controverted to the detriment of the taxpayer,
without considering the fact that its mistake caused the taxpayer to be
double taxed. Boyle involved a good faith mistake by the estate, and a
passive acceptance of the estate tax return by the government. In
Boyle, the government did not take an aggressive position before the
statute expired. Moreover, as the court noted, the taxpayers' conduct
was "undeniably exemplary, '332 yet they were double taxed. The
court further noted that the government's "insistence on form over
substance" was "not in vindication of a basic principle that should be
rigidly enforced. '333 Nevertheless, the government's actions did not
amount to a fraud upon the taxpayer's rights in the aggressive sense of
Bull, although Boyle was similar to Bull in that the government was
unwilling to consider the fact that the taxpayers had overpaid their tax
liability with respect to this dividend.
2. Is There a Defense to the Application of the Remedy?
If the equities favor the application of recoupment, the final consid-
eration should be whether there is any defense to that application.
Because recoupment is an equitable remedy, the equitable defenses
such as laches and unclean hands should be considered.
a. Laches
Statutes of limitations are creatures of law, not equity, although eq-
uity considers delay in determining whether the sought-after relief
should be granted.3- While the statute of limitations considers the
objective passage of time, equity is more flexible in that it also consid-
ers the effect of the delay as a whole and whether the delay was preju-
dicial.335  In equity, there are two important considerations in
331. Boyle, 355 F.2d at 235.
332. Id at 237.
333. Id
334. See McClintock, supra note 31, at 74-75. In considering the effect vel non of a
delay, courts often take the statute of limitations into account as a measuring point of
unreasonable delay. Id at 74 n.33; see also Pa. Note, supra note 44, at 346 (describing
modem trend to defer to the statute of limitations). A delay could, however, also
result in the inapplicability of an equitable remedy prior to the expiration of the stat-
ute of limitations. George L. Clark, Equity 46-47 (1954); de Funiak, supra note 31, at
47-48.
335. See, e.g., Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1337 (10th Cir. 1982)
("Laches will bar relief 'only where the enforcement of the asserted right would work
injustice."' (quoting Hoehn v. Crews, 144 F.2d 665, 671 (10th Cir. 1944), aff'd on other
grounds, 324 U.S. 200 (1945))); Kellogg-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United States, 330 F.2d
635, 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964) ("[Sjince the plaintiff-estate had adequate time, after receiving
the deficiency notices (on the income taxes), in which to file a protective claim for
refund of the estate tax before the normal limitations period ended, the estate is now
precluded by its failure to take that step.").
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determining the effect of a delay: its length336 and the conduct of the
parties in the interim. With regard to the latter consideration, it must
be determined whether this conduct "might affect either party and
cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the
other, so far as relates to the remedy. '337 An examination of the con-
duct of the parties will involve a consideration of fault and whether
one party purposely delayed in order to gain an unfair advantage over
the other party. If there is no purposeful delay, the inquiry should
focus on whether the party against whom laches is asserted, usually
the plaintiff, was diligent in asserting her rights.338 If the party was
diligent, the defense of laches should not apply against her. 39 In Bull,
the executor had a one-month period in which to file a protective
claim for refund before the statute of limitations expired.-4° This de-
lay was obviously not purposeful because the estate was thereby dis-
advantaged. The paramount question should be whether the executor
was diligent in asserting the rights of the estate.
Lower courts and some commentators have interpreted the
Supreme Court's silence on this issue to mean that laches is not a de-
fense to recoupment. 41 Laches, however, involves more than a mere
lapse of time. The reasonableness of the situation as a whole must be
considered in light of the time lapse. Thus, "laches must be deter-
mined in light of the particular remedy fashioned. '342
336. Mere lapse of time, however, does not amount to laches. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 687 F.2d at 1338.
337. Keeton, supra note 173, at 114 (quoting Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, 5
L.R.-P.C. 221, 239-40 (1874)).
338. De Funiak, supra note 31, at 48.
339. Id. Thus, mere ignorance of one's rights will not deprive a person of a remedy
on the ground of laches. Also, if a party is under a disability, the defense may not be
asserted against her. Id.
340. See supra text accompanying note 131. The issue of timeliness also arises in
the context of whether an equitable recoupment claim can be entertained if the claim
is barred when the main claim is asserted. See Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 263
(1935) (suggesting that the estate could proceed with its claim because, at the time the
government raised its inconsistent position, the statute was open); Minskoff v. United
States, 349 F. Supp. 1146, 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("Another reason for denying plaintiff
recovery on the theory of equitable recoupment is that, at the time of the income tax
assessment, plaintiff had no timely and adequate estate tax refund claim outstanding
nor could she have then brought one."), affd, 490 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1974); see also
Tierney, supra note 28, at 127-31 (discussing the issues of diligence and timing, and
posing arguments against it).
341. See, e.g., Holzer v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 875, 878 (E.D. Wis.) ("[L]aches
is not a defense to a claim for equitable recoupment."), affd per curiam, 367 F.2d 822
(7th Cir. 1966); Fuller, supra note 265, at 55-56 (stating that in many recoupment
cases the passage of time may be attributable to the taxpayer's contesting the subse-
quent liability, believing the earlier treatment to be correct). But see Journal Co. v.
United States, 195 F. Supp. 434, 440 (E.D. Wis. 1961) (denying recoupment to the
government, noting that the government had a year in which to protect itself but
failed to do so).
342. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1337 (10th Cir. 1982).
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One month is not a long period of time. Moreover, in the
meantime, the executor in Bull was diligently pursuing other avenues,
such as a contest of the income tax liability before the Board of Tax
Appeals. 3
It is not clear from the Bull decision whether the Supreme Court
ever seriously considered the effect of the executor's delay or whether
it regarded the one-month window period as so outweighed by the
inequity of the Commissioner's position as to be unworthy of mention.
It is clear, however, that the Court strongly regarded the Commis-
sioner's position as untenable.
Arguably, laches should be applied less readily against taxpayers
than against the government. As a general rule, knowledge of sub-
stantive tax provisions should not be attributed to lay taxpayers due to
the complexities of the federal tax laws.3 " This logic does not apply
to the government, however, which should be held to a higher stan-
dard of knowledge.
b. Unclean Hands
The extent to which the equitable defense of unclean hands applies
to recoupment is not clear. Early cases indicated recoupment would
not apply if the requesting party committed fraud.3 s In the later
cases of Herring and Bowcut, however, the taxpayer was permitted to
recoup a barred estate tax overpayment against an open income tax
deficiency,346 apparently without serious consideration of the govern-
ment's defense of unclean hands.' 7
343. Bull v. Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 993 (1927).
344. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985) ("Most taxpayers are not
competent to discern error in the substantive advice of an accountant or attorney.").
345. See, eg., Elbert v. Johnson, 164 F.2d 421. 424-25 (2nd Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.,
concurring) (implying that recoupment should not apply if the taxpayers did not act in
good faith); Minskoff v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1146, 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("The
doctrine of equitable recoupment being in the nature of an equitable defense, it can-
not be invoked by a party who lacks 'clean hands."'), affd, 490 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.
1974). It was also the early position of the IRS that unclean hands applied to defeat
the application of recoupment. See E.M. Piper v. United States, Supp. Action on De-
cision, 1969-77 (Feb. 13, 1969) ("[B]quitable recoupment is an equity doctrine and
here the taxpayer does not come with clean hands and refuses to do equity.").
346. See supra text accompanying notes 244-53.
347. A mitigating factor would be whether the government purposefully delayed in
raising the fraud claim. If so, then this might eradicate the government's unclean
hands defense.
In the taxpayer's brief in Bowcut, the taxpayer argued first that civil fraud, unlike
criminal fraud, is compensatory in nature, rather than penal. Mrs. Bowcut's payment
of the penalty should have absolved her of the fraud taint and rendered her hands
clean. Second, the fraud penalty was a negotiated penalty, not a litigated penalty. In
Mrs. Bowcut's brief she stated, "Sometimes it is advantageous for the taxpayer to
accept a civil fraud penalty upon reduction of other deficiencies." Brief for the Appel-
lee at 11, United States v. Bowcut, 287 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1961) (No. 16,837).
The government replied that Mrs. Bowcut had conceded the fraud issue in the set-
tlement agreement If she had intended to contest this issue, she could have argued
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Fraud, by definition, involves knowledge and an intentional evasion
of a tax liability.' In both Herring and Bowcut, fraud was involved
in the income tax return, which would have had a direct effect on the
estate tax return." 9 Although the surviving spouses/fiduciaries, who
stood to benefit from the respective estates, were also accused of the
fraud, the courts did not directly address this issue. If the survivors
had participated in the fraud, then they would have caused their own
dilemmas with full knowledge of their wrongdoing.3 50 Thus, this
would not have been the proper circumstance for the application of
recoupment, and the court should have given the government's argu-
ment greater consideration.
351
V. THE USE OF RECOUPMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT
While, in theory, recoupment is equally available to the taxpayer
and the government, in practice, the government has been relatively
unsuccessful with the remedy.352 One explanation is that, given the
that the settlement be structured solely in terms of a deficiency, but she did not do
this. Brief for the Appellant at 2, Bowcut (No. 16,837). In response to Mrs. Bowcut's
contention that civil fraud is compensatory in nature, the government argued that it
makes no difference because the point was made not to further punish Mrs. Bowcut,
but to deny her equitable relief. Id. at 5.
348. See supra text accompanying note 244; see also I.R.C. § 6663 (1994) (setting
forth civil fraud penalty, although term "fraud" is not defined); I.R.C. § 7201 (1994)
(criminal evasion); I.R.C. § 7454 (1994) (allocating burden of proof where taxpayer is
suspected of "fraud with intent to evade tax").
349. The court in Bowcut recognized this fact and used it to the taxpayer's advan-
tage. The court reasoned that the taxpayer had not doctored the estate tax return to
cover up the fraud on the income tax return; therefore, she was innocent of the fraud
and her hands were clean. Bowcut, 287 F.2d at 656-57. But see supra text accompany-
ing notes 248-50 (discussing innocent spouse provision).
350. As the government stated in its brief in Bowcut. "The essence of the claim for
recoupment lies in the fact that the party seeking it was unaware of some crucial fact
or legality and his lack of knowledge rendered him unable to protect himself during
the statutory period." Brief for the Appellant at 18, Bowcut (No. 16,837).
351. One potential weakness in this argument is that the fiduciary may not have
been the sole beneficiary. If not, innocent parties would be disadvantaged if recoup-
ment were not allowed. But if the fraud were attributable to an action of the fiduci-
ary, the beneficiaries then could bring suit against the fiduciary for breach of duty.
352. See, e.g., Estate of Mann v. United States, 731 F.2d 267, 279 (5th Cir. 1984)
(denying equitable recoupment to the government, arguably incorrectly, due to fail-
ure of the single transaction element), affg 552 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Lyeth
v. Hoey, 112 F.2d 4, 7-8 (2d Cir. 1940) (denying equitable recoupment to the govern-
ment under McEachern); Schlemmer v. United States, 94 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir. 1938)
(denying recoupment to the government on ground of lack of identity of interest);
Twitchco, Inc. v. United States, 348 F. Supp. 330, 337 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (holding that
doctrine of equitable recoupment was inapplicable due to failure of single transaction
requirement); see also Andrews, supra note 13, at 641 (discussing Wilmington Trust
Co. v. United States, 610 F.2d 703 (Ct. Cl. 1979) and noting that the government was
denied recoupment in a case which was "nothing more than the government's side of
equitable recoupment in the same context as Herring-Bowcut").
There have been a few cases, however, in which the government has sought and
obtained recoupment. See, e.g., Crossett Lumber Co. v. United States, 87 F.2d 930,
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important policy rationale behind the statute of limitations, recoup-
ment is not appropriate where the failure to tax income before the
expiration of the statutory period is the result of the government's
own negligence, and is not attributable to any negligence or fraud on
the part of the taxpayer.353 For instance, the mere fact that the tax-
payer is double taxed usually indicates some fault on the part of the
government because it has custody and control over returns, and
therefore has access to the facts. Thus, the mere passive acceptance of
an erroneous return may, arguably, constitute fault. Under some cir-
cumstances, this type of fault may operate as a quasi-estoppel against
the government.3  There is also the issue of whether taxpayers and
the government are similarly situated with respect to the application
of laches. As mentioned earlier, laches should not apply against the
taxpayer as readily as against the government, except in extreme
cases, because the taxpayer "may in fact not have understood the pre-
cise implications of a particular event. s355 It is appropriate, though, to
hold the government to a higher standard of cognizance and knowl-
edge because the government has greater procedural advantages and
far greater resources than are generally available to taxpayers.
Another problem for the government is that, logistically, the iden-
tity of interest requirement applies only when the government is the
requesting party. Thus, a significant additional requirement is im-
posed against the government.356 In combination, these problems
make it more difficult for the government to prevail in a recoupment
action.357
931, 933-34 (8th Cir. 1937) (holding that government may set up the defense of re-
coupment where taxpayer made representations to government on which it sought to
renege after the expiration of the statute of limitations); E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co. v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 486, 494 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (upholding government's
offset of interest on barred income tax deficiency against interest on open overpay-
ment of excess profits tax); Lit v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 435, 439 (E.D. Pa. 1937)
(permitting government to recoup barred gift tax against open estate tax
overpayment).
353. See, eg., Wilmington Trust, 610 F.2d at 714-15 (denying equitable recoupment
where government had more than eight months in one case and more than a year in
the other in which to assess); Estate of Mann v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 1132,
1135, 1140-41 (NJD. Tex. 1982) (denying government remedy of recoupment on
ground of lack of single transaction, but also noting that government had three
months to assess estate tax deficiency before expiration of statutory period and thus
was not entitled to use recoupment against open overpayment where estate tax was
barred due to its own failure to include plaintiff's income tax refund in gross estate),
aff'd, 731 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1984).
354. See Grand Cent. Pub. Mkt., Inc. v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 119, 130 (S.D.
Cal.) (stating that the Commissioner "may not blindly accept returns, or create estop-
pel by his own failure to perform"), appeal dismissed, 98 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1938).
355. Tierney, supra note 28, at 128 n.122.
356. See Fuller, supra note 265, at 57 (noting that courts strive to avoid harm to
innocent parties, and therefore will deny recoupment when anyone not involved in
the earlier deficiency may be affected by the subsequent liability).
357. See Reeves v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 673, 677 (W.D. Pa. 1957) ("[W]here
the knowledge is with the Internal Revenue Service, a liberal rule should be applied
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On the other hand, the public policy considerations largely favor
the government. But where the government is the aggressor and en-
gages in conduct that could be considered egregious, such as intracta-
bility in failing to consider the unfairness of its own mistake, as in
Bull, general public concerns about equity and fairness in the adminis-
tration of the tax laws then tend to overshadow other public policy
considerations.
For the government to prevail in the application of recoupment, it
should demonstrate good faith and some degree of diligence. For in-
stance, what measures did the government take while the statute was
open? Given the overwhelming burden of examining every tax re-
turn, fairness requires that passive acceptance of an incorrect return
count neither for nor against the government.3 -8
Generally, when the government seeks recoupment, it will do so as
a defense to a taxpayer's claim for refund.359 Given that the govern-
in the application of the statute against the taxpayer." (citing United States v. Mem-
phis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62 (1933))). Consider, also, the statement of the court
in Bennet v. Helvering, 137 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1943):
When a person seeks to recover money which he has paid, it does not offend
our sense of fair play that before he is allowed to unravel what he has done,
he should submit to the reopening of any past related transactions between
him and the person against whom he is moving. But in assessing a tax, the
Treasury is not on the defensive; it has the affirmative, it must bring the case
within the statute which imposes the liability. If in order to do so, it must
reopen a past transaction between the taxpayer and itself, which the law has
declared definitively closed, its position is equitably much weaker than in the
case of a refund.
Id. at 539; see also Fuller, supra note 265, at 56-57 (suggesting that it is more difficult
for the government to satisfy the identity of interest requirement). Perhaps a further
reason why it appears to be more difficult for the government to prevail in a recoup-
ment action is that the cases in which the taxpayer requests recoupment greatly out-
number those in which the government is the requesting party. The number of
recorded cases filed by taxpayers requesting recoupment relative to the number of
cases filed by the government appears to support this theory, although information on
the number of cases that settle without going to trial is unavailable.
358. See Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82, 90 (1971), affd, 456
F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972). The Tax Court in Mayfair Minerals stated:
The Commissioner of necessity does and must rely largely upon the repre-
sentations of the taxpayer, and, in order to estop the taxpayer from assuming
a contrary position, he is not compelled to look with suspicion upon all such
representations and himself examine, or cause to be examined, the financial
condition of all the taxpayer's debtors. It is the duty of the taxpayer to deal
fairly and truthfully with the government.
Id. (quoting Commissioner v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 59 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir.
1932)); see also Note, Recoupment and the Statute of Limitations in Federal Taxation,
47 Colum. L. Rev. 1338, 1339 (1947) ("The government cannot be committed to an
erroneous interpretation of the law, to the acceptance of an incorrect return, to an
unauthorized waiver of the statute of limitations or to erroneous information in
general.").
359. But see Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. United States, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,265, at 84,034 (D. Conn. 1992) (denying government's request for recoupment in
Tax Court which was raised in defense to taxpayer's argument that it was entitled to a
stepped-up basis).
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ment should be required to exert some degree of diligence in order to
use recoupment, the cases favoring the government should be very
narrowly confined to their facts. In Stone, for instance, the initial er-
roneous assessment against the trust had arisen out of an honest mis-
take on the part of both the government and the trust. Both parties
had acted in good faith, in accordance with the prevailing law, and
neither party was at fault. The government was diligent in assessing
the trust before the expiration of the statute of limitations against the
beneficiary.360 The government diligently protected its interest, but it
was whipsawed by the subsequent change in the case law. Thus, no
issue of laches or unclean hands applied against the government.
Because neither the taxpayer nor the government was at fault in
Stone, the only further considerations were the public policy implica-
tions and the related issue of unjust enrichment. On the government's
side of the public policy consideration was the fundamental impor-
tance of the federal tax system as a revenue raising system. If the
statute of limitations were to apply strictly in this case, the govern-
ment would lose revenue. But such a consideration is usually secon-
dary to other public policy considerations underlying both the statute
of limitations and the integrity of the federal tax system. In Stone, the
integrity of the federal tax system inured to the benefit of the govern-
ment. If recoupment had not applied, not only would the government
have lost revenue, but the beneficiary would have been unjustly en-
riched as well. The beneficiary, with hindsight, would have been able
to benefit directly by hiding behind the statute of limitations, thereby
avoiding her just share of tax liability. 361
Because both parties in Stone acted in good faith and neither was at
fault, it is curious that the Court did not apply the equity maxim, "The
360. Some commentators, however, have misstated this case. They assert that the
statute had already run against the beneficiary and therefore argue that Stone is in-
consistent with McEachern on this ground. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 602, 606.
361. A consideration which the Stone Court does not mention is the fact that there
was potentially more at stake than the mere single claim of this particular taxpayer.
Because of the subsequent change in the case law, there were likely to be a number of
other similarly situated taxpayers who would be able to avoid their fair share of tax
liability if the statute of limitations were strictly upheld. This is contrary to Bull,
where only one particular taxpayer was involved.
A further issue which the Court does not mention is the prospectivity of Helvering
v. Butterworth, 290 U.S. 365 (1933). Stone could have been decided on this ground,
without reaching the recoupment issue. Although at that time the non-retroactive
application of a Supreme Court decision was a relatively novel issue in the civil con-
text, it could nevertheless have been raised. Under the elements of Chevron Oil Co.
v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), admittedly decided much later, the Court could have
concluded that Butterworth did not apply retroactively. These elements under Chev-
ron are: (1) whether the decision establishes a new principle of law, either by overrul-
ing clear precedent upon which the parties may have relied or by deciding a case of
first impression the outcome of which may not have been reasonably foreseeable; (2)
whether retroactivity would further or hinder the purpose of the underlying rule of
law in light of its prior history; and (3) whether a retroactive application would pro-
duce hardships or inequities. let at 106-07.
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law prevails where the equities are equal. '3 62 Under a strict interpre-
tation of this maxim, the taxpayer should have prevailed, because the
government sought to assess the trust on behalf of the beneficiary af-
ter the statute of limitations had already expired. This maxim might
be interpreted, however, to mean that where there is equal equity,
public policy shall prevail. The public policy at stake in Stone was the
integrity of the federal tax system as an important source of revenue,
which the Bull Court referred to as "the life-blood of [the]
government. '363
Further, the decision did not undermine the intrinsic fairness of the
system because no tax liability had ever been paid by the beneficiary.
Moreover, because the income from the trust was distributable to the
beneficiary, there was an identity of interest. Thus, the implication of
Stone is that the equities will be construed in favor of the government
when the conduct of the parties is equally balanced. The problem for
the government is that the conduct of the parties is seldom equally
balanced.
Consider further McEachern, which appears to be inconsistent with
Stone under the established elements.3" While, initially, the taxpayer
was mistaken as a matter of law with respect to the tax treatment of
the item, the government was also mistaken in accepting the return as
filed. But unlike in Stone, the government was not diligent in assert-
ing its rights.365 Therefore, the taxpayer's payments of income tax
constituted statutory overpayments, made after the expiration of the
statute of limitations, and accordingly, recoupment could not apply.
Thus, because McEachern involved an honest mistake on the part of
the taxpayer and a passive mistake on the part of the government in
accepting the return as filed, recoupment was not an appropriate rem-
edy, and in fact, this was precisely the type of situation for which the
statute of limitations was designed.
Applying these elements, with hindsight to Stone, both parties had relied upon the
prior case law. Retroactivity would have caused a hardship to the government, who
would then have been time-barred from assessing the proper amount of tax.
362. McClintock, supra note 31, at 69.
363. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935).
364. One commentator has maintained, however, that McEachern can be recon-
ciled with Bull and Stone in that McEachern was not an equitable recoupment case at
all, but was instead decided under estoppel principles. McConnell, supra note 7, at
594; see also Legatzke, supra note 20, at 871 (noting that recoupment was not specifi-
cally pleaded in Bull); supra text accompanying note 175 (arguing that McEachern
was a case of statutory construction to which recoupment did not apply). This posi-
tion has been dismissed as "hair splitting." Kojes v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 762,
764 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
365. From an equitable standpoint, delay defeats equities or, stated differently, "eq-
uity aids the vigilant" and not the indolent. McClintock, supra note 31, at 71-76.
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VI. PROCEDURAL AND JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS
Recoupment raises several procedural and jurisdictional problems.
Two of these problems coalesce in the relatively recent Supreme
Court case of United States v. Dalm.36 Mrs. Dalm, the administratrix
of an estate, received administration fees from the estate, plus two
additional payments from a beneficiary. The beneficiary filed a gift
tax return with respect to the first payment made in 1976, although
Mrs. Dalm paid the gift taxes. The beneficiary filed no gift tax return
and paid no gift taxes on the second payment made in 1977. The gov-
ernment subsequently determined that the two payments from the
beneficiary constituted additional fees on which Mrs. Dalm owed an
income tax. Mrs. Dalm then petitioned the Tax Court to contest these
deficiencies, alleging that the payments were gifts. 367 After two days
of trial, Mrs. Dalm reached a settlement with the government by
which she agreed to pay the income tax deficiency on the 1977 pay-
ment and to make a partial payment of the income tax on the 1976
payment. After remitting these amounts, Mrs. Dalm filed a claim for
refund of the gift tax she had paid on the 1976 payment. When the
government failed to act on this claim, Mrs. Dalin brought suit in the
federal district court seeking a refund of the gift tax. 36 s
Although the statute of limitations on the 1976 taxable year had
long since expired, Mrs. Dalm alleged that because the assessment of
the income tax deficiency was timely, her suit for offset of that defi-
ciency by the gift tax she had paid was also timely under the doctrine
of equitable recoupment. The district court held for the government,
however, in concluding that Mrs. Dalm's suit constituted an independ-
ent suit for refund of the gift taxes which could be maintained only if
the main claim, the refund claim, was timely. 69 Because the statute of
limitations for refund of the gift tax had expired, recoupment could
not apply.3
70
Mrs. Dalm then appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the
lower court, holding that the district court had erred in its characteri-
zation of the main claim. According to the Sixth Circuit, the main
claim was the initial income tax deficiency which was timely; there-
fore, recoupment did apply.371 The government then appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that
366. 494 U.S. 596 (1990).
367. Id. at 599.
368. Dalm v. United States, 89-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) J 13,806, at 88,160-61 (S.D.
Mich. 1987), rev'd, 867 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 494 U.S. 596 (1990).
369. Id. at 88,165-66.
370. Id.
371. Dalm v. United States, 867 F.2d 305, 312-13 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 494 U.S. 596
(1990).
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recoupment did not apply because the statute of limitations barred the
suit for refund.372
But the Supreme Court misapprehended the nature of recoupment.
The 1976 payment by the beneficiary to Mrs. Daim was taxed twice
under inconsistent legal theories. Clearly, the 1976 payment to Mrs.
Dalm could not have constituted both a gift and income. In consider-
ing the equities, Mrs. Dalm acted in good faith. Her gift tax payment,
as well as the gift tax return on the 1976 transfer, were accepted by the
government, yet the government subsequently changed the theory of
taxation after the statute had run on the earlier gift tax payment.373
The result was that Mrs. Dalm was double taxed, and the government
was unjustly enriched. The government was the aggressor and took
unfair advantage of the statute of limitations. This was clearly the
type of situation for which equitable recoupment was designed. In-
deed, the facts of Dalm are reminiscent of those of Bull, as Justice
Stevens noted in his dissent.374 The problem for Mrs. Dalm, however,
did not lie with the merits of the case, but rather with a technical pro-
cedural issue.
372. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1990); accord Lovett v. United
States, 81 F.3d 143, 145-46 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that taxpayer who mistakenly
paid income tax on military severance pay could not sue for refund after statute of
limitations had run), cert. denied, No. 96-5225, 1996 WL 411265 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1996).
373. The Court appeared to attach significance to the fact that Mrs. Dalm had not
taken full advantage of her opportunities to raise the equitable recoupment claim
with the IRS in administrative proceedings. See Dalm, 494 U.S. at 610. A case with
similar reasoning is Kellogg-Citizens National Bank v. United States, 330 F.2d 635
(Ct. Cl. 1964), in which the IRS assessed income tax deficiencies against an estate on
items of income which had previously been included in the estate and on which an
estate tax had been paid, but refund of such tax was time-barred. The taxpayer con-
tested the deficiencies in the Tax Court and ultimately settled with the IRS. Under
the settlement agreement, the taxpayer agreed to pay an additional amount of income
tax, plus penalties and interest attributable to this amount. Because of its relationship
to the estate, the amount resulted in an overpayment of estate tax, for which a refund
was time-barred at the time of the settlement. The taxpayer then brought suit in the
Court of Claims seeking a refund of the estate tax overpayment. The Court of Claims
held that the taxpayer had not been diligent in asserting its rights because there had
been a period of ten months during which the taxpayer could have filed for a refund
of the estate taxes but had failed to do so. The taxpayer argued that during this ten-
month period the income tax liability was merely a contingent liability, because it was
unclear at that time whether the taxpayer ultimately would be responsible for that tax
and if so, in what amount. The Court of Claims, however, was not persuaded by this
argument. It concluded that the taxpayer should have filed an open protective claim
for refund when the IRS first sought to impose additional income taxes. Id. at 640.
The interesting point is that the Court of Claims appeared to be arguing laches
against the taxpayer. It never mentioned any jurisdictional problems other than expi-
ration of the statute of limitations, although the situation was very similar to that of
Dalm. See also Evans Trust v. United States, 462 F.2d 521, 526 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (holding
that equitable recoupment did not apply where the result of settlement with IRS in
Tax Court was that there never had been any deficiency).
374. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 612 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A. Equitable Recoupment as a Defense
The Bull Court postulated that "recoupment is in the nature of a
defense arising out of some feature of the transaction upon which the
plaintiff's action is grounded. Such a defense is never barred by the
statute of limitations so long as the main action itself is timely." '375
Thus, recoupment may not be used as an independent jurisdictional
ground for opening the statute of limitations.376 The modem technical
use of recoupment is generally through a refund claim in which the
taxpayer seeks to recoup a barred overpayment, or portion thereof,
against an open deficiency. 3 7 Procedurally, the taxpayer's claim must
be a claim for offset of the open deficiency by the barred overpayment
or, if the taxpayer has paid the deficiency, a timely claim for refund
must be made requesting an offset of the barred amount.78 Such an
offset would arise under the fiction that the barred overpayment
would create a credit against the open deficiency. 79 If the require-
ments for the application of recoupment are otherwise met, the stat-
ute of limitations will never bar such a suit.3s0
Occasionally, taxpayers mistakenly file a claim for refund of the
barred claim, rather than request an offset of the open deficiency by
the barred overpayment. While, as Justice Stevens noted in his dissent
in Dalm, such mistakes should generally be considered "meaningless
375. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1935).
376. See, e.g., Brigham v. United States, 470 F.2d 571, 577 (CL Cl. 1972) (noting
that the "function of the doctrine is to allow the taxpayer to reduce the amount of a
deficiency recoverable by the Government by the amount of an otherwise barred
overpayment of the taxpayer" (emphasis omitted)), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831 (1973);
Evans Trust, 462 F.2d at 526 (holding that taxpayer could not use recoupment to re-
cover barred estate tax when no deficiency existed and open refund claim requested
recovery of amount agreed upon by taxpayer and government in settlement); Ohlson
v. United States, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,266, at 88,006 (D. Colo. 1992) (noting
that recoupment is a defense and may not be used to cure an untimely refund claim).
As succinctly stated by one court: "Attempts by taxpayers to utilize the doctrine to
revive an untimely affirmative refund claim, as opposed to offset a timely government
claim of deficiency with a barred claim of the taxpayer, have been uniformly re-
jected." O'Brien v. United States, 766 F.2d 1038, 1049 (7th Cir. 1985).
377. See, e.g., Kolom v. United States, 791 F.2d 762, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1986) (permit-
ting taxpayer to recoup barred alternative minimum tax against open alternative mini-
mum tax deficiency); Boyle v. United States, 355 F.2d 233, 234 (3d Cir. 1965)
(describing action for refund of income tax on the ground that taxpayer should be
able to recoup barred overpayment of estate tax attributable to the income tax).
378. See Bull, 295 U.S. at 262-63.
379. See Holzer v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 875, 878 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd per
curiam, 367 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966) ("The doctrine of equitable recoupment utilizes
the fiction of a tax credit or defense to liability for a year open to suit to avoid viola-
tion of the statutory scheme providing for finality of tax determinations.").
380. See supra text accompanying note 124 (quoting the Supreme Court's rationale
for the application of recoupment in Bull). But see Schenectady Trust Co. v. United
States, 88-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 13,751, at 84,104-05 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (misinter-
preting Bull and requiring a timely refund claim to have been filed on the barred
claim).
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procedural distinctions," 381 some courts, nevertheless, have strictly
construed the jurisdictional requirements of recoupment in these situ-
ations, and have held that the claim is barred by the statute of limita-
tions because recoupment cannot constitute the sole jurisdictional
basis for the claim. 8
Cases in which recoupment was properly denied because it was
used as an independent jurisdictional ground, instead of a defense,
have involved erroneous refunds made after the statute of limitations
had run,383 situations in which there was no open deficiency,384 situa-
tions in which the party requesting recoupment was not the proper
party,385 and where the court did not have jurisdiction because the
381. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 621-22 n.9 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
382. See, e.g., Fairley v. United States, 901 F.2d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 1990) (character-
izing the recoupment claim as the main claim and holding that lower court was with-
out jurisdiction because claim was filed after statute of limitations had run); Ellard v.
United States, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 16,370, at 88,863-64 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (denying
taxpayer use of recoupment to offset barred personal excise tax refund against open
deficiency of 50% owned partnership); see also Epperson v. United States, 473 F.
Supp. 1360, 1362 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (disallowing recoupment, erroneously, on ground
that funds were not double taxed under inconsistent legal theories).
383. See, e.g., United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 485 F.2d 331, 333 (3d Cir. 1973)
(noting that taxpayer was trying to recoup "the very tax payment that the statute of
limitations barred it from recovering").
384. See, e.g., Brigham v. United States, 470 F.2d 571, 577 (Ct. CI. 1972) (holding
that taxpayers were not entitled to recoup barred overpayment because there was no
open deficiency to offset, and that taxpayers were attempting to expand recoupment
to obtain a refund attributable to an otherwise barred year), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831
(1973); Evans Trust v. United States, 462 F.2d 521, 526 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (holding that
taxpayer was not entitled to recoupment because no deficiency existed by virtue of
settlement, and statute had already run on overpayment).
385. See O'Brien v. United States, 766 F.2d 1038, 1046-48 (7th Cir. 1985) (consider-
ing beneficiary of estate who sought recoupment of barred income tax overpayment
after estate had litigated issue of open estate tax liability). Technically, O'Brien was
not decided on this ground, but rather was decided on the ground of improper tax and
taxable year. See Steven J. Willis, Correction of Errors Via Mitigation and Equitable
Recoupment: Some People Still Do Not Understand, 52 Tax Notes 1421, 1427 n.82
(1991) [hereinafter Willis, Correction of Errors] (discussing Justice Stevens's dissent in
Dalm). Willis criticizes Justice Stevens's dissent in Dalm by noting that the Seventh
Circuit did not decide O'Brien on the ground of improper party. Although Willis is
technically correct, Justice Stevens's point is that the court could not have reached
that conclusion without deciding that the beneficiary was not the proper party. If the
Seventh Circuit had directly addressed the issue of whether the estate could recoup
the barred income tax overpayment of the beneficiary against the open, litigated es-
tate tax deficiency, it would probably have decided that res judicata would apply,
precluding the estate from raising the issue. See Tierney, supra note 28, at 123-27
(discussing nature of claim and type of relief under recoupment).
The Seventh Circuit in O'Brien correctly noted that the beneficiary was not the
proper party to whom the identity of interest inquiry should apply, because the open
claim was not paid by the beneficiary but by the estate. Thus, only the estate could
request a refund because nothing under the Internal Revenue Code would permit the
beneficiary to do so. Therefore, the identity of interest test, if applied at all, must be
applied to the estate. See O'Brien, 766 F.2d at 1050-51 n.16. Nevertheless, Justice
Stevens was correct in noting that the Seventh Circuit's discussion of this issue was
dicta. Cf. Hufbauer v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 247, 251-52 (S.D. Cal. 1968) (award-
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main claim had been litigated.3s6 In the latter situation, an inequity
may arise if the forum in which the main claim is litigated is the Tax
Court.
B. The Tax Court and Equity Jurisdiction
The Tax Court originated from the Board of Tax Appeals, an in-
dependent agency of the Executive Branch, established under the
Revenue Act of 1924.11 The Board was granted restricted jurisdic-
tion over deficiencies and jeopardy assessments.? During the 1924
congressional debates, it was proposed that the Board's jurisdiction be
expanded, in part to allow refund jurisdiction, but this proposal was
defeated on the ground that it would increase the Board's case load,
and thus decrease its efficiency.38 9
In E.J. Barry,39 one of its earliest decisions, the Board determined
that it had jurisdiction to offset a proposed deficiency by an unrelated
overpayment in a taxable year not before the court. This decision was
rendered obsolete, however, by the Revenue Act of 1926,391 which
forbade the Board from determining whether or not the tax for any
ing refund to corporation where taxpayer brought suit in individual capacity and stat-
ute of limitations had run against corporation of which he was sole shareholder).
386. See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608-11 (1990).
387. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336-38. For a discussion of
the establishment of the Board, see Harold Dubroff, United States Tax Court-An
Historical Analysis, 1-107 (1979). Although the Board was intended to be independ-
ent of the Treasury Department, the Department was heavily involved in the selection
of the first Board members. Id. at 84-86. In fact, some of these members had previ-
ously served on the Committee on Appeals and Review, the forerunner of the Board
which was under the auspices of the Internal Revenue Service. Id. at 43-45.
388. The Board's jurisdiction was limited to income, excess profits, estate, and gift
taxes. The term "deficiency" was, and is, defined as "the excess of tax due over the
amount conceded as due by the taxpayer." Dubroff, supra note 387, at 73; see also
I.R.C. § 6211(a) (1994) (defining "deficiency" as the "amount by which the tax im-
posed... exceeds the excess of the sum of... the amount shown as the tax by the
taxpayer upon his return... plus.., the amounts previously assessed... over ... the
amount of rebates"). In order to appear before the Board, the taxpayer must first
have received a notice of deficiency from the IRS and must have filed an appeal with
the Board within 60 days of the date the notice was mailed. With respect to jeopardy
assessments, a claim in abatement must have been filed with the Board within 60 days
of receiving notice of the proposed assessment. Dubroff, supra note 387, at 73-74.
If a taxpayer lost an appeal before the Board, the taxpayer could file a claim for
refund after paying the assessed amount. If such a claim was denied, the taxpayer
could file a suit for refund in either federal district court or the Court of Claims be-
cause the 1924 Act had not provided for direct review of Board decisions. Id. at 77-78.
This is how the estate in the Bull case managed to relitigate the recoupment issue. See
Andrews, supra note 13, at 599 n.20.
389. Dubroff, supra note 387, at 74-77. It was also proposed that the Board be
allowed to redetermine the tax in any case in which "fraud, favoritism, (or] gross
error" was suspected. Id at 74-75 (quoting 65 Cong. Rec. 2614 (1924) (statement of
Rep. Jeffers)).
390. 1 B.T.A. 156 (1924).
391. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 274(g), 44 Stat. 9 (codified at I.R.C. § 6214(b)
(1994)).
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other taxable year had been overpaid or underpaid, although it au-
thorized a consideration of other taxable years in order to redeter-
mine the deficiency at issue.3 2
The rationale behind the 1926 Act was that Congress intended the
Board to have deficiency jurisdiction restricted to the taxable year(s)
at issue in the notice of deficiency.393 A consideration of other taxa-
ble years that were not procedurally before the Board would amount
to an ultra vires exercise of refund jurisdiction.394 After the 1926 Act,
the Board took the position that it had no equity jurisdiction in gen-
eral, and could not apply equitable recoupment, in particular.395 The
Supreme Court upheld this position in Commissioner v. Gooch Mill-
ing & Elevator Co.396 Gooch has been widely cited in support of the
proposition that the jurisdiction of the Board/Tax Court to apply equi-
table recoupment was revoked under the 1926 Act.3 97 But there are
several problems with this analysis. First, in stating the proposition
that the Board no longer had jurisdiction to apply equitable recoup-
ment, Gooch cited Barry.398 This reference was incorrect because
Barry did not involve a true equitable recoupment claim at all, but
rather, a Lewis v. Reynolds-related offset. Indeed, although admit-
392. Id. at 56. The Act states:
The Board in redetermining a deficiency in respect of any taxable year shall
consider such facts with relation to the taxes for other taxable years as may
be necessary correctly to redetermine the amount of such deficiency, but in
so doing shall have no jurisdiction to determine whether or not the tax for
any other taxable year has been overpaid or underpaid.
Id.
393. See Dubroff, supra note 387, at 126-28 (discussing deficiency and limited re-
fund jurisdiction of the Board).
394. Indeed, this had been the government's argument in Barry. See 1 B.T.A. at
157. A further rationale is that it would have increased the Board's case load.
395. See, e.g., Scaife Co. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 964, 966 (1942) ("[T]o deduct
from the amount of the admitted deficiency the amount of the overassessment would
be to exercise authority over a refund, which authority Congress has not given."); Red
Wing Potteries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 841, 846 (1941) (holding that Board
of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to apply recoupment); Estate of Highland v. Com-
missioner, 43 B.T.A. 598, 611-12 (1941) (considering issue sua sponte), affd sub nom.
Helvering v. Highland, 124 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 1942). It made no difference whether
the equitable recoupment claim was used as a defense or as an independent jurisdic-
tional basis. By the same token, an appellate court reviewing a Board decision also
lacked jurisdiction to consider recoupment because it was confined only to review of
the record in the lower court. Dubroff, supra note 387, at 123 (quoting S. Rep. No. 52,
69th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1926)); see H.R. Rep. No. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1925);
see also Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 320 U.S. 418, 420 (1943)(holding that Board has no jurisdiction to apply doctrine of equitable recoupment).
But see McConnell, supra note 7, at 579-86 (discussing recoupment's development as
a common law doctrine).
396. 320 U.S. 418 (1943).
397. See, e.g., Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 303 (1946).
It has also been held that an appellate court reviewing a Tax Court decision is re-
stricted to reviewing only those matters over which the Tax Court had jurisdiction.
Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 6 (1987).
398. 320 U.S. at 421 n.7.
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tedly not dispositive, the Barry opinion never used the term "recoup-
ment." Second, Gooch involved an erroneous inventory valuation
which resulted in an income tax deficiency in the open year and an
overpayment in the earlier, then barred, taxable year. Because of the
nature of inventory, such a misvaluation would have involved a rede-
termination of the entire tax liability for that taxable year. This is
because inventory has a substantial effect on gross income in the sale
of goods. 399 This meant that the effect of a misvaluation could only be
determined after examining all taxable events related to the sale of
the inventory over the entire taxable year in which the misvaluation
occurred. This would not have been permitted under the 1926 Act.
Furthermore, because of its consequent effect on other taxable
years, an inventory misvaluation should not constitute a "transaction"
or "single taxable event" for purposes of recoupment. °0 Finally, in a
true equitable recoupment claim, a consideration by the Board/Tax
Court of an inconsistent tax treatment of a single transaction or taxa-
ble event in a previous taxable year (i.e., in a taxable year not before
the court by virtue of the notice of deficiency) does not involve a rede-
termination of the entire tax liability for the previous taxable year. In-
stead, it should fall under the category of "other facts" that may be
considered in redetermining the amount of the deficiency for the taxa-
ble year in question.4 °' This is consistent with the rationale behind the
1926 Act.
In 1942, the Board became the Tax Court of the United States,
although there was no substantive change in its jurisdiction.4tn The
court remained an independent agency within the Executive Branch,
and a quasi-judicial body4°3 until 1969, when it became the United
399. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a) (1963) ("In a manufacturing, merchandising, or
mining business, 'gross income' means the total sales, less the cost of goods sold, plus
any income from investments and from incidental or outside operations or sources.").
400. See supra text accompanying notes 301-04. Contra Crossett Lumber Co. v.
United States, 87 F.2d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1937) (holding that deficiency in barred year
attributable to overvalued inventory was same transaction as overassessment in fol-
lowing year attributable to misvaluation).
401. See I.R.C. § 6214(c) (1994). The statute specifically states:
The Tax Court, in redetermining a deficiency of any tax imposed... for any
period, act, or failure to act, shall consider such facts with relation to the
taxes ... for other periods, acts, or failures to act as may be necessary cor-
rectly to redetermine the amount of such deficiency, but in so doing shall
have no jurisdiction to determine whether or not the taxes.., for any other
period, act, or failure to act have been overpaid or underpaid.
402. For a discussion of the problems involved in this change, see Dubroff, supra
note 387, at 165-204.
403. Examples of its quasi-judicial status include the appellate (rather than collat-
eral) review of its decisions, its exclusive jurisdiction, and the finality of its decisions.
See id. at 111-64.
19961.
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States Tax Court, an Article I legislative court within the federal judi-
cial system.4°
While the Tax Court continued to take the position that it did not
have jurisdiction to apply recoupment, 405 it nevertheless applied other
equitable principles.4° Moreover, the legislative history of the statu-
tory mitigation provisions indicates that mitigation was intended to be
a supplement to recoupment and other equitable remedies. 07 Be-
cause mitigation applies in the Tax Court, it is curious that Congress
did not mention the restriction of equitable jurisdiction in the Tax
Court, if indeed this had been the intent, because there is, otherwise,
no specific prohibition on the court's equity jurisdiction. On the other
hand, because the Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction, once a tax-
payer brings suit in the Tax Court, the merits of that claim may not be
relitigated in either the federal district court or the U.S. Court of Fed-
eral Claims.4 ° s Thus, the decision of the Tax Court is final and bind-
ing.40 9 Given this finality, it is irrational to assume that Congress
404. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 730, 730. For a
discussion of the effect of the 1969 Act on the court's jurisdiction, see Continental
Equities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 551 F.2d 74, 82-84 (5th Cir. 1977).
405. See, e.g., Stoller v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1554, 1567-68 (1990) (cit-
ing Dalm and holding that it had no jurisdiction to consider a taxable year not before
the court and thus could not apply recoupment), affd in part, rev'd in part, 994 F.2d
855, amended by 3 F.3d 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Estate of Schneider v. Commissioner,
93 T.C. 568, 570 (1989) (noting that absent a notice of deficiency and timely action on
that notice, the court does not have jurisdiction to determine a tax liability for a year
not before the court).
406. See, e.g., Woods v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 776, 789 (1989) (reformation);
Boulez v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 209, 216 (1981) (considering application of estoppel,
but declining to do so on the merits), affd, 810 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 896 (1987); Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 61, 66-70 (1979) (tax
benefit rule), affd, 641 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
407. S. Rep. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 49 (1938). The legislative history states:
The purpose of the statute of limitations to prevent the litigation of stale
claims is fully recognized and approved. But it was never intended to sanc-
tion active exploitation, by the beneficiary of the statutory bar, of opportuni-
ties only open to him if he assumes a position diametrically opposed to that
taken prior to the running of the statute. The Federal courts in many some-
what similar tax cases have sought to prevent inequitable results by applying
principles variously designated as estoppel, quasi-estoppel, recoupment and
set-off. For various reasons, mostly technical, these judicial efforts cannot
extend to all problems of this type. Nor can they provide a uniform, system-
atic solution of these problems. Legislation has long been needed to supple-
ment the equitable principles applied by the courts and to check the growing
volume of litigation by taking the profit out of inconsistency, whether exhib-
ited by taxpayers or revenue officials and whether fortuitous or the result of
design.
Id.
408. See I.R.C. § 6512(a) (1994) (prohibiting simultaneous suits over deficiencies in
the Tax Court and refunds in the district courts and U.S. Claims Court); I.R.C.
§ 7422(e) (1994) (providing that district court and U.S. Claims Court lose jurisdiction
to the extent that the Tax Court acquires jurisdiction).
409. See I.R.C. § 7481(a) (1994) (providing that decision of Tax Court is final and
binding).
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would not have been more explicit if it intended to deny the Tax Court
equity jurisdiction. Indeed, since the merger of law and equity in the
nineteenth century, the presumption is that all federal courts have eq-
uity jurisdiction, unless such jurisdiction is specifically restricted.41 °
It is also irrational to conclude that the Tax Court must wear blind-
ers and cannot consider other factors in previous taxable years that
may have a direct bearing on the deficiency at issue-as long as those
factors do not involve a redetermination of the entire tax liability for a
year not before the court. Dalm highlights the irrationality of this po-
sition. Because Mrs. Dalm chose to litigate the merits of her income
tax deficiency in the Tax Court, she obtained the advantage of a hear-
ing on the merits of the contested deficiency without first having to
pay the tax liability,41' but she was disadvantaged because she could
not have raised the recoupment claim in the deficiency proceeding.
Because the Tax Court assumed jurisdiction over the income tax defi-
ciency, the claim could not be heard by any court other than the court
of appeals, which could consider only the issues raised in the original
action.412 Thus, Mrs. Daln was denied a remedy because she chose to
exercise her right to bring suit in a prepayment forum. ' 13
As a result of the Dalm decision, equitable recoupment becomes a
remedy for the wealthy if taxpayers are truly foreclosed from raising
the issue in the Tax Court.414 The Supreme Court in Dalm, however,
410. See McClintock, supra note 31, at 12-19 (discussing development of equity in
the U.S.). According to McClintock, equity should be regarded not as a separate
system, but as a part of each area of law. The problem is that most law school curric-
ula do not deal adequately with equity, and thus judges are poorly trained in this area.
Id. at 17-19.
411. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 599 (1990). In Ms. Dalm's case, the
amount of tax liability she was required to pay was substantial. Id. In order to avail
herself of the federal district court, she would have been forced to pay the tax liability
in full first and then file a claim for refund with the IRS. Mulroney, supra note 221,
§ 12.3(b). Only after this claim had been denied could she have availed herself of the
federal district court forum. If she had brought suit for refund in the district court,
she clearly would have prevailed on the merits under the direct authority of Bull. Cf
Dalm, 494 U.S. at 606-08.
It has been suggested that unscrupulous government agents might artificially inflate
a proposed deficiency in order to force the taxpayer into Tax Court. Fuller, supra note
265, at 58.
412. See I.R.C. § 7482(a) (1994).
413. This is a point Justice Stevens made in his dissent. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 613-15
(Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Kolom v. United States, 791 F.2d 762, 765-68 (9th Cir.
1986) (allowing taxpayer to raise issue in district court after litigating deficiency in Tax
Court on ground that recoupment claim did not arise until prior decision created the
inconsistency); O'Brien v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 203,206 (C.D. Ill. 1984) (same),
rev'd, 766 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1985). Note that the Dalm decision does not affect the
government's use of equitable recoupment, because the government is never the
plaintiff in a Tax Court proceeding.
414. Although, as Justice Stevens noted, if the Supreme Court had considered the
issue of whether the Tax Court has equity jurisdiction, and had decided that issue in
the affirmative, the reasoning in Daln would have been rendered obsolete. Dalm, 494
U.S. at 615 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While Justice Stevens was correct, the result
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reserved judgment on the issue of whether the Tax Court has equity
jurisdiction.415 Regarding that reservation as an invitation to review
its position, the Tax Court recently decided in a reviewed decision,
Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner,416 that it can consider the issue of
recoupment as long as it is validly raised as an affirmative defense in a
suit over which the court, otherwise, has jurisdiction.417
In so holding, the court reasoned that nothing in the Internal Reve-
nue Code indicated that Congress intended to restrict the application
of equitable principles in deciding "matters within our jurisdiction."41
Instead, such a limitation had emanated from the Barry and Gooch
decisions.
The court dismissed Barry by noting that it had involved the issue of
setoff versus recoupment.419 Gooch, however, was a more formidable
opinion because it dealt directly with the issue of Tax Court jurisdic-
tion and equitable recoupment. But the Mueller court also dismissed
Gooch as inapplicable because recoupment had not been "properly
raised in a timely suit for redetermination of a tax deficiency over
which we have jurisdiction."420 Perhaps the subtext of the court's
would have been the same because Ms. Dalm's suit would then have been barred by
res judicata. See supra note 408.
The problems of the alleged inability of the Tax Court to hear equitable recoup-
ment claims is exacerbated procedurally, because if taxpayers are precluded from
raising recoupment claims in the Tax Court and must instead resort to a refund forum,
the burden of proof shifts. In the Tax Court, the taxpayer is always the plaintiff and
thus has the burden of proving not only that the government's determination of a
deficiency is arbitrary, but also the correct amount of tax liability. See generally John-
son, Burden of Proof, supra note 102 (discussing the allocation of the burden of proof
in the litigation of refund claims).
415. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 611 n.8.
416. 101 T.C. 551 (1993).
417. Id at 556 ("[E]xercising jurisdiction over petitioner's recoupment defense
does not require us to exercise jurisdiction that is beyond the scope of petitioner's
main claim for the redetermination of its estate tax deficiency.").
The Supreme Court has held that the Tax Court may not expand its jurisdiction
based upon equitable considerations. Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 6 (1987).
This has been interpreted to mean that the Tax Court may not expand its statutorily
prescribed jurisdiction through an exercise of general equitable powers. Woods v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 776, 785 (1989); see, e.g., Estate of Kelley v. Commissioner, 45
F.3d 348, 352 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that Tax Court has limited equitable jurisdiction
and can reform consent-to-extend agreements that are properly before the court);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 885, 890-91 (1989) (holding that Tax
Court cannot use equitable recoupment to assume jurisdiction over excise taxes be-
cause these taxes are not otherwise within its jurisdiction).
Because the taxpayer is always the plaintiff in the Tax Court, "An issue based on
the statute of limitations is a defense and not a plea to the jurisdiction of [the] Court."
Woods, 92 T.C. at 787 (citing Badger Materials, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 1061
(1963)).
418. Mueller, 101 T.C. at 558 (quoting Woods, 92 T.C. at 788-89).
419. Il at 559.
420. Id at 560.
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statement is that the entire tax liability for the closed year would have
had to be redetermined in order for recoupment to apply in Gooch.42
C. Administrative Claims and Settlements
Taxpayers also may raise an equitable recoupment defense in ad-
ministrative proceedings before the IRS.4z Indeed, if a taxpayer is
audited, or is otherwise before the IRS, there may be a quasi-exhaus-
tion requirement in order to obtain relief in the federal courts.42 For
instance, in no reported case in which the taxpayer and the govern-
ment have first reached a settlement agreement have the courts per-
mitted the taxpayer to use equitable recoupment in a subsequent
refund suit, although various other reasons for the taxpayer's loss
have been proffered by the courts. 24 The equities do not, however,
favor a party who inadvertently fails to raise the issue at the oppor-
421. The Supreme Court so noted in Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator
Co., 320 U.S. 418, 420-21 (1943); see also supra note 401 (discussing Tax Court statu-
tory jurisdiction).
422. See Rev. RUl. 71-56, 1971-1 C.B. 404, 404-05 (revoking Rev. RUl. 55-226, 1955-
1 C.B. 469, 470, which stated that the government had no authority to apply a barred
overpayment against an open deficiency); Rev. RUl. 81-287, 1981-2 C.B. 184, 185 (rul-
ing that government may use recoupment to offset a valid estate tax overpayment
against a barred income tax deficiency); see also Priv. Ltr. Ru. 85-52-005 (Aug. 29,
1985) (ruling that taxpayer may recoup barred excise tax overpayment against open
income tax deficiency); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-41-003 (June 6, 1984) (permitting govern-
ment to use recoupment to offset valid estate tax refund with barred income tax
deficiency).
423. See Fairley v. United States, 901 F.2d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting tax-
payer's plea for recoupment on ground that taxpayer failed to raise the issue in earlier
administrative proceedings). The Fairkley court misconstrued Dalm in noting that
Dalm required a rejection of the taxpayer's claim for failure to raise the issue in the
administrative proceedings. Id. Daim, however, did not establish such a requirement.
Instead, Daim noted, almost as an apology, that taxpayers could raise the issue of
recoupment in administrative proceedings; thus, the holding in Dalm was not as harsh
as it appeared. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990).
424. See, e.g., Kojes v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 762, 764-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1965)
(noting failure of single transaction element); Evans Trust v. United States, 462 F.2d
521, 526 (Ct. CL 1972) (describing case where recoupment was not used as a defense
and facts were not similar to those of Bull).
In Kojes, the taxpayer was an estate that filed suit for refund of a barred estate tax
overpayment resulting from a subsequent income tax deficiency. 241 F. Supp. at 763.
The court held that the taxpayer could not recoup the barred estate tax because the
income tax deficiency and the estate tax overpayment did not arise from the same
transaction, and also because the refund suit was barred by the statute of limitations.
IL at 765. Under Professor Andrews's two tax effect theory, however, the income tax
deficiency would produce an automatic estate tax deficiency; thus the two would con-
stitute a single transaction. The appropriate suit would have been a suit for refund of
the open income tax overpayment. If that were the case, the suit for the barred estate
tax overpayment would have been a "meaningless procedural distinction." Tierney,
supra note 28, at 136. The result in Kojes is correct, however, because the taxpayer
had the opportunity to raise the issue in the settlement negotiations and did not. Ac-
cordingly, the situation was not an appropriate one for the application of recoupment.
Cf. West Va. Pulp & Paper Co. v. McElligott, 40 F. Supp. 765, 770-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)(permitting government to recoup barred deficiency against open refund despite ear-
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tune time. Thus, the failure to raise the issue during the settlement
negotiations could be tantamount to collateral estoppel.4zs
VII. RECENT CASES AND COMMENTS: CONTINUING CONFUSION
A. Hall v. United States426
The judicial decisions since Dalm indicate that, despite Professor
Andrews's enlightening article, confusion remains. By way of illustra-
tion, consider the case of Hall v. United States. There, the plaintiff was
a family partnership that owned a royalty interest in a federal oil and
gas lease. Amoco Production Company ("Amoco") was the operator
of the lease. For the taxable years 1980 through 1985, the plaintiff was
subject to windfall profits taxes that Amoco withheld and remitted to
the government on behalf of the plaintiff.
42 7
In 1986, the Bureau of Land Management revised the mineral acre-
age downward retroactive to 1976, thus reducing the plaintiff's reve-
nue interest. The plaintiff then refunded the excess income to Amoco,
who, properly, did not credit the windfall profits taxes it had withheld.
In 1987, the plaintiff filed with the IRS a claim for refund of the
overpaid windfall profits taxes. While the plaintiff obtained a refund
for the open years, the refund claim was disallowed for the taxable
years 1980 and 1981 because those years were closed by the statute of
limitations. The plaintiff then brought suit against the government,
requesting relief through either the mitigation provisions or through
equitable recoupment.
The district court dismissed the recoupment claim in a footnote in
which it misstated the holding of Dalm.418 Professor Willis correctly
lier settlement because the subject of the settlement was different from the stibject of
the recoupment).
425. But see Ohlson v. United States, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,266, at 88,006-
07 (D. Colo. 1992) (rejecting taxpayer's argument that recoupment should apply
against government because IRS failed to detect and correct his miscalculations and
noting that the "taxpayer, not the IRS, bears the burden of filing correct tax returns").
426. 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,104 (D. Utah 1991), rev'd, 975 F.2d 722 (10th
Cir. 1992).
427. Id at 87,426-27; see Crude Oil W'mdfal Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
223, 94 Stat. 229, 230-54, repealed by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1941, 102 Stat. 1107, 1322-24. The purpose of this tax was
to control rising oil prices in the wake of deregulation by the Carter Administration.
Although the obligation to withhold and remit the tax liability fell upon the first pur-
chaser, Amoco, the tax liability was deemed to have been paid by the person with the
economic interest in the production, the plaintiff. See S. Rep. No. 394, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 60, 65-66 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 410, 474-76.
As Professor Willis notes, the opinion is unclear as to whether Amoco actually
withheld the taxes from payments due the plaintiffs or whether Amoco paid the entire
amount to the plaintiffs then collected the tax liability from them. Professor Willis
further notes that the difference is immaterial for the purpose of recoupment. Willis,
Correction of Errors, supra note 385, at 1421 n.6.
428. The Utah court incorrectly noted that Dalm had held that "taxpayers may not
invoke the equitable recoupment doctrine where there has not been a timely adminis-
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observes that the court technically reached the right result, but for the
wrong reason. 29 Professor Willis's reasoning with respect to recoup-
ment, however, was equally wrong. He states that Amoco, not the
plaintiff at bar, was the proper party and that Amoco would have as-
serted recoupment by underpaying the correct excise tax "in the same
dollar amount as the prior erroneous but uncorrectable overpay-
ment. '430 He goes on to note that, in any event, recoupment would
not have applied because there was no identity of interest between
Amoco and the plaintiff.431
First, Amoco was not the proper party; the plaintiff was. Amoco's
role was similar to that of an employer who is required to withhold
income tax on the compensation of an employee. The legislative his-
tory of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 is clear on this
point.432 Amoco had a duty to withhold the excise tax from the plain-
tiff's payments and to remit that amount to the government. Once
that obligation was fulfilled, Amoco's duty to the government was
complete. Amoco acted in good faith and in accordance with applica-
ble law at the time of the withholding. Any overpayment belonged to
the plaintiff, and only the plaintiff could file a claim for the refund.
Moreover, the battle over the proper amount of the tax liability be-
longed to the plaintiff, not Amoco. If Amoco had underwithheld, it
would have opened itself to liability. 33
Second, because the single transaction requirement was not met,
recoupment should not have applied in this case, unless the court had
chosen to extend the doctrine of recoupment. The vast weight of au-
thority regards an excise tax attributable to one taxable year as a dif-
ferent transaction from an excise tax attributable to a different taxable
year.43 Because of that precedent, the plaintiff would not be entitled
to relief under the doctrine of equitable recoupment because the
trative refund claim filed under § 6511(a)." Hall, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 87,427
n.2.
429. See Willis, Correction of Errors, supra note 385, at 1421.
430. Id. at 1427.
431. Id
432. See S. Rep. 394, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 60, 62, 64 (1979), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 410, 469-70, 472, 473-74 (noting that the withholding obligation is simi-
lar to that imposed upon an employer and that overpayments of the tax may be
credited against the owner's income tax).
433. See I.LRC. § 3403 (1994) (holding employer liable for tax required to be with-
held and paid); I.R.C. § 6672(a) (1994) (imposing personal liability for failure to col-
lect and pay over tax); see also Finley v. United States, 82 F.3d 966, 974 (10th Cir.
1996) (stating that responsible persons shall be held liable for willfully failing to remit
payroll taxes). Once the employer withholds, the employee is credited with having
paid the tax liability, regardless of whether or not the employer remits the withheld
amount to the government. Thus, the only recourse the government has is against the
employer. Id at 970.
434. See, e.g., Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 299-303
(1946) (holding that rationale behind the statute of limitations requires such a policy).
For a full discussion of Rothensies, see supra part IL.B.4.
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plaintiff was requesting a refund of a barred tax-i.e., attempting to
use recoupment as an independent jurisdictional ground. Perhaps this
was what the district court was trying to convey in its footnote.
B. Fairley v. United States435
In Fairley, the IRS audited the joint income tax returns of two dece-
dents for the taxable years 1978, 1979, and 1980. As a result of these
audits, one of the estates was forced to pay income tax deficiencies,
interest, and penalties in 1984, attributable to these three taxable
years. The payment of the income tax deficiencies produced a corre-
sponding estate tax overpayment. The estate filed a claim for refund
of the overpaid estate taxes in 1986, more than six months after the
statute of limitations had run on the 1982 estate tax return. This claim
was denied by the government on the ground that it was not timely.436
The estate then filed an amended income tax return for 1978, the
only one of the three taxable years on which the statute of limitations
had not expired,437 seeking a refund of the income taxes. The estate
alleged that it was entitled to recoup the entire amount of the over-
paid estate taxes against the income tax liability for that year.43
The government conceded that the estate was entitled to recoup the
estate tax overpayment attributable to the 1978 income tax payment
against the 1978 income tax liability. But the government contested
the estate's right to recoup the entire amount of the estate tax over-
payment against the 1978 income tax liability, because the estate had
failed to file a timely claim for refund attributable to the 1979 and
1980 taxable years.
The district court granted summary judgement to the taxpayer,
holding that the main claim was timely and that equitable recoupment
was "meant to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations. ' 439 The
court went on to state that it would be "most 'inequitable' to bar
plaintiff's recovery on the basis of his failure to seek recoupment pro-
portionately against the deficiency payments for 1978, 1979, and
1980.,44o
While equitable recoupment does allow the claimant to avoid the
bar of the statute of limitations to a limited extent, nevertheless, the
435. 901 F.2d 691 (8th Cir. 1990).
436. Id at 692.
437. The reason the statute had not expired with respect to the 1978 taxable year
was that the IRS had returned the 1978 income tax payment to the taxpayer because
the payment was sixty-five cents short. The taxpayer then re-remitted the payment by
check dated August 13, 1984. Id. at 692 n.1.
438. The reason the estate did not fe a claim for refund of the income taxes attrib-
utable to the 1979 and 1980 taxable years was because the statute had run with respect
to those payments. See Fairley v. United States, 89-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) J 9128, at
87,098-99 (E.D. Ark. 1988), vacated, 901 F.2d 691 (8th Cir. 1990).
439. Id.
440. Id. at 87,099.
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district court failed to grasp the message of McEachern. If the main
claim is not timely, recoupment is not an appropriate remedy. In Fair-
ley, the main claim was an income tax refund claim with respect to
three taxable years. This claim requested recoupment of the overpaid
estate tax. The claim was timely with respect to the 1978 taxable year,
but not with respect to the 1979 and 1980 taxable years.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit correctly held in favor of the govern-
ment, allowing it to recoup the estate tax attributable to the 1979 and
1980 taxable years. But the court's reasoning was confused. First, it
mischaracterized the taxpayer's earlier disallowed claim for refund of
the estate tax as the main claim. The Eighth Circuit then vacated the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the taxpayer,
holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the claim be-
cause the equitable recoupment claim was the sole basis for jurisdic-
tion." 1 The Eighth Circuit cited Dalm for the proposition that
"Fairley has invoked equitable recoupment in a separate suit for re-
fund of estate tax, rather than as a defense to the government's assess-
ment of an income tax deficiency."" 2
The court would have been correct in its reasoning if its characteri-
zation of the main claim had been correct. In that case, it would have
been addressing a straightforward refund action for the estate tax, and
equitable recoupment would not enter into the picture. In miscon-
struing the facts, the court never reached what should have been the
correct reasoning in this case: recoupment was inappropriate because
the single transaction element was not met." 3 While there is no doubt
that the payment of the income tax deficiencies would directly pro-
duce an estate tax overpayment, recoupment is available only to the
extent the main claim is timely. Because there were three taxable
years involved, each of those years represented a separate "transac-
tion" or "taxable event."4 " For purposes of recoupment, the two
closed years could not be bootstrapped by the open year into meeting
the jurisdictional requirement.
The district court misunderstood this point. It noted that the estate
was seeking to use recoupment as the sole basis for jurisdiction be-
cause it was invoking the doctrine "in a separate suit for refund of
441. Fairley v. United States, 901 F.2d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 1990). Under this ration-
ale, the Eighth Circuit would presumably have denied the taxpayer's claim for equita-
ble recoupment of the estate taxes against the timely filed claim for refund of the 1978
income taxes.
442. Id
443. It is curious that the court did not address this issue, since it was apparently
raised by the parties themselves. Instead, the court stated that its "holding makes it
unnecessary for us to reach this issue." I&a at 694 n.3.
444. See Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 300 (1946); ac-
cord Wood v. United States, 213 F.2d 660, 661-62 (2d Cir. 1954) (holding that govern-
ment may not offset an income tax refund for one taxable year by a deficiency in
another).
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estate tax, rather than as a defense to the government's assessment of
an income tax deficiency.""' 5 It further cited Dalm for what appears
to be approval of a requirement to exhaust administrative remedies. 46
There are several fallacies in this reasoning, however. First, the
court seems to have misunderstood the jurisdictional point of Dalm.
Dalm involved a prior proceeding in the Tax Court. This is problem-
atic for any further review in the district court, as Dalm points out.
Second, deficiencies in income tax are only challengeable in the Tax
Court, not in the district court which has only refund jurisdiction.
Third, Fairley was properly pursuing a refund claim of the 1978 in-
come tax under equitable recoupment in the district court. Fourth,
the Supreme Court in Dalm raised the issue of the administrative rem-
edy, not as a suggestion for an exhaustion requirement, but to soften
the harshness of its holding. Fifth, the effectiveness of the administra-
tive remedy depends upon taxpayers' knowledge and understanding
of the intricacies of the tax laws. If the courts cannot understand equi-
table recoupment, how can laymen be expected to understand it?
Sixth, the administrative remedy is probably only as good as the integ-
rity of the system itself. Because equitable recoupment is so often
misunderstood and inconsistently applied, the government does not
have much incentive to work things out administratively with the tax-
payers. In other words, the better the government's chances of suc-
cess in court, the less likely it is to negotiate an informal settlement
agreement with the taxpayers.
In a footnote, the Eighth Circuit raised the issue of whether recoup-
ment was an appropriate remedy on equitable grounds." 7 It noted
that the estate had nearly a year in which to file a claim for refund of
the estate tax attributable to the 1979 and 1980 income tax payments;
however, it failed to do so.448 This is a recurring issue in the recoup-
ment cases-one with no consistent resolution. The court summarily
concluded that recoupment was not an appropriate remedy on that
ground.449
CONCLUSION
Equity originated as a system of flexibility because the legal reme-
dies were often inadequate. It has evolved, however, into a rigid sys-
tem, which, except for jurisdictional issues, often cannot be
distinguished from law. Although equitable recoupment is an ex-
traordinary remedy, it is important because it directly addresses issues
445. Fairley, 901 F.2d at 694.
446. Id.
447. Id at 694 n.4.
448. Id
449. Id In the same footnote, the court raised the issue of unclean hands, notwith-
standing Bowcut, noting that the income tax deficiencies arose in the first place be-
cause the decedents had defrauded the government. Id.
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of fundamental fairness and indirectly affects public perception of the
federal tax system as a system of voluntary compliance. Many courts
and commentators seemingly have lost sight of the fact that recoup-
ment is, first and foremost, an equitable remedy. As such, it should
not apply automatically or be forced into artificial requirements. Eq-
uitable remedies, by their nature, are flexible, although they must con-
form to equitable elements. This is, perhaps, the message behind the
Supreme Court's failure to establish clearly articulated guidelines and,
perhaps, behind its failure to address 'substantively the issue of re-
coupment since 1947, even though there are many conflicts among the
lower courts.
Although the Supreme Court was, or should have been, aware of
the lowers courts' struggle to rationalize McEachern with Bull and
Stone, it nevertheless passed up the opportunity to clarify the issue in
Rothensies.450 Because of this lack of guidance, the established ele-
ments have become too narrowly construed. As a result, courts have
struggled with the remedy for over fifty years. This struggle has pro-
duced inconsistent results that not only promote forum shopping, but
450. The pre-Rothensies struggle is exemplified by the Seventh Circuit's decision in
American Light & Traction Co. v. Harrison, 142 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1944). In 1928, a
taxpayer's wholly-owned subsidiary acquired a substantial block of stock in another
corporation and shortly thereafter exchanged this stock for debentures of a third cor-
poration. The taxpayer believed the exchange to be a tax-free corporate reorganiza-
tion and failed to report any gain from the transaction. After the statute of
limitations for assessment and collection of a deficiency for the taxable year 1928 had
expired, it became apparent that the prior tax treatment of the gain had been
erroneous.
In 1930 and 1931, the taxpayer sold some of the debentures. It maintained that no
taxable gain resulted from this sale even though the earlier transaction had been mis-
takenly reported as a tax-exempt exchange. Therefore, the basis for purposes of the
sale was the fair market value on the date of the exchange. Because the later sale did
not net more than the redetermined basis, no taxable gain resulted. The IRS refused
to accept this position. The taxpayer then brought suit before the Board of Tax Ap-
peals, which held in favor of the taxpayer. American Light & Traction Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 42 B.T.A. 1121, 1124 (1940), affd, 125 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1942).
In 1933 the taxpayer sold the remainder of the debentures and erroneously in-
cluded an amount of gain in its income tax return for that year, attributable to the
sale. The government admitted that the taxpayer had overpaid its taxes for 1933, but
refused to allow a refund of this amount, claiming that it should be entitled to recoup
the open overpayment against the barred deficiency from 1928. Harrison, 142 F.2d at
641.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Board's decision, opining that its "power to con-
strue the statute [of limitations] is narrower than usual and closely circumscribed,
because the Supreme Court has given an authoritative interpretation in the McEach-
ern case." Id. at 643.
Judge Evans dissented, noting that the prior deficiency and the later overpayment
arose from the same transaction and should be governed by the Bull case. Id. at 645
(Evans, J., dissenting). The Judge then stated: "I also think the disputed questions
should be settled by the Supreme Court. Then inferior courts, the U.S. Tax Court, all
taxpayers, and the Government will thereby be made happy, or at least less unhappy
and less disputant." Id. (Evans, J., dissenting).
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also obfuscate the remedy of recoupment when it should most appro-
priately apply.
While recoupment is a narrow doctrine, as the Supreme Court has
stated, it is nevertheless an equitable remedy that should produce an
equitable result. But when the basic elements and their general appli-
cation are inconsistent, the result is inequitable, both substantively
and procedurally. Equitable remedies may occasionally produce sub-
stantively inconsistent results because these remedies require subjec-
tive determinations, based upon the specific facts of the individual
cases. Reasonable minds may differ in a subjective determination, but
there should be less subjectivity in the procedural aspect of the rem-
edy. For instance, because consideration of a recoupment claim
should initially focus on the individual facts, the decisions of the lower
courts should be upheld, as long as those decisions are based on an
appropriate consideration of the facts. But, when the elements and
their application are inconsistent, the appellate courts should inter-
vene, as they have.
But the flexibility of equity with its individualized remedy is less
likely to be accommodated in the modem legal system with its
crowded dockets. There is a danger of the remedy becoming inflexi-
ble, as well as inconsistent, if the elements continue to be narrowly
construed. While Professor Andrews's two tax theory is a clever leap
over the single transaction hurdle, an automatic, but inconsistent, ap-
plication of this element relegates recoupment to a quasi-legal rem-
edy. It also ignores the equitable elements that should be of primary
importance.
While this Article's proposed elements may not alleviate the sub-
stantive inconsistencies among the courts,451 the remedy is neverthe-
less, historically, an equitable one and it should be applied as such.
Although the remedy is still termed equitable recoupment, under its
modern construction, there is little equity left.452
451. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 647 (discussing the problem of forum shopping
due to the inconsistencies in this area).
452. This sentiment has been echoed in Legatzke, supra note 20, at 861, although
Legatzke is speaking only in terms of fairness rather than in terms of pure equity.
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